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It takes a bold thinker to introduce a new term into the thicket of contemporary 
discussions of citizenship, migration and belonging. Tendayi Bloom does this 
with her ambitious concept of noncitzenism. She presents noncitizenship as a 
unifying analytic category that describes a particular relationship between indi-
viduals and States. Her claim is that the relationship deserves attention because 
of its special consequences for the rights of affected individuals, irrespective of 
their particular type of noncitizenship. Cogently argued and lucidly written, this 
impressive book is both a valuable addition to the literature on one of the major 
political challenges of our times, and a stimulating provocation for constituencies 
actively engaged in contesting the many injustices it describes.
Jacqueline Bhabha, Harvard University, USA
By documenting critical social movements this book illustrates how the rights of 
noncitizens are being constituted as a site of political struggle. It is a brilliant 
book that restores political agency to noncitizens in (liberal) theory – something 
that states resist in (illiberal) practices.
Engin Isin, Queen Mary University of London, UK
This book is a timely challenge to ‘methodological citizenism’ – the assumption 
that all political thinking has to be structured around citizenship. Against this, it 
poses the idea of noncitizenship, rather than non-citizenship. Drawing on a wide 
range of resources, it points the way forward, offering a vision of what liberal 
theory and practice could look like if they were to break out of the state-citizen 
relationship. And it stands as an urgent warning that, if they are to remain rel-
evant to the project of social justice, then they must embrace the category of the 
noncitizen as an essential part of the liberal framework. It is essential reading for 
anybody concerned with the contradictions of national membership and global 
justice.
Phillip Cole, University of the West of England, UK.

Noncitizenism
Noncitizens have always been present in liberal political philosophy. Often hard 
to situate within traditional frameworks that prioritise citizenship, noncitizens 
can appear voiceless and rightsless, which has implications for efforts towards 
global justice and justice in migration. This book proposes an alternative.
 Noncitizenism identifies an analytical category of noncitizenship. While main-
taining the importance of citizenship, noncitizenship is another form of special 
individual- State relationship. It operates far from a State, at its borders, and 
within its territory, providing a tool for examining the continuity between sites 
of engagement and the literatures, questions and conclusions relating to them. 
The book argues that an accurate liberal theoretical framework, and one which 
can address contemporary challenges, must acknowledge the political relation-
ship of noncitizenship between individuals and States.
 This book is for students and scholars of political philosophy and for those 
interested in noncitizenship and how it can inform the response of liberal theory, 
citizenship, global justice, migration studies, political theory and policy work.
Tendayi Bloom is Lecturer in Politics and International Studies at The Open 
University, UK.
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1 Introduction
It is no longer possible, if it ever was, to ignore noncitizenship. Liberal democratic 
analyses till now have largely been citizenist. That is, they have focused on citizens, 
or people insofar as they relate to States as citizens. Efforts to address problems of 
global justice, including with regard to migration, have mostly focused on expand-
ing citizenship’s scope. This fails to account for the reality of another sort of special 
relationship, that of ‘noncitizenship’. This book argues for the recognition of 
non citizenship as an analytical category as fundamental to the liberal State as cit-
izenship. The two are not mutually exclusive, and individuals may well relate with 
a particular State both as citizens and as noncitizens.
 When noncitizenship is not dormant, but ‘activated’, this book presents how 
there arises a specific State obligation not to impair, and sometimes to facilitate, 
individuals’ capabilities. This includes their dynamic capabilities to affect their own 
circumstances and the conditions for justice. The form of this obligation depends 
upon context. From afar, this may relate primarily to obligations to refrain from 
internal and foreign policies with deleterious effects far away. A State’s activities 
should not impair the capabilities of those who relate to it as noncitizens, including 
from a distance. When noncitizens are in transit, noncitizenism challenges strong 
restrictions on movement and the impediments to capability to which these give 
rise. Sometimes it may even require actively facilitating a person to move. Within a 
State, it relates directly to the production of conditions which enable noncitizens to 
flourish.
 These various instantiations of noncitizenship are not distinct, but rather flow 
into each other. Crucial to understanding the implications of noncitizenism is the 
role of noncitizens themselves in helping to construct their world, through what will 
be defined in this book as ‘dynamic capabilities’. The purpose in this book is to 
examine noncitizenism and the obligations to which activated noncitizenship gives 
rise. This will require both the introduction of new terms and the re- examination of 
existing ones, which will be picked up and explored throughout the book.
Introducing noncitizens
People relate to a State as noncitizens for different reasons and to different 
extents, from those who have never visited the State in question, to those who 
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have always lived there or are even its formal citizens. There are those indi-
viduals who have moved into a State’s territory, such as: permanent residents, 
short- term migrant workers, diplomats, tourists and other visitors, longer- term 
migrants, asylum seekers, those with refugee status, and other displaced persons. 
Such people might also be en route to that State or at its borders. There are those 
who lack citizenship where they live, though never having moved. This includes 
stateless persons, and minorities within a State whose status is disputed or unde-
termined. It includes formal citizens who suffer discrimination and exclusion, or 
who contest the State, and so are unable to make full use of their citizenships. 
Also included are people who relate to States from afar: the colonised, the con-
quered, and those with more subtle connections, resulting from global and multi-
lateral systems, or global phenomena like climate change, for example. While 
these can often be addressed as distinct contexts with special challenges, under-
standing them in terms of what they have in common – a noncitizen relationship 
with the State(s) concerned – can help to locate the phenomena as part of a much 
larger and interconnected challenge.
 In liberal political thinking, the concern addressed in this book is commonly 
considered in one of two ways. On the one hand, there is the work of global 
justice theorists and cosmopolitans who present an expanded liberal theory that, 
broadly speaking, uses thinking that is usually done on a State level and applies 
it on the global level.1 On the other hand, there is work specifically directed 
towards migration, either focusing on the rights of migrants, or on who has 
access to citizenship or other statuses (including ‘denizenship’). Some do both.2 
The notion of unhyphenated noncitizenship can bring these discourses together 
by providing a unifying analytical category and mode of analysis. Whereas 
hyphenated ‘non- citizenship’ includes an assumption of lack, a relationship 
derivative from citizenship, unhyphenated noncitizenship here refers to an 
individual- State relationship in its own right.
 ‘Methodological citizenism’ here refers to the assumption that thinking about 
politics and individual- State relationships must be structured around citizenship. 
This book interrogates methodological citizenism, suggesting how it may have 
come about. What I call ‘noncitizenism’ is, then, one response to this. It advoc-
ates recognition of the reality of liberal noncitizenship as a way in which to 
understand the circumstances of those individuals (including formal citizens) 
who are experiencing some form of (non- consensual, vulnerable and challeng-
ing) noncitizen relationship with a State.
1 Many examples are examined in this book, but some key texts include: Charles Beitz (1979) Polit-
ical Theory and International Relations, Harvard University Press; Thomas Pogge (2008) World 
Poverty and Human Rights, 2nd Edition, Polity Press.
2 For example, and in different ways: Seyla Benhabib (2004) The Rights of Others: Aliens, Resi-
dents, and Citizens, Oxford University Press; Linda Bosniak (2006) The Citizen and the Alien: 
Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership, Princeton University Press; Joseph Carens (2013) The 
Ethics of Immigration, Oxford University Press; Saskia Sassen (2000) Guests and Aliens, New 
Press.
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 This book sits within a liberal context. It uses Seyla Benhabib’s form of 
immanent critique3 to examine how liberalism can be truer to its own foundations, 
and more internally just. The focus is on liberal democracy and States built upon 
these principles, as well as the language that has been used within this framework 
to justify global rules. Other theoretical systems are not addressed. This includes 
those with increasing influence in global governance. Though such an analysis 
would be worthwhile, there is not scope to include it here. This is a book situated 
within the liberal discourse, critical of it, and responding to it.
 As it is understood here, unhyphenated noncitizenship, like citizenship, is not a 
characteristic that is essential to any individual, but rather emerges as an individual-
 State relationship within liberal democratic State construction. Noncitizenship is 
not a problem per se for a liberal State. Far from it. Noncitizenship is essential to a 
liberal political position. However, when it is neglected, constructed as (hyphen-
ated) non- citizenship, or inappropriately activated, then it challenges the liberal 
democratic State structure and those State(s) built upon liberal democratic prin-
ciples. Noncitizenism does not undermine solidarity movements responding to one 
or another mode of discrimination (gender, class, race, sexuality, age, nationality, 
for example). Instead, it brings them together as parts of a much broader relation-
ship of noncitizenship.
 Noncitizenism engages specifically with that sphere of political reality that ref-
erences the State directly. It argues that just as the theoretical and real- world cre-
ation of a liberal State system produces the citizen- State relationship, the 
noncitizen- state relationship is also produced. For the most part, this relationship 
may be dormant, but this book explores how noncitizenship is activated, impacting 
on the capabilities of affected individuals, and what this means in terms of the 
obligations of the States concerned. In this book, then, I start with the noncitizen.4
More than a theoretical problem
Reframing the parameters of debate is urgent. While monetary wealth is not all 
there is to well- being, it is indicative – and particularly at its extremes. At the 
time of writing, an estimated 10.3 per cent of the world’s population is living on 
less than US$1.90 per day.5 Wealth is concentrated in a small number of States. 
Of the 20 States with the highest by per capita GDP in 2015, most can be loosely 
3 Seyla Benhabib (1986) Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory, 
Columbia university Press.
4 There are other works that have started in this way, notably Heather Johnson (2014) Borders, 
Asylum and Global Non-Citizenship: The Other Side of the Fence, Cambridge University Press. 
However, her use of the hyphenated ‘non-citizenship’ is different from my understanding of 
 unhyphenated ‘non citizenship’. Another work that starts in this way is Katherine Tonkiss and 
Tendayi Bloom (2015) ‘Theorising Noncitizenship: Concepts, Debates and Challenges’, 
pp. 837–852 in Citizenship Studies 19(8), which opened a volume in which alternative approaches 
to the noncitizenship and non-citizenship were elaborated.
5 The World Bank (2016) Taking on Poverty: Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016, International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, pp. 5, 6.
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defined as being constructed on liberal democratic principles.6 Meanwhile, of the 
20 States with the lowest per capita GDP, all but two has been a colony or a 
 ‘protectorate’ of one or more of those States that are now wealthy and ostensibly 
liberal democratic.7 Their former colonisers are all now in the top 40 States by per 
capita GDP.8 The history of the world’s States is closely interconnected and so is 
the reality of the individuals living in and moving between them today. Part of 
understanding this will need an examination of how today’s liberalism came about 
and what this implies today. This will be the focus of Chapter 3.
 Globally, inequality is growing. In 2016, eight men owned the same amount 
as the poorest half of the world’s population.9 Between 1988 and 2011, the 
incomes of the poorest 10 per cent increased by less than US$3 a year, while the 
income of the richest 1 per cent increased by 182 times as much.10 Even amongst 
formal citizens within those States built upon liberal democratic principles, 
inequality, poverty and violence can make it difficult to enact their citizenship 
fully or at all. Such persons may well flourish despite, rather than because of, the 
State. That something is amiss can also be seen in the number of people migrat-
ing involuntarily. Reportedly, forced displacement and exclusion today has 
reached a level not seen since the Second World War.11 At the time of writing, 
UNHCR estimates that 65.3 million people have been forcibly displaced glo-
bally. The Second World War is estimated to have displaced around 40–60 
million people, the Partition of India a further 14 million. Many of those indi-
viduals are unable to participate as citizens within the system of States.
 Saskia Sassen characterises these phenomena within a more general phenom-
enon of ‘expulsion’, so that individuals (as well as institutions) are being sys-
tematically expelled from core economic orders.12 In turn, her expulsion can be 
seen within a much longer- running and wider noncitizen exclusion. In theory, 
the human rights of all persons are legally protected, both internationally and 
 6 From highest to lowest: Luxembourg, Switzerland, Macao SAR China, Norway, Qatar, Ireland, 
Australia, USA, Singapore, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Netherlands, UK, Austria, Canada, Hong 
Kong SAR China, Finland, Germany, United Arab Emirates. From The World Bank (2017) 
World Development Indicators, updated 1 February 2017, data for 2015.
 7 The exception is Ethiopia, which was occupied by Italy, but not colonised. Liberia’s colonial 
history is also more complicated.
 8 From lowest to highest: Burundi, Central African Republic, Niger, Malawi, Madagascar, Liberia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, The Gambia, Mozambique, Guinea, Somalia, Togo, Guinea- 
Bissau, Burkina Faso, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Uganda, Comoros. Those 
colonisers not already listed in the note above include Belgium at 21, France at 23, Italy at 27 
and Portugal at 37.
 9 Oxfam calculations using wealth of richest individuals from Forbes Billionaires listing and 
wealth of the bottom 50 per cent from Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook 2016, cited in 
Oxfam Briefing Paper January 2017.
10 D. Hardoon, S. Ayele and R. Fuentes-Nieva (2016) ‘An Economics of the 1%’, Oxfam.
11 UNHCR (2016) Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, UNHCR.
12 Saskia Sassen (2014) Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in Global Economy, Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
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within liberal States.13 In reality, though, some individuals are excluded from 
human rights frameworks, often because a duty- holder is not adequately desig-
nated. The noncitizen claims examined in this book are not general. They are 
special obligations, generated from the special relationship of noncitizenship. As 
such, the obligations are assigned, even if sometimes they are shared between 
States. In order to ensure everyone’s rights are secured, this book will address 
the logics of expulsion directly – and the logics of both hyphenated non- 
citizenship and unhyphenated noncitizenship. People do not only relate to States 
from within their borders, and an individual may relate with a particular State in 
several ways. Noncitizenship provides a mechanism by which to examine the 
continuity between various sites of engagement.
 Today, then, those in noncitizen relationships with powerful States, wherever 
they live, may have to fight to be taken into account, even conceptually.14 This 
arises at the level of theory and it will need to be addressed at this level. At the time 
of writing, the discourse of fear is increasingly common in popular and policy 
debate in States built upon liberal democratic norms, and security concerns are 
used to justify increasing exclusions and expulsions.15 This book does not rule out 
exclusions but argues that discrimination and expulsion cannot be the default. 
 Noncitizens are not anathema to a liberal political framework (on both State and 
global levels), but are fundamental to it. Noncitizens are in a special relationship 
with States and have claims upon them as a result. Noncitizens and their claims 
become challenging when their reality goes unacknowledged or is inappropriately 
activated. This book, then, identifies a theoretical problem with significant real- 
world implications that urgently need to be addressed.
 Rather than start from and then qualify an ideal theory, this book begins from 
the world as it is now and draws attention to a form of relationship that really 
exists, albeit ignored. On the one hand, it builds upon the theoretical approach of 
Phillip Cole, who warns that liberal theory as we know it is necessarily an 
‘insider theory’, constructed by and for those on the inside of it, who are then 
blinded to realities outside a framework that is serving them well.16 On the other 
hand, it develops a historical approach, examining deeply problematic elements 
of the roots of contemporary liberal political philosophy and considering how to 
move away from them. This includes the role of key liberal theorists in the 
13 Benhabib 2004 ibid.; David Weissbrodt (2008) the Human Rights of Non-citizens, Oxford Uni-
versity Press. See also, for example, Laura van Waas and Amal de Chickera (2017) ‘Unpacking 
Statelessness’, in Tendayi Bloom, Katherine Tonkiss and Phillip Cole (eds) (2017) Understand-
ing Statelessness, Routledge.
14 This problem for liberalism was already famously pointed out by Hannah Arendt.
15 Valeria Bello (2017) International Migration and International Security: Why Prejudice Is a 
Global Security Threat, Routledge.
16 Phillip Cole (2017) ‘Insider Theory and the Construction of Statelessness’ in Tendayi Bloom, Kath-
erine Tonkiss and Phillip Cole (eds) (2017) Understanding Statelessness, Routledge. An important 
aspect of this is who is able to be heard within the dominant discourses; see for example, Anke 
Graness (2015) ‘Is the Debate on “Global Justice” a Global One? Some Considerations in View of 
Modern Philosophy in Africa’, pp. 126–140 in Journal of Global Ethics 11(1).
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realities and the theories of colonisation and slavery, for example. Examining 
these roots is crucial to understanding and addressing the blind spots in liberal-
ism today, and will be the focus of Chapter 3.
 As with citizenship, an individual might well be pretty much unaware of her/is 
noncitizen relationship with a State. As will be shown in Chapter 8, this relationship 
can be ‘activated’ when a person is made to feel particularly vulnerable – and this 
vulnerability is challenging both to the individual and to the State. Activated noncit-
izenship can challenge the legitimacy of a State built upon liberal democratic prin-
ciples. It can also be practically challenging to the State’s functioning. It can even 
represent an existential challenge to a liberal State. The way this plays out is best 
seen at the extremities. From one side, there are irregular migrants and stateless 
persons as presented in Chapter 4. This includes people who are physically present 
within a State that denies a relationship with them and obligations towards them. 
Coming from the other direction, situations of colonisation give rise to unwanted 
and ambivalent citizenship, and poverty and discrimination mean that formal cit-
izenship can be unfulfilled. The individuals involved across these situations are not 
only not acting as citizens. They can be seen to be in positive relationships with 
States. ‘Noncitizenship’ gives us a way in which to examine the form of that rela-
tionship, not as an absence, but as an individual- State relationship in its own right.
 Noncitizens, then, have claims upon States, qua noncitizens. The obligations 
generated by activated noncitizenship can be understood through the tool of 
‘dynamic capabilities’. The framework of ‘dynamic capabilities’ uses the core 
notion of capabilities developed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, that 
what is important is what a person can do and be.17 The notion of ‘capabilities’ is 
co- opted in this book in order to identify the sorts of claims arising from 
noncitizen- vulnerability. It will not be possible to delineate a universal list of 
obligations or claims for all people in all contexts for all time. Instead, a dynamic 
approach can take into account the changing nature of individuals’ capabilities 
and associated needs, the States and societies that may or may not facilitate 
them, and crucially, the role of the actors involved in framing the context within 
which this takes place. But the idea of ‘dynamic capabilities’ goes further than 
this. It also includes an examination of how the individual and the State can be 
part of crafting the context within which capabilities can be realised.
Locating noncitizenship within liberalism
Given liberalism is such a broad church (and note, ‘liberal’ here refers to the 
philosophical tradition rather than colloquial or party- political uses of the term), 
it is worth sketching briefly what it means here. Individualism, equality, and 
liberty are core elements of liberalism. I include also solidarity which, though 
17 Note, for example, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (1993) The Quality of Life, Oxford Uni-
versity Press; Martha Nussbaum (2003) ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and 
Social Justice’, pp. 33–59 in Feminist Economics 9; Amartya Sen (2005) ‘Human Rights and 
Capabilities’, pp. 151–166 in Journal of Human Development 6(2).
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sometimes ignored by liberal theorists, is present in liberal State discourses and 
beyond – and, in reality, it is important to how people construct their lives. 
According to liberalism, individual humans are the ultimate units of concern. 
That is, if you divide up a person you do not get smaller political units. This is 
not to discount important goods that emerge only amongst groups of individuals 
living together, such as a feeling of shared pride, or the value in interactions 
within special relationships of families or communities. But these are valued 
insofar as they are good for individual humans. Another important aspect is uni-
versalism – that this approach and its corollaries apply for all people for all time. 
These elements are often seen as being in tension, but they need not be.
 A core challenge within the liberal project is to address what should be done 
both when freedom for some implies oppression and constraint for others, and when 
freedom comes into conflict with equality. This is particularly relevant here since 
the freedoms associated with citizenship have often relied upon the loss of freedoms 
associated with unacknowledged noncitizenship – not least, for those colonial sub-
jects constructed at modern liberalism’s founding. The tension between freedom 
and equality has long been seen as a key problem in liberal thought even without 
considering noncitizenship. This is because in its simplistic form, enforcing material 
equality seems to require a breach of liberty, and enforcing liberty in its simplest 
form will most likely lead to material and other inequality.18 A common response to 
this is to see liberty as necessarily intertwined with equality, such that there is an 
equal right of all persons to be free.19 For this to make sense, ‘equality’ must be 
seen beyond the notion of ‘sameness’. Rather, equality is about removing hierar-
chy.20 The pre- political scope of a liberal theory must include everyone.
 While much work has been done reconciling liberty and equality, attempts to 
balance liberty and solidarity have often been neglected.21 Often sidelined in 
mainstream liberal discourses, solidarity is more commonly taken up instead by 
nationalisms and communitarianisms on the one hand and socialisms on the 
other.22 Yet, a sometimes- implicit commitment to solidarity obscures implicit 
commitments of the theorists themselves, as well as ignoring a key element of 
human society. In this book, solidarity and togetherness in some form are 
18 This tension has been central to the development of libertarianism, which prioritises liberty over 
equality and argues that freedom will inevitably lead to acceptable inequality. For a classic pre-
sentation, see Robert Nozick (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basic Books.
19 Ronald Dworkin (1991 – first published 1977) Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, 
p. 266; Atracta Ingram (1994) A Political Theory of Rights, Oxford University Press; HLA Hart 
(1955) ‘Are there any Natural Rights?’ pp. 175–191 in Philosophical Review 64. See also, for 
example, John Mackie (1984) ‘Can there be a Right based Moral Theory?’ pp. 168–181 in 
Jeremy Waldron (ed.) (1984) Theories of Rights, Oxford University Press, p. 177.
20 See, for example, Catharine MacKinnon (1987) Feminism Unmodified: Discourses On Life and 
Law, Harvard University Press.
21 Attracta Ingram (1994) A Political Theory of Rights, Oxford University Press, p. 13. Note that 
the word ‘solidarity’ is used, rather than ‘fraternity’, which is traditionally located within the tri-
umvirate. This is to avoid the inherent sexism and paternalism in the terminology of fraternity.
22 Yael Tamir (1995) Liberal Nationalism, Princeton University Press; David Miller (1995) On 
Nationality, Clarendon Press; Gerry Cohen (2009) Why Not Socialism? Princeton University Press.
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recognised as being important to individuals’ capabilities, but this is dynamic 
and, as such, need not lead to communitarianism or nationalism, for example.
 Finally, this book adopts a background assumption of ‘modest cosmopolitan-
ism’. Liberalism’s core commitments to equality, liberty, and solidarity, alongside 
universalism and individualism, neither entail nor are entailed by ‘cosmopolitan-
ism’. Instead, cosmopolitanism is a matter of scope. For example, some key liberal 
theorists narrow the scope of the equality, liberty, solidarity, even of the uni-
versalism, so that they function only within a limited group. For others, this repres-
ents a major problem,23 while still others see it as trivial.24 Structural 
cosmopolitanism is the position that it is necessary to promote a world State.25 
Empirical cosmopolitanism, meanwhile, argues that the world in fact is (or could 
be) run as a world State.26 This book adopts a moral cosmopolitan stance. That is, it 
holds that if a liberal metric is to be adopted, then absolutely all people must be 
included within it, while recognising that people may relate to the liberal 
framework(s) in different ways including through noncitizenship. Moral cosmopoli-
tanism need not translate to either structural or empirical cosmopolitanism.
 To be useful, any such approach must be empirically accurate about how the 
world is and adopt a realistic picture of how it could be. However arbitrary they 
may be, national States are important to people. Flag- waving at sports matches and 
‘national’ events, mobilisation around national politics, and self- identification with 
national States, all demonstrate that people currently do care about national States, 
and often associate themselves with them emotionally, even fighting for them when 
they are threatened or still to form. The State (and the nation- State, when it is so 
defined) is privileged by the power it has to reinforce commitment. Acknowledging 
the importance of nations and States to people must come alongside a critical re- 
examination of nations’ apparent necessity, their connection with States,27 and the 
implications of this for noncitizenship.
 The world just is currently divided into States. Resources, political representa-
tion, social services, just are currently largely organised along State lines no matter 
how arbitrarily or unjustly they arose. This neither means that they should be 
 organised this way, nor that this way of the world should not be contested, but it 
23 Phillip Cole (2000) Philosophies of Exclusion, Edinburgh University Press, at p. 154; Lea Ypi 
(2008) ‘Justice in Migration: A Closed Borders Utopia?’ pp. 391–418 in Journal of Political 
Philosophy 16(4).
24 John Rawls (1999) The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press.
25 Luis Cabrera (2010) The Practice of Global Citizenship, Cambridge University Press. This could 
also be a way to understand Seyla Benhabib’s approach, as presented in Seyla Benhabib (2004) 
The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens, Cambridge University Press, though in a 
later book she shows how the seeds of this are perhaps already there; see Seyla Benhabib (2011) 
Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times, Polity.
26 Andreas Bummel (2010) The Composition of a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations, 
Committee for a Democratic U.N.
27 Benedict Anderson (2006) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism New Edition, Verso; Katherine Tonkiss (2013) Migration and Identity in a Post-
National World, Palgrave Macmillan.
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means that this is how things are at present. Based on this fact about the world, any 
attempt to develop a just society will need to make use of State and interstate insti-
tutions, or else disband them and start from whatever results. It is within the context 
of the system of States that international organisations like the UN have been 
created. They ostensibly try to mitigate the ill- effects of having States, to control 
their power and to ameliorate human life globally. Such organisations function 
because of an underlying respect for the institution of the State. Irrespective of 
whether States (including those self- defining as nation- States) are ideally beneficial 
or necessarily existent, and irrespective of what one feels about the existing inter-
national organisations, theory must take them into account. This book, then, adopts 
a moral cosmopolitan account within the empirical context of a society- of-States. 
This forms an important part of the backdrop here.
 There are many ways to understand what is meant by a ‘State’ and indeed one 
may draw upon different aspects of States at different times. This book mainly 
refers to the State qua institutional structure (though this is in fact often tightly tied 
to territorial jurisdiction and citizen- membership, for example). The analysis here 
focuses on the institutional structure in order to examine directly the nature of the 
political relationships of individuals with systems of institutional power and organ-
isation. This is not the only, or even the most, valid approach, but it is the one taken 
here. There are places in this book where person- to-person or intra- group relation-
ships play a more central role, or where the relationships between noncitizens and 
citizens, or the noncitizenry and the citizenry, are considered. In such cases this is 
made explicit. The common convention of using the upper case ‘State’ is adopted 
throughout. This book also adopts the wording ‘s/he’ and ‘her/im’ for example. 
This is to avoid assuming binarity, while retaining the plural use of ‘they’ and 
‘them’ which can sometimes be made difficult to express when these latter are 
adopted to refer to singular individuals. Her/im is used rather than her/him to avoid 
binarity. Some read this phonetically, others pronounce it ‘ze’ and ‘zer’. The book 
draws upon a range of text- based and other sources. This includes the work of 
visual artists and photographers. The images that have been selected either chal-
lenge or illustrate what is being discussed in the text and are used as sources along-
side those text- based sources which are cited or discussed.
 This book is intended to speak specifically to the considerations of States and 
multi- State institutions arising out of liberal frameworks. This is not because it 
would not be a useful exercise to address other frameworks, but because that is 
something for another book and another project. Liberal democratic thinking has 
been important globally in the development of the contemporary assumption of 
citizenship. As such, addressing a liberal democratic audience addresses more 
than the local jurisdictional concerns in ostensibly liberal democratic States and 
groupings. It also speaks to those international institutions for which these ways 
of talking have traction. This book argues for the recognition of noncitizenship 
as a fundamental liberal concept, coexistent and intertwined with citizenship, 
and suggests a basis for identifying the obligations that arise as a result. This is 
what I refer to as noncitizenism.
2 Noncitizenism
‘Noncitizenism’ refers to the move away from what we can call ‘methodological 
citizenism’, and towards a theory that recognises the noncitizen relationship. 
For the most part the story told in liberal political theory is the story of citizens, 
or people insofar as they relate as citizens. Noncitizens have always been there 
in the background. This is because the creative process that gives us the State 
and citizenship also produces noncitizenship. Today, some noncitizens are on 
the territory of the States with which they have noncitizen relationships, while 
others are found at their borders or in lands far away. In order to examine the 
nature of the relationships such individuals have with those States, we need to 
look for their commonalities. Left unacknowledged, noncitizenship today can 
make individuals destitute,1 detained,2 and even left to die3 with impunity in and 
by States ostensibly built on liberal democratic principles. The failure to 
acknowledge noncitizenship makes people seem rightsless,4 excludable, and 
1 Prevented from working and unable to claim State welfare, refused asylum seekers in the UK may 
be left destitute; see Tendayi Bloom (2015) ‘London’s role in the policy of destitution of asylum 
seekers: The “Ghosts” in the British migration infrastructure’, in Anne Kershen (ed) (2015) 
London The Promised Land Revisited, Ashgate.
2 Again, this can be seen most easily in the migratory context. In the US, women and children from 
Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala who have been apprehended at the US-Mexico border are 
put immediately into, and often kept indefinitely in, administrative detention. Given the acknow-
ledgement that these persons have been, for the most part, fleeing violence and cannot be deported, 
this detention often lacks a defined end point. For example, Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (2015) ‘Human Rights Situation of Refugees and Migrant Families and Unac-
companied Children in the United States of America’, Organisation of American States OAS/
Ser.L/V/II.155 16 24 July 2015.
3 This phrasing comes again from the migration context, from that of the ‘Left-to-Die boat’, see for 
example Efthymios Papastavridis (2013) ‘The “Left-to-Die Boat” incident of March 2011: Ques-
tions of International Responsibility Arising From the Failures to Save Refugees at Sea’, Refugee 
Law Initiative Working paper No. 10, School of Advanced Study, London. See also Tara Brian 
and Frank Laczko (eds) (2014) Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost During Migration, IOM.
4 Some people’s recognised relationships of citizenship are undone in order to make them deporta-
ble. The most extreme example of this in recent years has been the mass denationalisation of 
Dominican Republic citizens identified as being of Haitian descent, making thousands of those 
who used to have formal citizenship stateless. See for example, Jillian Blake (2017) ‘Race-based 
Statelessness in the Dominican Republic’, pp. 102–116 in Tendayi Bloom, Katherine Tonkiss and 
Phillip Cole (eds) (2017) Understanding Statelessness, Routledge.
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worse.5 Liberal theory, though various in interpretation, is based upon a commit-
ment to the dignity of the individual and the notion that justice requires equality 
of liberty and respect (as well as solidarity). Yet, so long as a person needs cit-
izenship, or quasi- citizenship (explained below), in order to be recognised, it 
looks like liberal theory is doomed to the inconsistency of excluding some 
‘featherless bipeds’ from its scope.6 This book does not deny the special rela-
tionship of citizenship. It draws attention to another special relationship, that of 
noncitizenship, which has been ignored for too long.
What noncitizenism is and what it is not
Central to the position in this book is that the construction of States upon liberal 
democratic principles gives rise to two relationships, neither more basic than the 
other. It is impossible to create a liberal State in a world of States without also cre-
ating citizenship and it is just as impossible to do so without creating noncitizen-
ship. That is, in coming into being, the liberal State makes some people dependent 
upon it as citizens, and some dependent in what we can call a ‘noncitizen’ manner. 
In the way the world currently functions, this often puts great burdens upon such 
individuals. Yet, both citizenship and noncitizenship are foundational – they are 
both needed for the creation of the liberal State. The noncitizen- vulnerability and 
challenge are harder to mitigate qua noncitizenship, partially because we have so 
little experience of thinking about what an appropriate conception of noncitizen-
ship would look like.
 While much theoretical work examines the relationships between citizens and 
States, this book addresses the noncitizen- State relationship directly. It recognises 
noncitizenship as an often active and dynamic relationship between an individual 
and a State, wherever on the planet s/he is. In a globally connected world a person 
can have a noncitizen relationship both from afar and from within the State in ques-
tion, and this relationship may well intertwine with aspects of citizenship. Nonciti-
zenship can be dormant, but it can also be ‘activated’ in various ways. Activated 
noncitizenship is easiest to trace when a person has migrated. As such, migration- 
activated noncitizenship features heavily in this book.
 When a person is in a noncitizen relationship with the State in whose territory 
s/he is currently located, this can be referred to as ‘noncitizenship in situ’. Some 
noncitizens in situ have quasi- citizen relationships, symbolised for example by 
migrant worker or student visas, or by internationally protected statuses as in the 
case of refugees or stateless persons.7 Insofar as these statuses themselves are 
5 The recent release of the Nauru Papers by UK newspaper The Guardian has shown the extent of 
the maltreatments considered acceptable towards migrants Australia has relocated to its offshore 
detention centre on the island.
6 This phrase is attributed to Plato. It derives from (but does not appear in) The Statesman, in which 
Socrates dialogues with a ‘stranger’ who distinguishes between bipeds and quadrupeds and then 
identifies humans as being those bipeds that are not birds, that is, which do not have feathers. Julia 
Annas and Robin Waterfield (eds) (1995) Plato: The Statesman, Cambridge University Press.
7 Some of those experiencing noncitizen vulnerability may even officially be citizens of their coun-
tries of noncitizenship. This is introduced below.
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relevant, they are in a continuum with (but not quite reaching) citizenship. These 
are not noncitizen statuses, though such individuals may well also be experi-
encing activated noncitizenship. Some individuals experiencing noncitizenship 
in a State may in fact also be formal citizens of that State. Still other noncitizens 
may lack any such recognised citizen or quasi- citizen relationship.
 Noncitizenship is also essential to liberal political thought and reality. Engin 
Isin writes: ‘[c]itizenship and otherness are then really not two different con-
ditions, but two aspects of the ontological condition that makes politics 
possible.’8 For Isin, it is necessary to revisit the meaning of contemporary cit-
izenship. He sees citizenship and otherness as ‘conditions of politics’. The 
approach here is similar, but differs in an important way. It advocates nonciti-
zenship as an analytic category in its own right within liberal theory and politics. 
That is, noncitizenship and citizenship are both essential to the creation of the 
State, and represent two modes of relating to it. This does not interfere with 
Isin’s notions of citizenship that go beyond State and other formal institutions. 
Yet, with regard to the State, some persons might relate overridingly as citizens 
or as noncitizens, while for others the relationship will be more mixed. This 
book develops the concept of liberal unhyphenated noncitizenship. It argues that 
this noncitizenship needs to be acknowledged and begins to examine its implica-
tions, including in terms of the resultant State- noncitizen obligations.
Now I turn to what this book is not
First, this book does not argue directly for a change in law. Instead, it advocates 
a refocusing of theoretical and political discourse. It seeks to develop a revised 
understanding of existing individual- State relationships and of the resulting 
obligations. The principal aim is to change the terms of debate – and for a theor-
etical, cultural and political recognition of noncitizenship and the obligations to 
which it gives rise.9 In fact, most of the obligations attributed to States in relation 
to noncitizens in the following chapters already exist under Human Rights 
frameworks. Legally, States already have these duties. They remain unfulfilled 
for cultural and political, amongst other, reasons. As such, it is principally this 
theoretical, cultural and political assumption that is addressed here rather than 
starting with law or policy. Twentieth- century liberal thinking arose partly as 
one alternative to fascisms and exclusionary narratives.10 The proposal here is to 
continue in this tradition, but to be aware of, and to challenge, liberalism’s 
 8 Engin Isin (2002) Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship, University of Minnesota Press, at 
p. x.
 9 Innocent Asouzu argues that ‘the ultimate aim of any authentic philosophising subject subsists […] 
in changing ideas such that through the possession of new and better ideas, human beings can affect 
changes in the world through their actions.’ Innocent I. Asouzu (2004) The Method and Principles 
of Contemporary Reflection in and Beyond African Philosophy, University of Press, p. 6.
10 Jonathan Glover (2012) Humanity: A Moral History of the 20th Century, 2nd Edition, Yale Uni-
versity Press.
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longer history in the construction of, and legitimisation of, colonialism and 
enslavement – and the impacts of this upon how the world is today, and how lib-
eralism functions within it. The intention is to use this particularly to respond to 
the difficulties raised by theorists of global justice and of migrant rights.
 Second, the arguments in this book do not deny the vast inequalities within 
the relationship of citizenship, and amongst citizenships.11 Some citizens of 
States ostensibly built upon liberal democratic principles may be unable to make 
full use of their citizenships, because of discrimination on the grounds of ethni-
city, gender, social class, sexuality, physical ability, age, former migration, place 
of residence, and economic status, for example. Formal citizens may also suffer 
noncitizen- vulnerability as a result.12 Citizenship and noncitizenship are not 
mutually exclusive. Some have argued for a recognition of solidarity across 
 citizenship and hyphenated non-citizenship according to one or another of these 
dimensions of discrimination.13 A robust understanding of noncitizenship can 
help to explain how this might work. That is, noncitizenship can occur for mul-
tiple reasons and in multiple dimensions. Whether this happens overtly or 
implicitly, and whether because of race, class, gender, ability, or some other 
factor, or an intersection of factors, this can be interrogated through the lens of 
noncitizenship. The focus in this book is primarily and overwhelmingly on the 
special nature of the State- noncitizen relationship, and these other elements 
insofar as they relate to the individual- State relationship.
 Third, this book is not an argument, an excuse, or a reason to deprive or to 
deny access to formal citizenship for anyone. In fact, I advocate significantly 
easier access to recognised formal citizenship in many cases, and support aspects 
of the jus nexi of Ayelet Shachar, the constitutional patriotism of Katherine 
Tonkiss, the jus domicile of Dora Kostakopoulou, and the stakeholdership of 
Rainer Bauböck.14 The noncitizen relationship presented in this book does not 
offer an alternative to citizenship, or a reason to see those who should be 
so- recognised as less than full citizens (as I show in more detail below, I reject 
the notion of denizenship and the idea of binarity between citizenship and 
11 For example, Stephen Castles (2005) ‘Hierarchical Citizenship in a World of Nation-States’, 
pp. 689–692 in Political Sciences and Politics. See also the Global Passport Power Rank www.
passportindex.org/byRank.php. Note the correlation of this, for example, with the HDI.
12 For example, see analysis in Chris Hayes (2017) A Colony in a Nation, Norton.
13 For example, see Shanthi Robertson (2015) ‘Contractualization, depoliticization and the limits of 
solidarity: noncitizens in contemporary Australia’, pp. 936–950 in Citizenship Studies 19(8) ADD.
14 Ayelet Shachar (2009) The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality, Harvard Uni-
versity Press; Ayelet Shachar and Ran Hirshl (2007) ‘Citizenship as an Inherited Property’, 
pp. 253–287 in Political Theory 35(3); Katherine Tonkiss (2013) Migration and Identity in a 
Post-National World, Palgrave Macmillan; Dora Kostakopoulou (2008) The Future Governance 
of Citizenship, Cambridge University Press; Rainer Bauböck (2008) ‘Stakeholder Citizenship: 
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?’, Transatlantic Council on Migration Paper, Migration Policy 
Institute, Washington DC. See also Ruth Lister’s examination of evolving understandings of the 
inclusivity of citizenship: Ruth Lister (2007) ‘Inclusive Citizenship: realising the potential’, 
pp. 49–61 in Citizenship Studies 11(1).
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noncitizenship). What this book does offer is a way in which to understand how 
people are in fact relating to States, providing an alternative to the hyphenated 
‘non- citizenship’, as nothing more than a negation, based on the assumption that 
citizenship is the only possible mode of relating to a State.
 While more inclusive admission to full citizenship regimes is an important way 
to address many instances of activated noncitizenship, the problems associated 
with the non- recognition of (unhyphenated) noncitizenship cannot be adequately 
addressed in this way – neither theoretically nor practically. It is also not solved by 
adding yet more quasi- citizen statuses to an already long list. The human rights of 
everyone are, in theory at least, already legally protected, albeit not enforceably so, 
by existing treaties and conventions.15 This book argues for an explicit philosophi-
cal, social and political recognition of the rights of noncitizens qua noncitizens. 
These rights are based on three factors: a person’s humanity, her/is noncitizen- 
vulnerability in relationship to a particular State or States, and the challenge that 
this raises for the relevant State(s) and the State system, including challenging its 
legitimacy. The noncitizenship presented here is a foundational relationship in its 
own right and the demand for its recognition is one of justice.
 Consider the more than 11 million irregular immigrants in the United States, 
for example.16 Irrespective of any citizen- approximating status, and separate 
from arguments for amnesties, I argue that irregular immigrants already have 
legitimate claims upon the US (in this case) for human recognition, and to 
enable them to meet their basic needs and develop their capabilities. The argu-
ment here is that these claims are not only humanitarian or ethical. They are 
also political and institutional, based on the individuals’ noncitizen relation-
ships to the US.
 One could argue that the US never consented to their physical presence, 
indeed tried to block it, but this does not detract from the noncitizenship- based 
claims those individuals have against the US.17 These claims do not only derive 
from their presence, but also from the theoretical realities of State- creation and 
the policy realities of exclusion. This relationship may even be more deeply felt 
and so further ‘activated’ because of the decapacitation, exclusions and coercion 
of irregular immigrants, generating particular obligations towards them.18 This 
15 David Weissbrodt (2008) The Human Rights of Non-Citizens, Oxford University Press. See also 
OHCHR (2006) The Rights of Non-citizens, United Nations.
16 The most recent official figure comes form a 2012 report for the US Department of Homeland 
Security, estimating 11,510,000 persons; Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina and Bryan Baker (2012) 
‘Estimates off the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011’, 
Department of Homeland Security, p. 4. Irregular migration is examined in more detail in Chapter 3.
17 Conversely, the argument might be made that the US has consented through the acceptance of 
these persons’ labour. Prima facie this was not acceptance by the State but by employers, though 
this can be contested, (e.g. see Christian Joppke (1998) ‘Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted 
Immigration’, pp. 266–293 in World Politics 50(2)). Whichever way, if there is consent, it only 
strengthens the argument here.
18 For example, see Jose Antonio Vargas (2011) ‘My Life as an Undocumented Immigrant’, The 
New York Times Magazine.
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position may at first seem to be at odds with standard liberal frameworks that do 
not acknowledge noncitizenship. But once noncitizenship is recognised as funda-
mental to those frameworks and noncitizen- vulnerability addressed, the chal-
lenge irregular migrants pose becomes less threatening.
 The latent citizen and/or noncitizen- vulnerability and challenge that indi-
viduals experience may well be little noticed. For the most part, this is a good 
thing. According to most liberal interpretations, it means that, with regard to 
that person, the State is making good use of the concentration of power and 
regulation of resources entrusted to it, while also mitigating appropriately for 
individuals’ surrender of power. However, a system that serves some indi-
viduals well may be experienced very differently by others. This means that in 
order to develop a theoretical framework it is necessary to seek out noncitizen 
activation and its implications for individuals, including those who are far 
from the State in question. Noncitizenship, like citizenship, is for the most part 
a dormant status, ready to be felt when it conflicts with an individual’s aims or 
impairs her/is capabilities. This book shows not so much how the noncitizen 
status is constructed, but how it is activated, and how two important aspects of 
this activation – vulnerability and challenge – can help us to understand the 
relationship of noncitizenship and its associated claims on States built upon 
liberal principles.
 Individuals can be in both citizen and noncitizen relationships simultan-
eously with a particular State. But is it possible for a person to be in neither a 
citizen nor a noncitizen relationship with any State at all? This is theoretically 
possible. However, the world is in fact almost entirely composed of States 
which hold substantial control over their territories (excepting the High Seas, 
for example). It is conceivable that a person could be in no relationship with 
any liberal State – and liberal States are the focus here. However, as has been 
demonstrated by scholars like Charles Beitz, the world today is substantially 
interrelated so that for the most part this is unlikely. Either way, this does not 
make a big difference to the position presented here. It is enough to note that, 
in the world as it is, a person is, for the most part, forced to relate in some way 
to some collection of States, including liberal States. And s/he must in fact 
relate through some combination of citizenship and noncitizenship. Where one 
of these is made invisible or impossible, the other is likely to become predomi-
nant. Where neither can be recognised, this puts the individual in a difficult 
position.
Located liberalism and universalism
In his 2000 book, Philosophies of Exclusion, Phillip Cole not only warns that 
noncitizens are absent from liberal theorising, he also suggests that perhaps they 
can never be included.19 For Cole, liberal political philosophy seems to build an 
19 Phillip Cole (2000) Philosophies of Exclusion, University of Edinburgh Press.
16  Noncitizenism
edifice of universal principles of justice and human rights upon an underlying 
structure that arbitrarily narrows, and must so- narrow, the scope of who can be 
considered eligible to enjoy it. In more recent restatements of what he comes to 
call ‘insider theory’, Cole explains that liberal theory, by its very definition, is an 
insider theory, as it is constructed by its insiders who, perhaps unwittingly, 
define noncitizens out of consideration.20 Women, disabled persons, ethnic, and 
other marginalised groups, Cole observes, can be incorporated as the scope of 
insidership is expanded. But being a noncitizen is not of the same sort as being a 
woman for example. Women can be defined into or out of citizenships as scope 
is either widened or narrowed. With noncitizens, the situation is different. Cole 
argues that noncitizens are excluded by definition. This book presents an altern-
ative way to respond to this problem that Cole identifies. Liberal theory con-
structs the noncitizen – and necessarily so. But this book tries to show a way in 
which to recognise the noncitizen qua noncitizen within contemporary liberal 
political thought.
 A common criticism of liberal thought is that it hides its epistemic location. 
By claiming universalism and a distanced rationality, it can give the appear-
ance of being impartial.21 As Cole identifies, liberal theory, like any theoret-
ical position, is produced by located beings. And those beings speak from a 
particular position within the power structure of the State and the wider polit-
ical systems. If those scholars writing the core texts of liberal theory experi-
ence the world primarily as citizens, and are unfamiliar with the experience of 
activated noncitizenship, then it stands to reason that the theory that arises as a 
result overlooks noncitizenship. This does not mean that citizen theorists 
cannot develop a noncitizenist approach to liberal theory, but it will need 
especial care, and can benefit from input from individuals relating to States in 
a variety of ways. One way in which to begin to avoid these pitfalls is to 
ensure as many and as diverse contributors as possible are involved in all 
stages of the formation of theory. This is borne out by experience with fem-
inism, for example. A sudden flowering of feminist work in liberal political 
theory occurred in the 1970s, at the time when many women were suddenly 
part of the academy.22 And, as I argue in Chapter 10, this also gave rise to an 
enriching of theory more widely.
20 Phillip Cole (2017) ‘Insider Theory and the Construction of Statelessness’, in Tendayi Bloom, 
Katherine Tonkiss and Phillip Cole (eds) (2017) Understanding Statelessness, Routledge; Phillip 
Cole (2015) ‘At the Borders of Political Theory: Carens and the Ethics of Immigration’, Euro-
pean Journal of Political Theory.
21 The problem in this can be seen symbolically if we consider the Mercator Map for example. 
 Produced in the sixteenth century, it puts Europe in the centre and makes it proportionally larger 
than other continents. This projection is still commonly used today and in its apparent valueless 
descriptive quality, it can skew perceptions of the world. This is something which other projec-
tions, like the Peters Project, for example, is trying to redress.
22 Charles Mills (2015) ‘Race and Global Justice’, in Barbara Buckinx, Jonathan Trejo-Mathys and 
Timothy Waligore (ed.) (2015) Domination and Global Political Justice: Conceptual, Historical 
and Institutional Perspectives, Routledge.
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 The core canon in liberal political theory and even global justice theory still 
primarily derives from a narrow pool of thinkers,23 located largely in wealthy 
English- speaking universities in rich countries. Charles Mills argues that the 
reason race, for example, has often been absent from liberal theoretical dis-
courses is that:
… group experience and group privilege play a role in influencing concerns 
and interests. We would expect that those who have historically been the 
beneficiaries of racial injustice would tend to have less interest in exploring 
the topic than those who have been its victims.24
He argues that the construction of theory as raceless, for example, by those who 
have not experienced race as a problem, makes it difficult to critique or even to 
see race- based injustices within it. Similarly, and more broadly, assuming that 
all people can be neatly organised according to contemporary citizenships makes 
it difficult to examine the implications of noncitizenship as anything other than 
the lack of, or deviation from, the norm – the norm of citizenship.
 The idea that knowledge is ‘located’ or ‘situated’ is not new, and there is a 
body of work examining how to address this in political and social spheres, as 
well as theory.25 Feminist and intersectional philosophers, for example, argue 
that some social problems are just not visible from a ‘male’ or ‘White’ gaze.26 
And indeed, the insiders of the liberal democratic insider theory have tradition-
ally been White and male – and primarily relating as citizens. When asked to 
describe the world, we describe it as we know it. Theorists can only ever the-
orise what they know to be there – and if the theoretical framework and the insti-
tutions upon which it is based are serving those theorists well, what reason is 
there to suppose that it is missing some people out? As more diverse voices are 
included in the theoretical canon, it becomes possible for all theorists to develop 
richer approaches.
 On a theoretical level, Phillip Cole takes this further to say we have thereby 
constructed a theory that privileges the voices of insiders and makes it imposs-
ible for outsiders’ voices to feed into the theory’s reconstruction.27 And yet, pre-
cisely because of the rational basis of liberalism (centred around the individual, 
the equality of dignity and freedom, aiming at universalism), a self- reflective 
23 See Anke Graness (2015) ‘Is the Debate on “Global Justice” a Global One? Some Considerations 
in View of Modern Philosophy in Africa’, pp. 126–140 in Journal of Global Ethics 11(1).
24 Mills 2015 ibid.
25 For example, see David Walsch’s paper, ‘Reflections on the Nature of Modernity’, on breaking 
away from the ‘tyranny’ of the conventional perspective. See also, for example, Dale Turner’s 
presentation in Dale Turner (2006) This is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous 
Philosophy, University of Toronto Press.
26 The term comes from George Yancy (2008) Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Signifi-
cance of Race, Rowman & Littlefield.
27 Cole 2017 ibid.
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liberal position should be able to take on board criticisms from previously over-
looked perspectives and use new voices to create more accurate and more just 
liberal presentations of the world. Indeed, in doing this, liberalism could also 
provide a means by which to address some contemporary injustices which put 
weighty burdens of the inadequately conceived State and State system on some 
individuals while benefiting others. One aspect of this will be the recognition of 
noncitizenship.
 This locatedness of thinking is made jarringly apparent in Asti Maria’s photo-
graph, ‘Home’, part of the series ‘Transit in Doubt’. It is a fuzzy photograph of a 
rough- sleeper in Hong Kong. At the time when she took the photograph, the 
photographer was herself an Indonesian domestic worker in the city. The inten-
tion behind the series was to enable the viewer to explore the world through the 
eyes of a domestic worker, a perspective that is often hidden. However, in 
Figure 2.1 Home (Asti Maria, Lensational, 2013).
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‘Home’, Maria does more than this. She helps us also to notice what she notices 
but cannot quite see, drawing us into her own efforts and understand a scene that 
may be outside the viewer’s experience on several levels. Maria, from her own 
particular perspective, is raising a question, not about her position in society 
only, but about the society in which she, the viewer of her photograph, and the 
rough- sleeper all participate. Seen alongside Maria’s more recent work, with the 
crisp lines of Hong Kong skyscrapers, this image appears as even more of a con-
trast. It shows what is blurred even in the spaces (including the theoretical 
spaces) that may appear to be known. It forces the viewer to look more closely at 
what is otherwise a mundane city scene to see other realities. The photographer 
shows herself as located, and forces the viewer to acknowledge her/is own locat-
edness as well. Such recognition will be necessary if we are to develop a liberal 
theory that recognises noncitizenship.
Noncitizenship without the hyphen and its critics
I introduce the analytic category of unhyphenated ‘noncitizenship’ to try to 
respond to this. Unlike hyphenated ‘non- citizenship’, it does not assume a defer-
ence to citizenship or an expulsion. Though imperfect and unequal, States’ rela-
tionships with, and obligations to, citizens are well rehearsed. Insofar as 
individuals relate to States as noncitizens, this is not the case. Noncitizenship 
here is not some status to be added to the list that includes worker and student 
visas, residents and refugees, and the vast gamut of officially recognised rela-
tionships with States. These statuses are not citizenships, but they are also not 
noncitizenships. Insofar as they are officially recognised, they are approxima-
tions or proxies to citizenship, bestowed upon an individual by the grace of a 
State. That which is officially recognised in these statuses, is not noncitizenship. 
And so I refer to them as ‘quasi- citizenship’ statuses. The rights associated with 
them are not- quite-citizenship rights. A person with a work visa is not usually 
considered eligible for all of citizenship’s benefits but, thanks to a State’s benefi-
cence, s/he has access to some. Noncitizenship is a different dimension of such a 
person’s relationship with the same State, a dimension not represented in the 
quasi- citizen aspects of the individual- State relationship.
 For example, someone living in a State with a work visa has a quasi- citizen 
relationship with that State, making claims, contributing, perhaps even voting. 
But at the same time s/he is always vulnerable to the cessation of the work con-
tract and the expiry of the visa. S/he is vulnerable to the State, to the employer 
and to officials in a special sort of way and must negotiate eligibility for certain 
goods. Ultimately, s/he is always at risk of deportation. Such individuals are, 
then, also vulnerable to the State in question as noncitizens – a form of vulner-
ability that today can be more abject, unmitigated and potentially total, since it is 
currently largely unrecognised within liberal democratic systems. Such persons 
might in this respect also pose a challenge to that State. In Chapter 8, this is 
shown to be a three- faceted challenge: moral challenge, a legitimacy challenge, 
and perhaps an existential one as well.
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 Unhyphenated noncitizenship differs from ‘denizenship’. Denizenship is 
often used to refer to resident foreigners, to not- quite-citizen members (such as 
freed slaves) or to those born far from an empire’s metropole.28 In contemporary 
analyses of denizenship, Rainer Bauböck presents it as a (poor) second to cit-
izenship. Tomas Hammar observes that the high level of rights amongst denizens 
(qua foreign residents) is making naturalisation less attractive in some States.29 
They portray denizens as being within the State of their denizenship, with deni-
zenship providing a citizen- like-but- not-citizen relationship with that State. 
Unhyphenated noncitizenship should not be seen as secondary to citizenship, 
and, like citizenship, noncitizenship can also be held with a State from afar.
 Alongside his analysis of denizenship, Bauböck directly addresses the fact 
that there are people who do not have political rights in a faraway State that has 
power over their lives.30 But in his discussion of denizenship, he puts these 
people to one side. His focus for denizenship is on those who are, to use his 
terms, ‘resident aliens’ in the State in question.31 He argues that such individuals 
should not be forced to become citizens in order to access basic and not so basic 
rights. The discourse of noncitizenship helps to link Bauböck’s denizens with his 
others far away (who are the focus of the cosmopolitan global justice literature).
 The removal of the hyphen also challenges the existing system’s binarity. It 
can seem as if there are two mutually exclusive options. On the one hand, 
there is citizenship, and on the other hand is its negation: hyphenated non- 
citizenship. There is also currently a middle ground populated by those who 
are not quite citizens, with priority given to citizens. Within this common 
approach, the dividing line between those persons who count as citizens and 
those persons who count as (hyphenated) non- citizens will depend on where 
along the continuum you place your cut- off. This provides too limited a frame-
work within which to understand the complex relations people have with 
States. It shapes the theorisations that can be developed and the options that 
are imaginable. Indeed, the hyphenated term ‘non- citizenship’ even makes it 
difficult for someone disagreeing with the position in this book to argue in 
favour of seeing non- citizenship as merely a non- relationship, since this posi-
tion seems terminologically trivial.
28 Rachel Ida Buff (2012) ‘Domestic Internationalisms, Imperial Nationalisms’, pp. 123–140 in 
Sukyana Banerjee, Aims McGuiness and Steven Charles McKay (eds) (2012) New Routes for 
Diaspora Studies, Indiana University Press; Peter Kvisto and Thomas Faist (2010) Beyond a 
Border: The Causes and Consequences of Contemporary Immigration, Pine Forge Press (Sage), 
pp. 225, 226.
29 Bauböck 2008 ibid. p. 11 states explicitly that denizenship cannot replace citizenship; see also 
particularly Rainer Bauböck (1991) ‘Migration and Citizenship’, pp. 27–48 in New Community 
18(1) p. 31; Tomas Hammar (1990) Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens, and 
Citizens in a World of International Migration, Avebury.
30 Rainer Bauböck (1994) ‘Changing the Boundaries of Citizenship: The Inclusion of Immigrants 
in Democratic Politics’, pp. 199–232 in Rainer Bauböck (ed.) (1994) From Aliens to Citizens: 
Redefining the Status of Immigration in Europe, Avery, Vienna.
31 Bauböck 1994 ibid. p. 203.
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 Consider the experience of urban Maoris as presented by Manuhuia Barcham. 
Barcham observes how a pervasive enforcement of the assumption of binarity 
makes it difficult to characterise the realities of many urban Maoris.32 He 
observes that for official recognition within the New Zealand State, individuals 
need to be classified as either Maori or not Maori, and to be either New Zealand-
ers or not New Zealanders. The truth, Barcham explains, is more complex. I 
understand him as saying that for intersecting and complicated reasons, the same 
individuals are both Maori and at odds with being Maori, New Zealanders and at 
odds with being New Zealanders. The rigid terminology born of, and reinforc-
ing, an uncompromising theoretical structure, forces such individuals artificially 
to choose boxes in which to insert themselves – or for others to choose those 
boxes on their behalves. The assumption of binarity in individual relationships 
with States is challenged by such individuals’ experienced reality.
 Given all this, why not just invent a totally new word without the baggage of 
‘noncitizenship’? I have considered doing so. However, this would depart unnec-
essarily from existing discourse. In practice, discussion around ‘noncitizenship’ 
often seems to engage in more than negation, even when not explicitly acknow-
ledged or when conflated with the negation discourse. Although still etymologi-
cally constructed from ‘citizenship’, the unhyphenated ‘noncitizenship’ allows the 
relationship to be examined on its own terms and without deference.33 Consider 
the etymological vs the ontological relationship between ‘man’ and ‘woman’.
 A further concern with this terminological discussion is that it speaks to 
anglophone discourse and seeks to address a theoretical oversight arising within 
this particular linguistic context. That is true. And indeed, any terminological 
question will be rooted in the linguistic framework within which that terminol-
ogy is used and developed. This book is written in English and is located largely 
within the anglophone tradition. However, the assumed and forced deference of 
hyphenated non- citizenship to citizenship does not only occur in English. 
Chapter 4 revisits how the broader dehumanisation of noncitizens, using the lan-
guage of ‘lack’, is found across several linguistic traditions. For now, though, it 
is enough to drop the hyphen, and to build a theorisation that departs from the 
usual deference to citizenship.
A special relationship
Noncitizenship as presented here is a special relationship and the obligations it 
generates in States are special obligations. They derive from the way in which 
32 Manuhuia Barcham (2000) ‘(De)Constructing the Politics of Indigeneity’, pp. 137–151 in Ivison, 
Patton and Sanders (eds) (2000) Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Cambridge 
University Press; see also his 2013 talk, which gives a much more personal account of his perspective 
in this area, Manuhuia Barcham (2013) ‘What Do You Mean the Culture is Different Here?!?’, talk at 
Ignite Seattle, November 20 2013. I discuss this further for example in Chapters 5 and 10.
33 For example, see Katherine Tonkiss and Tendayi Bloom (2015) ‘Theorising Noncitizenship: 
Concepts, Debates and Challenges’, pp. 837–852 in Citizenship Studies 19(8).
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noncitizenship is constructed and how it is justified. This is an important depar-
ture from common discourses. Other approaches to the human rights of such 
individuals have difficulty allocating the associated duties. Acknowledging the 
noncitizen relationship does not give rise merely to humanitarian claims, but to 
directed claims of justice based on how the liberal State and the system of States 
are constructed.
 One way to see this is through the development of debate on coercion – and 
particularly coercion at State borders.34 Noncitizenship allows us to see how this 
form of border- zone coercion extends beyond the border. Broadly, we can under-
stand that ‘whenever coercion takes place, one will is subordinated to the other. 
The coerced is no longer a completely independent agent’.35 At the border, 
coercion of this sort can be identified: an individual who wants to cross a border 
and is prevented from doing so, or is forced to cross in a dangerous manner, is 
no longer acting freely. S/he is made vulnerable to the State(s) involved and to 
other individuals with regard to her/is capability to function and to act. In fact, 
noncitizen coercion by States does not only take place at the border, but this 
example helps to illustrate something larger.
 Several writers (e.g. Arash Abizadeh, Phillip Cole, Joseph Carens, Bas 
Schotel)36 have examined the problem of trying to justify control at a State 
border, arguing that it looks concerningly illiberal. Others query whether border 
control can really be understood as coercive in this way at all. David Miller 
argues that what takes place at the border is not coercion, but prevention.37 
Unlike coercion, prevention rules out one option from a set of options. Coercion, 
by contrast, forces a specific action. As such, for Miller, border control does not 
threaten autonomy and does not require justification of the sort called for by 
Arash Abizadeh, for example.38 However, this focuses only on one side of what 
is taking place and ignores the large literature on prevention more generally as 
coercive. When converted into the language of vulnerability vis- à-vis capability, 
this is even clearer. Indeed, writers on coercion argue that forcing someone to 
perform some particular act can be effected by preventing her/im from perform-
ing other acts.
34 This debate is rehearsed for example in Tendayi Bloom and Verena Risse (2014) ‘Examining 
hidden coercion at state borders: why carrier sanctions cannot be justified’, pp. 65–82 in Ethics 
and Global Politics 7(2).
35 Gerald Dworkin (1970) ‘Acting Freely’, pp. 367–383 in Nous 4, at p. 367.
36 Arash Abizadeh (2008) ‘Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No right to Unilaterally 
Control Your Own Borders’, pp. 37–65 in Political Theory 36; Joseph Carens (1987) ‘Aliens and 
Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’, pp. 251–273 in The Review of Politics 49; Phillip Cole 
(2000) Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration, Edinburgh Univer-
sity Press; Bas Schotel (2012) On the Right of Exclusion: Law, Ethics and Immigration Policy, 
Routledge.
37 David Miller (2010) ‘Why Immigration Controls are not coercive: A Reply to Arash Abizadeh’, 
pp. 111–120 in Political Theory 38.
38 Arash Abizadeh (2010) ‘Democratic Legitimacy and State Coercion: A Reply to David Miller’, 
pp. 121–130 in Political Theory 38.
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 In the border case, a person may well not only be being prevented from entry 
into one State alone. It is theoretically possible that a person could be excluded 
from every State. In such a case, the coercion needs to be understood as reaching 
more deeply than the prevention of one border crossing. It theoretically risks 
preventing that person from living out a located life.39 Perhaps in a world that 
was differently composed, a person could go to some non- State space and live 
out some other life plan without submission to, or interaction with, States. 
Perhaps such a life would be better, or perhaps more brutish. In the world as it 
currently is, though, except in extraordinary circumstances, a person has to be in 
a relationship of some sort with some State or States, whether they like it or not.
 This type of relationship does not only occur at the border. Abizadeh presents 
the problem of border control as unjustified to a constituency that includes all 
people. He argues that liberal theory does not have an adequate way to explain 
the way in which this coercion takes place. And it is not only at the border that 
liberal democratic theory comes into contact with individuals that it defines out 
of its scope of justification. It may be that in many such cases, coercion as 
usually defined cannot be traced directly. And yet it is clear that there are indi-
viduals who are vulnerable to a State vis- à-vis their vital interests and broader 
capabilities without being counted within the scope of democratic justification. 
Far from being a lack of a relationship, this in fact creates a special relationship.
 One other way to see coercion, then, is through the way in which it makes a 
person vulnerable with regard to her/is capabilities. That is, the noncitizen rela-
tionship can be understood through the way in which an individual’s basic and 
less basic capabilities become dependent upon that State – in a way that is left 
unexamined and unmitigated. Of course, citizens are also vulnerable to a State, 
and indeed much liberal theorising has aimed at understanding whether this sub-
jection of citizens to States is legitimate, and, as such, what the proper limits and 
mitigations of State power should be. The coercion of citizens by their States is 
often framed as involving limiting citizens’ capabilities in one dimension in 
exchange for the protection and promotion of their capabilities in some other. 
For example, a State may limit citizens in their use of violent power. Yet, in 
doing so, it commits to protect the vital interests that those individuals would 
have protected otherwise – and indeed to do so to a greater and more efficient 
extent – for example by organising a police force. Many liberal theories try to 
find ways in which this submission is consensual, even if hypothetically (i.e. this 
is what people would consent to). The coercion of noncitizens has not undergone 
the same level of examination. And yet, if we go along with writers like Michael 
Blake and Thomas Nagel who claim that relationships marked by State coercion 
ground duties of justice, then this seems to be a serious omission.40
39 This is developed in Chapter 3.
40 Michael Blake (2002) ‘Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy’, pp. 257–296 in 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 30; Thomas Nagel (2005) ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, 
pp. 113–147 in Philosophy and Public Affairs 33. This point is also made in Bloom and Risse 
2014 ibid.
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 This special relationship of noncitizenship does not preclude other relation-
ships, including citizen- like ones. Joseph Carens, for example, argues that irreg-
ular immigrants embodied within a society have rights therein on this basis. That 
is, they enter into some aspects of the citizenry insofar as they are living in the 
State and perhaps becoming integrated therein.41 Dora Kostakopoulou takes this 
further to argue that such individuals in fact have a claim to citizenship on the 
basis of their lives in a State.42 In this book I do not take a position with regard 
to citizenship (though supporting inclusive formal citizenship along the lines 
presented in Chapter 1). Insofar as such individuals are experiencing the State 
qua noncitizens, they have claims qua noncitizens. They may well also have 
claims as citizens in other dimensions. This approach makes it possible to 
connect the discussions of the relationship of a State towards individuals at its 
borders and within its territory to discussions of the relationships between a State 
and individuals far away.
 It has been argued that individuals in State A who are affected by the activities 
of State B thereby develop claims against State B. This book merely adds that 
these obligations are continuous with those obligations arising when the person 
arrives at State B’s borders or within its territory. So long as there is a special 
relationship of noncitizenship, there are special obligations that result, though the 
nature of the claims and of the obligations may differ depending on context.
 The noncitizenist approach, then, provides a means by which to examine how 
these locations of coercion, or vulnerability, relate to each other. A person may 
well have different claims at different times in this process. Yet something core 
to that individual’s relationship to the State in question remains constant. This is 
what noncitizenship provides. It provides a way in which to understand what 
connects relationships which can otherwise appear to be substantially different. 
In addition, by developing an understanding of noncitizenship and citizenship as 
intersecting and overlapping relationships, it is possible also to consider how one 
individual may relate to multiple States in different ways at one time and how 
these relationships in turn interact with each other. It also makes it possible to 
draw attention to elements of these relationships that might otherwise be over-
looked. There is, then, a special relationship of noncitizenship that can be under-
stood through the special sort of vulnerability that a person thereby has in 
relation to a particular State, and the challenge that this poses.
A non- contractarian relationship
Citizens submit their individual powers to a State. This may be with a view to 
ensuring their basic and less basic interests are secured (if they’re Hobbesian), or 
perhaps they so- submit in order to achieve even greater heights of collective 
41 Joseph Carens (1987) ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’, pp. 251–273 in The 
Review of Politics 49.
42 Kostakopoulou 2008 ibid.
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achievement (if they’re Lockean) or for some other reason (indeed, not all lib-
erals are contractarians, though contractarians may struggle the most to incorp-
orate noncitizens). In the noncitizen relationship, that submission cannot be of 
the same sort. Indeed, noncitizenship is generated by the creation and sustaining 
of the State irrespective of the interests of noncitizens – but also, noncitizenship 
is constructed by States irrespective of whether those States intended to con-
struct it. Noncitizenship, then, is at core necessarily a very different sort of rela-
tionship. Irrespective of how citizenship is defined, noncitizenship cannot be 
contractarian. A liberal theory must, then, include an account of how a State 
built upon liberal democratic principles, even one organised along contractarian, 
or hypothetical contractarian, lines can explain its relationship to such indi-
viduals. Noncitizenism does not only advocate recognition of noncitizenship, but 
also drives the development of a theoretical framework that can better address 
reality more generally.
 Noncitizenship as presented here is compatible with a variety of liberal demo-
cratic positions and the relationship of noncitizenship could be incorporated into 
most liberal perspectives. It advocates the inclusion of individuals who, by defi-
nition, in some dimension do not fit within the liberal State system as currently 
conceived. Throughout this book, there are examples of individuals who, 
because of a mismatch of laws and policies, find themselves falling between the 
cracks in the citizenist organisation of the world. There are also examples of 
individuals who disagree with their position in the current State structure, either 
because there is no State representing their interests and history, or because the 
State system is currently constructed and is unable inadequately is unable to take 
into account their way of life, for example because of their regular mobility. 
There are also individuals who traverse modes of noncitizen relationship, so that, 
unable to participate in the citizenist system in one position, they relocate in 
order to try to access it in some other way. A theoretical structure that assumes 
citizenism will find it difficult to analyse and recognise these and other perspec-
tives. Acknowledging unhyphenated noncitizenship could enable a currently citi-
zenist structure to take this individual relationship into account without much 
additional revision.
3 Theoretical error, real- world 
problems
There is, then, a theoretical error behind substantial real- world problems and 
those real- world problems are behind the theoretical error. The solution proposed 
here is theoretical, though it is driven by, and is directed at, reality. It requires a 
step back from standard theoretical liberal tropes, and the scope of vision they 
give to liberal State politics.
 Despite its fundamental importance, noncitizenship has long gone unacknow-
ledged in liberal political theory and liberal political institutions. As a result, nonci-
tizens have often been kept from access to even the most basic goods needed for 
human development – food, shelter, water, sanitation, healthcare and primary edu-
cation.1 This book disassembles the dehumanisation of noncitizens inherent in tra-
ditional interpretations of liberal political thought in order to acknowledge the 
reality of noncitizenship as a foundational individual- State relationship.2 Nonciti-
zenship is more than an absence of citizenship. It can be a mode of engagement 
with a State in its own right. The argument here, then, is what I refer to as ‘nonciti-
zenist’ (echoing ‘feminist’). It is that, in order to take seriously the equal moral 
worth of every human, a liberal theoretical framework and political reality must 
take account of this noncitizen relationship.
 This work, is both practically and theoretically urgent. Failure to acknow-
ledge noncitizen relationships with States seems to enable rights- deprivation, 
humanity- denial and wilful death. Addressing this practical problem is also 
important in order to develop a robust and relevant political and legal theory 
with applicable conclusions. This is not about producing a better alignment 
between ideal and real theory. It is about examining the world as it really is 
today and the obligations to which this gives rise. The concerns raised with 
existing systems are urgent. They threaten the legitimacy of politico- legal theory 
that does not adequately address the reality of the basic relationship of nonciti-
zenship. And they threaten the associated rights and obligations. Failure to take 
the activated noncitizen relationship into account can leave people effectively 
rightsless in the real world.
1 See opening to Chapter 2.
2 This is done particularly in Chapter 5.
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Noncitizens bear the burden of inadequate theory
[29-year-­old­ Esrafil]­ had­ no­ money­ and­ no­ home­ because­ his­ asylum­





(Refugee Action UK 20063)
From­ the­ details­ given­ above,­ it­ seems­ that­ Esrafil­ did­ not­ principally­ die­ of­
poverty and ill- health. And he did not die in a country that lacked the resources 
to help him to live. Though ostensibly built upon liberal democratic norms, the 
UK (the country where this took place) did not acknowledge his presence within 
them. He died because of a failure to recognise his living and human existence 
within moral and legal frameworks, and his relationship with the State on whose 
territory­he­stood.­The­relationship­Esrafil­had­with­the­UK,­where­he­died,­was­
represented only as a non- relationship. He was unwanted and so unacknow-
ledged. According to the State’s policy framework, he should not have been 
there. But he was. That is the burden that noncitizens bear – at its most extreme, 
they must live in a system that only acknowledges them when it wants to. And 
when it doesn’t want to, they are destined not to exist.
­ Not­all­those­relating­as­noncitizens­suffer­as­Esrafil­did.­Many­live­well,­and­
rarely­encounter­their­noncitizenship­to­this­extent.­Many­are­able­to­use­citizen-
ships or quasi- citizenships to overcome the most extreme noncitizen depriva-
tions. A university lecturer from the UK, for example, may well live in the US, 
so long as the university continues to renew its contract with her/im and the State 
continues to let that count as reason enough for her/im to remain. S/he lives as a 
noncitizen in the US insofar as her/is right to remain is contingent and her/is 
quasi- citizenship is easily undone, giving rise to precarity. Once the university 
ceases to employ her/im, the State most likely ceases to recognise its 
relationship.
 Noncitizens generally lack access to rights except through citizenship proxies. 
When noncitizenship is left unacknowledged it is possible for a person’s living 
human existence to be denied by a State, even when s/he is physically present on 
its territory. On some occasions, this non- recognition might be considered worse 
than death. The truth of this was tragically demonstrated in the example above 
which speaks of the death, in 2006, of an Iranian young man who set himself on 
fire­in­order­to­be­seen.
 Noncitizens bear the burdens of their own non- recognition in four main 
ways.4 First, the noncitizen burdens are felt upon the territory of a State – as in 
the­case­of­Esrafil.­For­him,­pervasive­citizenism­(the­assumption­that­citizenship­
3 Refugee Action (2006) The Destitution Trap, Refugee Action, London p. 10.
4 This is developed in detail in Chapter 8.
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is the only form of relationship a person can have with a State) or statusism (dis-
crimination even in basic humanity according to status) meant he had to prove 
some citizenship or quasi- citizenship in order to be acknowledged where he 
lived.­ Esrafil­ could­ provide­ no­ such­ proof.­ Consequently,­ while­ physically­
present, he was assumed to have no relationship with the State in question, and 
so­was­(to­use­the­language­of­a­2007­UK­Home­Office­document),­‘denied­the­
privileges of life in the UK’.5 Language is important. To construct access to the 
means to satisfy basic human needs as a ‘privilege’ is to play with words.6
 This overwhelmingly affects those persons who already bear the most burden. 
Often, those who are assumed excludable must stay with particular employers or 
spouses­in­order­officially­to­legitimise­their­presence­through­a­quasi-­citizenship,­
backed up with the threat of deportation or non- recognition. This makes such 
persons vulnerable to other individuals and to States in a way that is unknown to 
those who only ever feel a full liberal democratic citizen relationship with the 
State(s) that have most power over their lives. The recent trend towards ‘denation-
alisations’, both on a large scale such as in the Dominican Republic, and in numer-
ous one- off cases, for example on terrorism grounds, in European countries, help 
to demonstrate the intersections of citizen and noncitizen forms of vulnerability.7
 Second, noncitizens bear burdens at State borders. Each of us is asked to 
prove our own exception to the assumption of exclusion at a State border 
(outside of Schengen8 or other localised agreements). For many, this can seem 
like a mere formality: the ritual showing of archaic documents. For others, this is 
a site at which the noncitizen relationship is symbolically activated. For entry, it 
is important to prove that a particular individual human being is associated with 
5­ UK­Home­Office­(2007)­Enforcing the Rules,­Her­Majesty’s­Stationary­Office.
6 See critiques of ‘earned citizenship’. Ayelet Shachar criticises this as a property-like way to under-
stand citizenship, rather than her preferred connectedness: Ayelet Shachar (2013) ‘Earned Citizen-
ship: Property Lessons from Immigration Reform’, Article 2, Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities 23(1). Theodora Kostakopoulou critiques earned citizenship as a special condition for 
migrants­in­Theodora­Kostakopoulou­(2014)­‘Mobility,­Citizenship­and­Migration­in­a­Post-Crisis­
Europe’, Instituto Affari Internazionali, No. 9, June 2014.
7 Jillian Blake (2017) ‘Race Based Statelessness in the Dominican Republic’, in Tendayi Bloom, 
Katherine Tonkiss and Phillip Cole (eds) (2017) Understanding Statelessness, Routledge. I 
develop­this­particularly­in­Chapter­3.­Sandra­Mantu­(2015)­Contingent Citizenship: The Law and 
Practice of Citizenship Deprivation in International, European and National Perspectives, Brill. 
Matthew­Gibney­relates­this­to­banishment,­while­Kristy­Belton­refers­to­it­as­in situ displacement. 
Matthew­Gibney­ (2013)­ ‘Should­Citizenship­Be­Conditional?­The­Ethics­ of­Denationalization’,­
pp. 646–658 in Journal of Politics 75(3); Kristy Belton (2015) ‘Rooted Displacement: The 
Paradox of Belonging Among Stateless People’, pp. 907–921 in Citizenship Studies 19(8). Kather-
ine Tonkiss problematises the assumed integration of nationality and citizenship inherent in this term. 
See Katherine Tonkiss (2017) ‘Statelessness and the Performance of Citizenship-As-Nationality’ in 
Tendayi Bloom, Katherine Tonkiss and Phillip Cole (eds) (2017) Understanding Statelessness, 
Routledge. This is revisited in Chapter 4.
8 ‘Schengen’ here refers to the European zone of free movement, named after the city in Luxem-
bourg where the treaty which created it was signed in 1985. Within the Schengen area travellers, 
in theory at least, do not need to produce documents in order to cross international borders.
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some recognised citizenship or quasi- citizenship. Ethnicity, race, gender and 
other factors can also affect how both noncitizenship and citizenship are experi-
enced at the border.9
­ David­Miller­draws­attention­to­the­assumed­acceptability­of­this­to­foreground­
his­work­on­compatriot­partiality.­He­writes­that­at­the­border,­‘we­dutifully­join­
the­ appropriate­ queue,­ we­ take­ for­ granted­ that­ state­ officials­ can­ treat­ human­
beings quite differently simply because some are citizens and others are not’.10 But 
the protests that arise when something challenges the acceptability of this indicate 
otherwise.­Perhaps­comfortable­citizens­join­the­queues­Miller­describes­unthink-
ingly. It is not so much because they support what the queues represent, but 
because they have never really thought about it. As was argued in Chapter 2, for 
those who do not personally experience the challenges of unrecognised noncitizen-
ship, and have not been shown its implications, there is little reason to invent it.
­ A­State­may­also­redefine­the­physical­individual-­State­relationships­that­an­
individual can have with it by changing the nature of the border- zone and 
extending the spaces of exception.11 Consider cases of extraterritorial immig-
rant­detention­centres,­like­those­of­Australia­in­Nauru­and­Papua­New­Guinea­
(PNG).­ The­ acute­ vulnerability­ of­ individuals­ in­ extraterritorial­ immigrant­
detention centres has recently been gaining publicity globally. This has been 
fuelled, in these Australian cases, by self- immolations of detainees who have 
no other way to be heard, by outcry from doctors, lawyers and civil society 
members­who­come­into­contact­with­the­centres,­and­by­films­and­newspaper­
articles­ –­ and­ by­ the­ July­ 2016­ PNG­ Supreme­ Court­ decision­ that­ the­
Australian detention centre there is unconstitutional.12 This was compounded 
by the August 2016 release by the UK newspaper the Guardian of ‘The Nauru 
 9 Naila Kabeer (2002) ‘Citizenship and the boundaries of the acknowledged community: identity, 
affiliation­ and­ exclusion’,­ IDS Working Paper 171, October 2002, Institute of Development 
Studies,­University­of­Sussex;­Willem­Maas­(2009)­‘Unrespected,­Unequal,­Holow?­Contingent­
Citizenship and Reversible Rights in the European Union’, pp. 265–280 in Columbia Journal of 
European Law­15(2);­Evelyn­Nakano­Glenn­(2004)­Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender 
Shaped American Citizenship and Labor, Harvard University Press; Shahram Khosravi (2010) 
‘Illegal’ Traveller: An Auto-Ethnography of Borders,­Palgrave­Macmillan.
10­ David­Miller­(2016)­Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration, Harvard 
University Press, at p. 20.
11­ Georgio­ Agamben­ (1998)­ Homsacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Standford University 
Press; Nando Sigona (2014) ‘Campzenship: reimagining the camp as a social and political space’, 
pp. 1–15 in Citizenship Studies 19 (1).
12 Lucy Fiske (2016) ‘Self-immolation incidents on Nauru are acts of “hopeful despair” ’, available at 
http://theconversation.com/self-immolation-incidents-on-nauru-are-acts-of-hopeful-despair-58791; 
Ben Doherty (2016) ‘Doctors refuse to discharge “Baby Asha” because of fears for safety on 
Nauru’, the Guardian, 12 February 2016; see the work of Australian Lawyers for Human Rights; 
for example, using the hashtags #CloseTheCamps and #LetThemStay; The Manus Solution,­a­film­
made as part of the ABC series, Four Corners; Tendayi Bloom (2016) ‘The Beginning of the End of 
Double-Offshoring?­The­Panama­Papers,­Asylum­in­Australia,­and­the­PNG­Supreme­Court’,­avail-
able at www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/
blog2016/beginning-end (accessed 2nd April 2017).
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Files’, a series of 2000  testimonies from detainees on the island, cataloguing 
extreme abuses of persons with no legal recourse.13 These individuals bear 
substantial burdens as a result of their unrecognised noncitizenship and the 
state of exception that this allows. Their bodies are relocated geographically, 
cementing the ambiguity in their human relationships with the Australian 
State.14
 This takes us to the third site of burden- bearing, when a noncitizen is 
physically far from a State that has overwhelming power over her/is life. The 
changing nature of the relationship between the inhabitants of the Bikini Atoll 
in­ the­Marshall­ Islands­ and­ the­United­States­ can­help­ to­ illustrate­ this.­The­
US­ coordinated­ the­ administration­ of­ the­ Marshall­ Islands­ after­ the­ end­ of­
the Second World War. After conducting a series of nuclear tests in the Atoll, 
the US left Bikini, the largest of the islands, uninhabitable. The individuals 
were­initially­moved,­at­the­behest­of­the­United­States,­from­one­of­the­Mar-
shall­ atolls­ to­ another.­ While­ the­ Marshall­ Islands­ is­ now­ an­ independent­
State,­ these­ tests­ have­ rendered­ some­Marshallese­ particularly­ vulnerable­ in­
various dimensions.
 This is yet another way in which noncitizenship can arise. In this case, the 
United States made life unsustainable for faraway others. Those individuals then 
became directly vulnerable to the US and developed claims, that the US has 
largely recognised, as a result.15 Important in the Bikini Atoll example is also the 
way in which this relationship between individuals from Bikini and the State of 
the­US­evolved­over­ time.­It­altered­with­changes­both­in­ the­Marshall­Islands­
and in the US, as well as in the relationship between the two. It also altered as 
the affected individuals migrated. The language of (unhyphenated) noncitizen-
ship facilitates analysis of the interconnection between these various dimensions 
of the individual- State relationship.
 Noncitizens bear the burdens of inadequate theory and its implications for the 
real world. At the same time, there are not yet mechanisms through which nonci-
tizens qua noncitizens can impact upon this situation. It is a vicious cycle. For 
this reason, those most affected by this burden will need to adopt informal means 
in­order­to­be­acknowledged.­And­they­do.­At­the­extreme­is­Esrafil­at­the­head­
of this section. Those who are insiders to the theory bear substantial obligation 
both to redress these burdens and to ensure that the perspectives of the excluded 
are­ fed­ into­ the­ development­ of­ a­ more­ just­ theoretical­ and­ real-­world­ set­ of­
institutional structures that more adequately suit the world as it really is. This 
book focuses upon institutional obligations of States built upon liberal demo-
cratic principles. But derivative from this will be political obligations also upon 
citizens and even quasi- citizens.
13­ See­ www.theguardian.com/australia-news/ng-interactive/2016/aug/10/the-nauru-files-the-lives-of-
asylum-seekers-in-detention-detailed-in-a-unique-database-interactive (accessed 2 April 2017).
14 The situation for irregular immigrants is revisited in Chapter 4.
15 Chapter 7 presents this example in more detail and engages with the more complex historical 
relationship­between­the­US­and­the­Marshall­Islands.
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Acknowledging a problematic past
The images of being political bequeathed to us came from the victors: those 
who were able to constitute themselves as a group, confer rights on and 
impose obligations on each other, institute rituals of belonging and rites of 
passage, and, above all, differentiate themselves from others, constructing 
an identity and an alterity simultaneously.
(Engin Isin, writing in Being Political in 200216)
Tracing­ how­ the­ difficulties­ referred­ to­ here­ have­ arisen­ can­ help­ us­ to­ develop­
ways in which to address them. The sixteenth to nineteenth centuries in Europe 
were­characterised­by­major­political­changes.­There­was­a­blossoming­of­human­
rights and a recognition of obligations of States towards ordinary people. This 
included­the­development­of­the­notion­of­‘citizenship’­rather­than­‘subjecthood’.­
Countries like Britain, the Netherlands and France, within which several modern 
liberals­were­writing,­were­also­benefiting­from­the­new­wealth­and­new­opportun-
ities in the so- called ‘New Worlds’. In burgeoning European colonies overseas, 
other­ new­ways­ of­ categorising­ people,­ using­ racial­ stratifications,­ for­ example,­
were­being­used­to­justify­land­seizure,­violence,­indenture­and­enslavement­of­per-
sons.17 The role of race and of domination in this construction of modern citizen-
ship and liberal theory more generally must be part of understanding its limitations 
today.­It­may­be­that­liberalism­cannot­be­reconfigured­without­these­inconsisten-
cies. If this is the case, Cole was right to suggest that it might be obsolete. But if 
liberalism is to stand a chance, it will need to address these problems head- on and 
examine the blind spots to which they have given rise.
 This contextualisation is important to understanding the birth of modern 
liberal thought and the limitations this put upon the vision of its authors. It shows 
that­ in­ fact­ ‘egalitarian­political­ theory­has­often­ended­up­ justifying­explicitly­
inegalitarian institutions and practices’.18 As settlers in English colonies, for 
example, railed against slavery to the Crown using the language of freedom and 
equality of Enlightenment liberalism, large populations were enslaved under 
them, constructed out of consideration within the same liberal calculus.19 John 
Locke describes how ‘Native’ peoples, as they did not ‘improve’ the land 
16 Engin Isin (2002) Being Political,­University­of­Minnesota­Press,­p.­2.
17 For example, see Catherine Hall (2002) Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English 
Imagination 1830–1867, Polity; several essays in Catherine Hall (ed.) (2000) Cultures of Empire: 
Colonizers in Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A Reader, 
Manchester­University­Press.
18 Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton and Will Sanders (2000) ‘Introduction’, pp. 1–22 in Duncan Ivison, 
Paul Patton and Will Sanders (eds) (2000) Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
Cambridge University Press, at p. 2.
19­ Samuel­Johnson,­creator­of­ the­first­English­dictionary,­demanded:­ ‘How­is­ it­ that­we­hear­ the­
loudest­yelps­for­liberty­from­the­drivers­of­negroes?’.­This­comes­from­his­1775­paper­‘Taxation­
No Tyranny: An Answer to the Resolutions and Address of the American Congress’, www.
samueljohnson.com/tnt.html­(accessed­4­April­2017).
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according­to­his­definition­of­improvement,­did­not­have­relevant­claims­to­it.20 
James Cook reportedly observed that Australia was so sparsely populated that 
there was no sense of ownership amongst the existing occupants at the time of 
colonisation. As a consequence of this, for example, colonised lands could 
apparently­be­appropriated­justly­within­a­liberal­understanding­of­justice­of­the­
time. This is an important aspect of the development of both the theory and the 
practice of today’s liberal democracies. And the blind spots developed then 
persist today.
­ Crucially,­ this­was­ already­ identified­by­ liberal­ theorists­ at­ the­ time.­To­ an­
extent, the concern at the insider and located perspective presented in the 
previous­ chapter­ was­ already­ identified­ by­ Adam­ Smith­ who­ warned­ that­ a­
democracy of masters would be less likely to serve the interests of slaves than a 
despotism. He wrote:
…­every­law­is­made­by­their­masters,­who­will­never­pass­anything­prejudi-




will wish for liberty in a country where this institution is established.21
And so slaves bear the burdens of this weird form of liberalism which is also 
constructed not to take them into account. Liberalism’s founding fathers 
developed­theories­that­explicitly­justified­racialised­exclusions­of­certain­people­
from consideration – and indeed supported extremes of treatment of people 
thereby excluded. Yet liberals also railed against this and contemporaries identi-
fied­the­inconsistencies­in­such­theoretical­approaches­and­the­inhumanity­of­the­
activities that the theories apparently legitimised.
 In some philosophy classrooms, when Locke is taught, his work is prefaced 
by the recognition that there are no longer the same apparently endless opportun-
ities for settlement as there were in his time. But in Locke’s time too, the vast 
lands ripe for appropriation were only available because some individuals were 
explicitly written out of consideration in the liberal metric. These persons were 
the noncitizens, the non- consenters to the liberal system, and those given no 
20 See ‘Of Property’ in the Two Treatises. See also useful analyses in: Barbara Arneill (1996) John 
Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonialism, Clarendon Press, Oxford; James Tully 
and Quentin Skinner (1993) ‘Rediscovering America: The Two Treatises and Aboriginal Rights’, 
pp. 137–176 in James Tully (ed.) (1993) An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Con-
texts, Cambridge University Press.
21 Adam Smith (1982) Lectures on Jurisprudence, Liberty Classics pp. 452–453 and p. 182. 
Suggested by Domenico Losurdo (2014) Liberalism: A Counter-History, Verso [translated by 
George­Elliott].
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opportunity, even theoretically, either to consent or to withhold consent. In par-
ticular, this included the indigenous people whose land was seized and those 
who were enslaved. They were ostensibly written out of consideration because 
their ways of seeing their relationships with the land and its resources were seen 
as different to the liberal thinking developing in Europe at the time. But they 
were also written out because it was convenient to do so. Today it can seem 
shocking­that­such­acts­were­justified­along­liberal­lines.­And­yet­today­nonciti-
zens are also excluded from consideration, giving rise to new sets of oppressions 
that follow the lines of that same methodological citizenism and statusism that 
justified­slavery­and­colonisation.
 John Locke’s philosophy also needs to be seen in the context of his own 
biography – his own located position. He helped to draft the notorious consti-
tution­of­Carolina­such­that­‘[e]very­freeman­of­Carolina­shall­have­absolute­
power and authority over his Negro slaves, of what opinion or religion 
soever’.22 He was also reportedly a shareholder in the Royal African 
Company.23 This puts his commitment to extraordinarily illiberal practices 
into context. But that does not mean that liberalism itself must always be 
corrupt. It shows how interests and position can cloud the interpretation of 
liberalism and provides a starting point for rooting out the blind spots that 
liberalism’s origins have helped to instate.
 It is important, then, to observe that despite the apparently rational and 
universalist nature of the arguments, these blind spots were introduced from a 
racist and protectionist position based on self- interest. It relied upon the 
acceptability to the readership of the idea that some people could be seen as 
less than human (though, as we see, their contemporaries also contested this). 
This has given rise to two structural problems that are important to under-
standing liberalism today:
 (1) On the one hand, the exclusions of the colonial period gave rise to, or 
aggravated, imbalances of wealth and power that are inherited today, skewing 
the way in which individuals can participate as citizens in the international 
system of States.
­ (2)­ On­ the­ other­ hand,­ the­ justification­ of­ these­ exclusions­ required­ the­
introduction of blind spots and exclusions to liberal theory itself. If we con-
tinue to use a theory that emerged from this context without correcting for 
these­inconsistencies­and­injustices,­then,­it­would­be­surprising­if­we­did­not­
develop a theoretical framework, and a system based on it, that reproduced 
them. Those exclusions introduced by the modern liberals were based for 
22­ ‘The­Fundamental­Constitutions­of­Carolina,­March­1,­1669’,­in­Francis­Newton­Thorpe­(1909)­
Colonial Charters and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories and Colonies Now or Here-
tofore Forming the United States of America, Compiled and Edited under the Act of Congress of 
June 30 1906, Government Printing Office, Washington DC, see particularly Article 110. See 
also James Tully (1982) A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries, Cambridge 
University Press.
23 Losurdo 2014 ibid. p. 15.
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example on race and on gender, so it stands to reason that these elements con-
tinue­ to­ motivate­ structurally­ entrenched­ injustices­ in­ contemporary­ liberal-
isms and societies based around them. This need not mean that Locke’s work 
and that of other liberals should be discarded, but that in using it and the work 
that builds upon it, we need to be aware of the blind spots of the authors. One 
such blind spot that still persists from these origins is found in the reality of 
unacknowledged noncitizenship.
Contemporary developments
Contemporary liberalism arose in the late twentieth century out of this tradition. 
It developed particularly after the First and Second World Wars and with a new 
perspective on the possibilities of what people can do to each other. Its authors, 
several of whom are based in the United States, were responding to a perceived 
need­to­apply­the­liberal­principles­of­the­past­to­find­a­just­way­forward­in­a­new­
and­ frightening­world.­As­ in­ the­ classic­ texts,­ justice­ internal­ to­ the­State­was­
initially still the primary concern though certainly not the only one. They inher-
ited the assumption of citizenship, which has largely remained unchallenged.
 Perhaps most paradigmatic amongst those contemporary liberals is John 
Rawls, who had himself experienced the changing realisation about the world, 
through military service in Asia (including seeing the aftermath of the Hiro-
shima bomb) and campus politics (including protests against the Viet Nam 
War), for example.24 His work presented a new sort of liberal framework, 
arising from and for mid- twentieth-century America. For Rawls and others 
there is a focus on relations within the citizenry, excluding noncitizens from 
the ranks of the vulnerable and excluded. He recognises that State borders are 
morally arbitrary, but holds that this does not render them meaningless, and 
seems to use this to legitimise their assumed prevalence.25 From behind an 
international veil of ignorance, Rawls believes that representatives of peoples 
would reach a consensus for duties only of mutual aid between ‘liberal and 
decent peoples’, and a duty of assistance between them and illiberal, not 
‘decent’, peoples.26­ This­makes­ it­ difficult­ to­ consider­ justice­ for­ those­ indi-
viduals already marginalised by, or not obviously attached to, a particular 
State or the system of States.
 This is not completely resolved when the theory is globalised. In his globalised 
version of a Rawlsian framework for example, Charles Beitz emphasises the 
24 Daniele Botti, forthcoming; Iain King (2014) ‘Thinkers at War – John Rawls’, Military History 
Monthly.
25 John Rawls (1999) The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press p. 252.
26 John Rawls proposes the ‘veil of ignorance’ as a thought experiment. He suggests that one way 
to­ test­ the­principles­of­ justice­ is­ to­ imagine­what­sort­of­principles­would­be­devised­by­ indi-
viduals who know nothing of their position in society but who understand the basics of how a 
society functions. Rawls himself saw this as functioning on a State level, but neo-Rawlsians like 
Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz have used the same device on a global level.
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importance­of­justifying­(i.e­not­just­assuming)­restriction­of­rights­to­citizens.27 
For­him,­(human)­rights­just­are­‘conditions­that­the­institutions­of­all­domestic­
societies should strive to satisfy, whatever a society’s more comprehensive 
aims’.28 On the one hand, this seems to admit a noncitizenism like that presented 
in this book. On the other hand, in his 2009 book The Idea of Human Rights, 
Beitz­explains­that­institutional­protection­for­rights­is­to­be­provided­in­the­first­
instance­by­States,­ through­ their­ laws­and­policies,­where­ ‘the­beneficiaries­of­
these protections are citizens’.29 It is possible that he did not intend this to restrict 
scope only to formal citizens. Yet, this reintroduction of the assumption of cit-
izenship, even if only through a quirk of language, is not uncommon amongst 
cosmopolitan approaches. Beitz and other cosmopolitans who do this do not 
explain how the composition of that citizenry is to be decided, how someone 
may enter it, nor how noncitizens are to feature. Rights theorists, including those 
who concern themselves directly with the problems of dehumanisation and 
exclusion, can also be found to use language in this way.30
Methodological citizenism
Amongst­ theorists­ of­ global­ justice,­ then,­ there­ is­ another­ common­ problem.­
While concerned with noncitizens overseas, some appear to take it for granted 
when­they­discuss­justice­within a State that they are talking only of citizens.31 
Jon­Mandle,­for­example,­explicitly­discusses­noncitizens­abroad,­including­with­
regard to political participation.32 He describes a hypothetical mechanism for 
allowing neighbouring or allied countries or other foreign groups to have input 




­ In­ a­ different­ way,­ Gillian­ Brock’s­ 2009­ book­ on­ global­ justice­ explicitly­
addresses immigration, and some of the needs and rights arising as a result.35 But 
27 Charles Beitz (1975) ‘Justice and International Relations’, pp. 360–389 in Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 4; Charles Beitz (1979) Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton Univer-
sity Press (1999 edition).
28­ Charles­Beitz­(2003)­‘What­Human­Rights­Mean’­pp.­36–46­in­Daedalus 132(1), p. 44.
29 Charles Beitz (2009) The Idea of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, p. 85.
30 For example, Ronald Dworkin discusses the particular rights and obligations of citizens at length, 
but does not address the question of who can be a citizen and what to think about noncitizens. 
Ronald Dworkin (1991) Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, pp. 185, 266.
31 Seyla Benhabib provides a particularly interesting presentation of this kind of approach in terms 
of what she calls ‘sovereigntism’, see Chapter 7 in Seyla Benhabib (2011) Dignity in Adversity: 
Human Rights in Troubled Times, Polity.
32­ Jon­Mandle­(2006)­Global Justice, Polity Press, p. 86.
33­ Mandle­2006­ibid.­p.­87.
34­ Mandle­2006­ibid.­p.­87.
35­ Gillian­Brock­(2009)­Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account, Oxford University Press.
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in this discussion the focus is not on the rights of noncitizens themselves, but on 
the implications for other groups: for citizens and others left behind. This is quite 
common.­ In­ her­ early­work,­ even­Martha­Nussbaum,­ upon­whose­ capabilities­
approach this book draws heavily in Chapter 9, assumes citizen- composition, 
and that a State’s obligations are principally to its own citizens. She uses the 
word ‘citizen’ without explanation and does not discuss the implications of non-
citizenship. For example, in 2003, to indicate universality, she wrote that entitle-
ment is for all citizens, continuing: ‘to secure a right to citizens in these areas is 
to put them in a position of capability to function in that area.’36 Amartya Sen 
reflects­ on­ needing­ to­ ensure­ all­ ‘citizens’­ have­ access­ to­ development­ and­ a­
voice in society, but it is sometimes also unclear who he would include in that 
constituency.37­ In­ 2011,­Nussbaum­ explicitly­ rejected­ justice­ theorising­whose­
scope is limited to citizens.38
 And yet citizenship is often seen as arbitrary, as a status of inherited privi-
lege, or an essentially ‘caste- like’ ‘rank of citizenship’.39 Despite this, the experi-
ence of formal citizenship is itself unequal and less secure than it could be. Here 
emerges another important role for noncitizenship. On one hand, class, race, 
ethnicity and gender, for example, can alter persons’ experiences of citizenship, 
so that there is an intertwining of citizenship with noncitizenship.40 On the other 
hand,­ some­may­want­ to­ reject­ aspects­of­ citizenship,­ claiming­an­empowered­
noncitizenship.41 Noncitizenship and citizenship are not mutually exclusive. Rec-
ognising this makes it possible to identify and to address discrimination within 
the system in a new way.
­ For­ David­ Miller,­ a­ State’s­ right­ to­ exclude­ comes­ with­ the­ obligation­ to­
protect the equal status of all those living within its borders.42 For liberal com-
munitarians­ like­ Miller,­ there­ must­ be­ universal­ membership­ within­ a­ State,­
36­ Martha­Nussbaum­ (2003)­ ‘Capabilities­ as­ Fundamental­ Entitlements:­ Sen­ and­ Social­ Justice’,­
pp. 33–59 in Feminist Economics 9, p. 35, p. 7.
37 Amartya Sen (2009) The Idea of Justice, Allen Lane, London, pp. 352–355.
38­ Martha­Nussbaum­(2011)­Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, Harvard 
University Press, p. 128.
39 For example, Joseph Carens (1987) ‘Aliens and Citizenships: The Case for Open Borders’, 
pp. 251–273 in The Review of Politics 49(2),­p.­252;­Gregory­Vlastos­(1984)­‘Justice­and­Equal-
ity’, pp. 41–76 in Jeremy Waldron (ed.) Theories of Rights, Oxford University Press, p. 54.
40 For example, Elizabeth Anderson (2011) The Imperative of Integration, Princeton University 
Press;­Evelyn­Nakano­Glenn­(2004)­Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American 
Citizenship and Labor,­Harvard­University­Press;­‘Essays’­ in­Tariq­Modood,­Anna­Triandafyl-
lidou and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (2006) Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European 
Approach.­ In­Chapter­9,­ I­also­discuss­ this­with­ regard­particularly­ to­ the­semi-fictional­figure­
presented in Buchi Emecheta’s Second Class Citizen. See also Leti Volpp (2007) ‘Citizenship 
Undone’, pp. 25–79 in Fordham Law Review­75;­Niraja­Gopal­Jayal­(2013)­Citizenship and Its 
Discontents: An Indian History, Harvard University Press.
41 Developed in Chapter 6.
42­ David­Miller­ (2005)­ ‘Immigration:­ The­Case­ for­ Limits’,­ pp.­ 193–206­ in­Andrew­Cohen­ and­
Christopher Heath Wellman (eds) (2005) Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, Blackwell, 
p. 205.
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which requires that the State’s culture and social character are protected by 
strong external borders, trumping claims of outsiders. This is why, famously, for 
Michael­Walzer,­allowing­there­to­be­non-­member­permanent­residents­within­a­
State is like being in a house with ‘live- in servants’, leaving some people, while 
fully present and contributing to society, effectively denied full human status 
within the polity. To avoid this, Walzer advocates easy access to membership for 
all­long-­term­residents­alongside­significantly­closed­borders.­On­one­level,­this­
is positive, giving the individuals concerned the option of accessing citizenship. 
But this is based on an implicit citizenism. Stretching the household metaphor 
(which is already over- stretched by Walzer), it also seems a little like household-
ers saying that if someone wants to work for them, s/he has to become a family 
member, whether s/he wants to or not.
 To see the problem with this it is useful to look beyond the metaphor, at real- 
world­ discourse­ relating­ to­ the­ treatment­ of­ migrant­ domestic­ workers.­ Mary­
Romero critiques the quasi- family relationship which she argues has often been 
cultivated between employers and domestic workers in the United States. She 
observes that this stands in the way of those workers accessing the full dignity 
and respect of workers.43 In the UK, it has been observed that households 
employing such workers often characterise themselves as ‘benefactors’ or ‘hosts’ 
who are enabling those individuals to start a new life in the country, rather than 
seeing themselves as employers of employees who are providing a service.44 
This skews the logic of the relationship. The worker is expected to be grateful 
and may struggle to claim rights.
 These writers demonstrate the need for live- in workers not to be seen as 
family members. The alternative to a house with live- in servants need not, there-
fore, be a house with family members treated as servants, as Walzer suggests. 
Instead, it could be a house with paid members of staff who are respected and 
treated appropriately, in the role of employees. Walzer’s example is emotive and 
provides a useful stimulus for thought. However, his solution does not take a 
sufficiently­critical­approach­to­existing­relationships.
 While most thinkers would not go as far as Walzer, in the power of his 
example and his response to it, we see implications of assuming citizenship to be 
the only proper relationship with a State. This most commonly arises as a result 
of a State- based status quo (with States largely understood as nation- States); 
what has variously been called ‘methodological nationalism’ and ‘explanatory 
nationalism’.45 That is, a system that assumes nations. It gives rise to ‘methodo-
logical citizenism’, an assumption of citizenship as the principal or only form of 
relationship between an individual and a State.
43­ Mary­Romero­(2016)­Maid in the USA,­Routledge­[first­published­1995];­ILO­2013­p.­44.
44­ Bridget­Anderson­(2007)­‘A­Very­Private­Business.­Exploring­the­Demand­for­Migrant­Domestic­
Workers’, pp. 247–264 in European Journal of Women’s Studies 14(3).
45 Thomas Pogge (1997) ‘The Boundaries of Nationalism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26; 
Ulrich Beck (2004) ‘Cosmopolitan Realism: on the distinction between cosmopolitanism in 
philosophy and in the social sciences’, in Global Networks 4(2).
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 This citizenism relates to noncitizenism in some sense as sexism relates to 
feminism or racism to the pursuit of racial equality. It has been referred to by 
Jason­Tucker­and­Matthew­Gibney­as­‘tyranny’­of­citizenship­and­of­citizens.46 
It­is­difficult­retroactively­to­take­noncitizens­into­account­in­structures­theor-
etically­ defined­without­ them.47 Work will be needed in order to make sure 
those­ structures­ can­ address­ noncitizenship.­ It­ will­ be­ difficult.­ But­ it­ is­ not­
impossible.
The search for an alternative
There­is­disagreement­regarding­how­to­address­these­weaknesses.­Much­empha-
sis has been placed upon widening access to existing systems through citizen-
ship, while others have proposed ways to enable rights outside citizenship.48 
Another approach is to advocate easier access to border crossings, including 
internal border crossings.49 There is also a growing body of work arguing for 
more radical change. Some advocate recognition of a form of global citizenship 
or another kind of universal membership, while others worry that liberal theory 
may simply be at an impasse that liberalism itself simply cannot address.50 One 
other approach is to critique the very notion of citizenship as currently con-
structed­and­to­pursue­a­different­political­project.51
­ Some­have­ tried­ to­ address­ this­ by­fixing­ the­way­ in­which­ citizenship­ is­
defined­and­how­it­is­allocated.­They­problematise­arbitrary­and­excluding­cit-
izenship regimes based on birth, advocating something like what Ayelet 
Shachar calls jus nexi in citizenship acquisition, which would be based upon a 
person’s connections within the citizenry. Dora Kristopoulou, who looks at 
46­ Jason­Tucker­and­Matthew­Gibney­take­slightly­different­approaches.­While­Tucker­refers­to­the­
‘tyranny­of­citizenship’,­warning­about­the­tyranny­of­the­institution­of­citizenship,­Gibney­refers­
to the ‘tyranny of the citizens’, to characterise the fact that those with membership are able to 
have power over those kept from membership. Jason Tucker (2013) ‘Challenging the tyranny of 
citizenship: statelessness in Lebanon’, Doctoral Thesis, University of Bath, September 2013, 
p.­181;­Matthew­Gibney­(2008)­‘Who­Should­be­Included?­Noncitizens,­Conflict­and­the­Consti-
tution of the Citizenry’, in F. Stewart (ed.) (2008) Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Under-
standing Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies,­Palgrave­Macmillan.
47 John Rawls (2005) Political Liberalism Expanded Edition, Columbia University Press, p. 13.
48 Ayelet Shachar (2009) The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality, Harvard 
 University Press; Katherine Tonkiss (2013) Migration and Identity in a Post-National World, 
Palgrave­Macmillan;­Bauböck­ibid.;­Hammar­ibid.
49 Joseph Carens (2013) The Ethics of Immigration, Oxford University Press; Linda Bosniak (2008) 
‘Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants’, pp. 123–138 in Engin Isin, 
Peter Nyers and Bryan Turner (eds) (2008) Citizenship Between Past and Future, Routledge.
50 Seyla Benhabib (2004) The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press; Luis Cabrera (2010) The Practice of Global Citizenship, Cambridge University Press; 
Cole 2000 ibid.
51 Engin Isin (2002) Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship,­University­ of­Minnesota­Press;­
Engin Isin (2012) Citizens Without Frontiers, Bloomsbury. See also Linda Bosniak (2010) 
‘Peasants and Citizens in Constitutional Thought’, pp. 9–29 in I-CONN 8.
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citizenship based on residence and Katherine Tonkiss, who focuses on embrac-
ing State institutions themselves as key, also seek to expand citizenship and in 
important ways.52­Their­work­ does­ not­ conflict­with­ that­ presented­ here,­ but­
seeks to answer different questions. These approaches contribute to an urgent 
re-­examination­ of­ the­ justice­ of­ citizenship.­ This­ book­ adds­ that­ insofar as 
such individuals are in fact experiencing the State qua noncitizens, they have 
claims qua noncitizens. It is likely that many people currently primarily relat-
ing as noncitizens need access to much stronger citizenships for the reasons 
Shachar, Kristopoulou, Nyers, Tonkiss and others set out. However, such indi-
viduals also currently relate with State institutions in another way, and this 
also needs to be acknowledged. As was argued in the context of communitari-
anism above, even if the relationship between external and internal borders is 
established, it is still necessary to take noncitizens, including territorially 
present­ noncitizens,­ into­ account­ when­ thinking­ about­ justice­ and­ how­ to­
operationalise it.
 State obligations towards territorially present noncitizens have been analysed 
in the context of migration discourse. Recently, some have emphasised the need 
to move away from focusing on the most vulnerable of migrants as an exception 
to an assumption of exclusion to include also persons to whom Bas Schotel and 
Joseph Carens respectively refer as ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’.53 A key text in this 
move is Bas Schotel’s 2012 book, On the Right of Exclusion, which demands 
justification­ for­ the­ exclusion­ even­ of­ ordinary­ migrants.­ Against­ common­
assumptions, he argues that it is exclusion­ that­needs­ to­be­ justified,­not­ inclu-
sion. However, while Schotel deals primarily with border- crossing, this book 
draws­ upon­ similar­ justifiability­ problems­ in­ the­ State-­noncitizen­ relationship­
more broadly.
 In his 2013 book, The Ethics of Immigration,54 Joseph Carens brings several 
decades of work together to present an approach to entry to a State’s territory 
that has evolved since his famous 1987 article.55 The current book takes into 
account both Schotel and Carens’s ways of addressing how ‘ordinary’ or 
‘normal’ individuals enter into relationships with States and what this means 
for noncitizen claims on States. Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi’s 2016 book, Migra-
tion in Political Theory provides a useful overview of contemporary philo-
sophical and theoretical debates about migration.56­Many­of­the­essays­in­this­
collection were directed towards addressing the problems associated with non-
citizenship. And yet it did not seem to engage explicitly with noncitizenship 
qua noncitizenship.
52 Shachar 2009, ibid.
53 Bas Schotel (2012) On the Right of Exclusion, Routledge; Carens 2013 ibid.
54 Carens 2013 ibid.
55 Carens 1987 ibid.
56 Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi (eds) (2016) Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and 
Membership, Oxford University Press.
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 Noncitizenism draws attention to the substantial obligation- generating relation-
ship between noncitizens and States, showing that noncitizen rights are not purely 
humanitarian­in­nature,­and­are­not­supererogatory,­but­are­part­of­a­just­institutional­
arrangement. When persons have to prove either citizenship or some quasi- 
citizenship in order to make claims against a State, this means that anyone unable to 
do so will be seen as (hyphenated) non- citizens, assumed to have no recognised rela-
tionship with, or claim upon, the State concerned. The recognition of (unhyphenated) 
noncitizenship is, then, both theoretically appropriate and in fact urgent. There is also 
a readiness for change amongst some international policy actors. There has been a 
growing and developing constellation of entities and processes directed at securing 
the­rights­of­various­groups­of­noncitizens,­whether­through­the­Millennium­Devel-
opment­Goals­and­their­successors,­the­Sustainable­Development­Goals­or­increasing­
discussions of migration and the claims of migrants, for example.57
 It is increasingly acknowledged that rights need to be secured for migrants, 
workers and refugees, as well as for those stateless persons who have not moved. 
Globally,­there­is­realisation­that­individuals­are­vulnerable­to­States­far­away­and­
theorists and policy- makers alike have been seeking ways to secure rights in this 
context. There has also been increasing recognition of the interconnection between 
these various instances of noncitizenship. The noncitizenism I present brings this 
work­together.­It­offers­an­analytical­tool­that­allows­the­specific­vulnerability­–­and­
the challenge – of all of these individuals’ relationships with States to be understood 
together. This addresses a core problem in contemporary understandings of liberal-
ism,­and­some­of­the­inherited­difficulties­from­liberalism’s­problematic­past.
­ Another­way­to­see­this­challenge­is­through­an­image.­Gohar­Dashti’s­photo-
graph of a couple embracing in the desert, alongside their pile of belongings, is 
desolate. But it is also challenging. There is something in it that does not make 
sense. We do not know how the couple came to be in the desert. And it is not 
clear how they will live if they continue to be here. Their bodies and their 
belongings seem small and futile in comparison to the dry of the desert around 
them and the rocks behind them. And yet, Dashti writes of the series of images, 
entitled ‘Stateless’, of which this is a part:
Maybe­ it­ is­ only­ at­ this­ point,­when­nature­ can­ be­ a­ safe­ haven­ for­ these­
refugees. Sky becomes the ceiling and mountains the walls of their new 
home; because Nature is the only promising place that shelters these people, 
an eternal and everlasting refuge.
The photographs are taken in the desert, reportedly staged on the island of 
Qeshm­in­the­Persian­Gulf.58 The environment seems inhospitable but, as Dashti 
57 This is picked up again in Chapter 11.
58­ Cate­ McQuaid­ (2016)­ ‘­“Stateless”­ photographs­ timely­ and­ timeless’,­ The Boston Globe 12 
January­ 2016,­ www.bostonglobe.com/arts/2016/01/12/images-from-iran-filled-with-mystery-
drama/FUsk3FGuXukdGLEZt1AOgI/story.html­(accessed­4th­April­2017)].­That­they­are­taken­
in Iran and not a State identifying as liberal democratic does not detract from the power of the 
images in the context under discussion in this book.
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explains, it is also a haven. Like the individuals forced to put themselves at the 
mercy­of­nature,­on­flimsy­boats­ in­ the­photographs­ in­Chapter­11,­ these­ indi-
viduals are forced to seek their shelter in the sparse landscape of rocks. Unable 
to­find­recognition­within­a­State­or­ the­State­system,­individuals­are­forced­to­
find­ shelter­ in­ nature,­ but­ to­ do­ so­ not­ in­ a­ state­ of­ nature,­ but­ in­ a­world­ of­
States.­ This­ turns­ liberal­ justifications­ of­ the­ State­ on­ their­ head,­ challenging­
their legitimacy and forcing us to rethink the role of noncitizenship in a liberal 
State.
Figure 3.1­ Stateless­(Gohar­Dashti).
4 Introducing ‘unwanted’ 
noncitizens
‘Unwanted’ noncitizens here refers to those noncitizens with whom a State or 
States would rather have no relationship at all. This chapter considers in par-
ticular the situation for irregular migrants and stateless persons within a State 
built on liberal democratic principles. While the contexts for those defined in 
these two ways are different, both can be characterised by State non- recognition 
of its relationship with individuals, putting them at risk of extreme vulnerability 
with regard to core capabilities. There are other commonalities. For example, 
many stateless persons in fact lack travel documents. If such individuals want to 
travel internationally, they must do so irregularly. Conversely, irregular migrants 
or their children may end up effectively or formally stateless, or at risk of state-
lessness, because of lost documents or difficulties with birth registration, for 
example.1 This chapter focuses largely on ‘unwanted’ noncitizens in situ. This is 
because in these cases, the nature of the individual- State relationship is particu-
larly easy to uncover. There is much discussion here of their vulnerability, but 
irregular immigrants and stateless persons should not only or even primarily be 
seen as vulnerable. They are active agents (albeit constrained) who are poten-
tially challenging a State and the State system.
 The rights and interests of ‘unwanted’ noncitizens are usually the last to be 
considered, if at all. Yet their relationships with the States where they live can 
tell us much about the construction of noncitizen- vulnerability and how dehu-
manisation, stigma and shame create and recreate this vulnerability in new ways. 
Existing arguments for the rights of these ‘unwanted’ noncitizens often rely upon 
humanitarian concerns and rights which, as they are seen as outside the institu-
tional framework, can sometimes appear to be supererogatory. Yet, irrespective 
of a particular State’s intentions or interests, a State based on liberal democratic 
principles has a fundamental and substantive relationship with its noncitizens, 
including those with whom it would rather have no relationship at all. Nonciti-
zens in general, and ‘unwanted’ noncitizens in particular, are made vulnerable to 
that State, a vulnerability that is reinforced rather than neutralised by its denial. 
1 Jacqueline Bhabha (2011) Children Without a State: A Global Human Rights Challenge, MIT 
Press; Laura van Waas (2009) Nationality Matters: Statelessness Under International Law, 
Intersentia Publishers p. 12.
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With this in mind, this chapter also observes that, while access to citizenship is 
important, trying to address noncitizen- vulnerability only through the acquisition 
of citizenship and proxy- citizenship risks further entrenching some of the prob-
lems it aims to solve.
 Before launching into the chapter, it is important to make some notes. First, 
statelessness is not a migratory status. It may sometimes arise as a result of 
migration, but this is not the only mechanism.2 Statelessness can arise for 
example from administrative, gender and ethnicity barriers, from changes in 
State borders and changes in relationships between States.3 Crucially, a person is 
stateless because s/he is not recognised as a citizen by any State. Second, a 
person can enter the category of ‘irregular immigrant’ when s/he crosses an 
international border without (perhaps arbitrarily withheld) permission. But a 
person can also find that s/he has become an irregular immigrant without 
moving. This happens, for example, with the expiry of a visa, a change in rela-
tions between States, or perhaps as a result of a change or cessation of employ-
ment or an employment contract. In such cases, it is not the migration itself that 
is irregular, but how a person and her/is activities are or are not categorized 
within the State in question. Studying the situations for these two groups of 
‘unwanted’ noncitizens is instructive, then, in terms of both their commonalities 
and their dissimilarities.
Irregular immigrants
‘Illegals’ is not a noun. It is not a noun. […] what you can say is that it is an 
immigrant living illegally or that it is an immigrant living without papers or 
without documents in this country. But what you cannot do is to label a 
person ‘illegal’.
(Maria Hinojosa, speaking to Steve Cortes, an advisor to then US 
Presidential Candidate Donald Trump on the television show 
MSNBC ‘AM Joy’ on 31 October 2016)
Irregular immigrants are the quintessential ‘unwanted’ noncitizens. They are 
people with whom a State or States has explicitly tried to refuse a territorial (or 
any) relationship and yet who are manifestly in just such a relationship. The adjec-
tive ‘irregular’ is used in this chapter. A phenomenon is ‘irregular’ if it does not 
follow an expected pattern or some set of regulations, or goes against attempts at 
regulation. This provides a good description of the form of migration discussed 
here, and ‘irregular’ (as an adjective) lacks the value- ascription made by other 
terms often employed (such as ‘illegal’ or ‘clandestine’). Irregular migration might 
2 See Caia Vlieks’s discussion of statelessness in situ and statelessness in a migratory context: Caia 
Vlieks (2017) ‘Contexts of Statelessness: The Concepts “Statelessness in Situ” and “Statelessness 
in the Migratory Context” ’, in Bloom, Tonkiss and Cole, (eds) 2017, ibid.
3 For example, Laura van Waas (2008) Nationality Matters: Statelessness Under International Law, 
Intersentia.
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accompany criminal activities, and the deprivations associated with an irregular 
status might push people into illegal activity, but irregular migration itself seems 
more like an administrative infraction than a dangerous crime. The reference here 
is to ‘immigrants’ rather than ‘migrants’ as the discussion for now relates to the 
relationship between such persons and the State(s) where they are currently in situ.
 Not everyone agrees. Peter Schuck, for example, argues that one should ‘call 
the activity what it manifestly is, “illegal”, rather than “irregular”, an arguably 
amoral euphemism’.4 From a very different perspective, Nicholas De Genova 
argues that ‘irregular’ is a ‘less obnoxious but not less problematic’ proxy for 
‘illegal’.5 For De Genova, migration that circumvents administrative systems is 
not illegal in the usual sense of the word and so it is not irregular. He advocates 
‘undocumented’ as the most honest term since the anomaly being highlighted is 
one of documentation.6 However, this risks excluding: someone whose presence 
is irregularly documented; someone whose presence is regularly documented, 
but whose employment is not; or someone whose documentation has elapsed. 
The focus here is upon the deviation from the status quo, the irregularity.
 The term ‘extra- legal’, suggested by Catherine Dauvergne prima facie provides a 
useful alternative.7 It locates the activity outside the law rather than against it. This is 
initially attractive, but in reality, irregular immigrants may well follow the law, pay 
tax, and support a State’s legal systems. They may be forced in some instances to 
contravene regulations because of the way their relationships with a State have been 
constructed. It seems likely that such individuals do not feel like they have a supra- 
legal relationship, but rather have an agonistic one with the law, fearing detection 
because they are unavoidably contravening administrative prescriptions.8 The rela-
tionship they have with the State(s) concerned is not extra- legal, but irregular.
 A person is considered to be an ‘irregular’ immigrant if her/is presence or work 
within the State where s/he is present or working is in contravention of that State’s 
administrative regulations governing entry, residence or work. This includes those 
who have committed serious crimes in their home countries and now live abroad to 
avoid punishment, alongside child soldiers who have fled torture and being forced 
to kill, but are now unable to prove their age, identity, and the validity of their need 
4 Schuck, with Rogers Smith, has gained notoriety by lobbying to block jus soli American citizenship 
for the children of irregular immigrants; see for example Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith (1996) 
‘Two Yale Professors argue against the concept of … Citizenship Without Consent’, The Social Con-
tract Fall 1996; Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith (1985) Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in 
the American Polity, Yale University Press; Peter Schuck, Response to ‘Forum: The Case for 
Amnesty’, initiated by Joseph Carens, Boston Review May 1 2009, http://bostonreview.net/forum/
case-amnesty/moral-argument-details-matter-peter-schuck (accessed 4 April 2017).
5 Nicholas De Genova (2002) ‘Migration ‘Illegality’ and Deportability in Every Day Life’, Annual 
Review of Anthropology 31 p. 420.
6 De Genova 2002, ibid.
7 Catherine Dauvergne (2008) Making People Illegal: What Globalisation Means for Migration and 
Law, Cambridge University Press.
8 For example, see discussion by Jose Antonio Vargas in his 2013 film, Documented, as he dis-
cusses the difficulties he experiences in regularising his status.
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for protection. It includes someone who has travelled with cash from illicit trade to 
continue such trade in a new country, alongside a mother or father who has spent 
months travelling dangerously to a more affluent State to earn money from menial 
labour to send home. It also includes the American gap- year backpackers who, 
allowing their visas to expire in Australia, float into what, in 2013/14, continued to 
be one of Australia’s largest irregular immigrant groups.9 It has been found that 
people migrate irregularly for similar reasons to those for which people migrate 
more generally. The activity is rendered irregular by the administrative institutions 
rather than the people who move.10
 In examining irregularity, it is useful to consider who it is that migration reg-
ulations are intended to exclude, and so whose movement and whose presence it 
is intended to delegitimise. Consider the American backpackers in Australia 
mentioned above. Australian government data show that US citizens have per-
sistently made up the third- largest group of ‘unlawful non- citizens’ in Australia, 
comprising 8 per cent of Australia’s irregular immigrants in 2012, 2013 and 
2014, just below the numbers of Malaysian and Chinese citizens respectively. 
Indeed, migrants from OECD countries comprise well over a third of all 
Australia’s ‘unlawful non- citizens’ for all three years (38.1 per cent in 2012, 
37.8 per cent in 2013, 37.5 per cent in 2014).11 And yet no OECD citizens were 
recorded to have been in Australian immigration detention facilities in the period 
31 January 2013 to 31 December 2014 (the period overlapping the above statis-
tics for which data was available at the time of writing).12
 During this period, the detained immigrant population in Australia was 
recorded to have been made up, to different extents over time, of citizens of: 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, India, Iraq, Iran, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Viet Nam, as well as stateless persons. For the 
period after this until July 2016, two additional nationalities started to appear in 
Australian immigration detention. From March 2015, New Zealanders were 
recorded to be held in detention, rising quickly to be the second- largest group, 
and from October 2015, UK citizens also began to be recorded.13 US citizens 
 9 Data taken from Australian Government (2014) Australia’s Migration Trends 2013–14, Com-
monwealth of Australia, p. 137. This also provides the data for Chart 2.1. At the time of writing, 
this is the most recent data available. I first came across this phenomenon in Catherine Dauvergne 
(2008) Making People Illegal: What Globalisation Means for Migration and Law, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 16, n. 43.
10 For example, see discussions in: Bimal Ghosh (ed.) (1998) Huddled Masses and Uncertain 
Shores: Insights Into Irregular Migration, Kluwer Law International; Khalid Koser (2007) Inter-
national Migration: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, p. 54; see also discus-
sion in Vicki Squire (2016) ‘Unauthorised migration beyond structure/agency? Acts, 
interventions, effects’, Politics, online view 1 December 2016.
11 Australian Government 2014 ibid.
12 Australian Border Agency Immigration Detention Statistics monthly reports, available from: 
www.border.gov.au/about/reports-publications/research-statistics/statistics/live-in-australia/
immigration-detention (accessed 31 August 2016).
13 Malaysian detainees were recorded in April 2016, but not before or since.
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were not recorded in immigration detention. This can help us to explore whose 
presence the prescription of irregularity is intended to delegitimise and suggests 
that the way in which noncitizenship is experienced is not homogenous, not even 
amongst ‘unwanted’ noncitizens.
 Discourse about irregular migration can often be polarised, describing people 
either as victims or as villains, with those who support the rights of the individuals 
involved tending to place more individuals into the victim category.14 Bridget 
Anderson has warned that drawing such firm lines makes some persons seem 
villainous when they are more appropriately described, if anything, as victims, 
while characterising people as victims suggests they can only suffer or be helped, 
but cannot be angry or participate.15 This contributes to the dehumanisation which 
will be taken up in Chapter 5. Acknowledging the relationship of noncitizenship 
can help to provide a way in which to represent irregular immigrants as active 
agents in their own right. Noncitizens in general, and ‘unwanted’ noncitizens in par-
ticular, are vulnerable, but they are not only vulnerable and while this chapter 
focuses on vulnerability, later in this book the emphasis is on agency and the chal-
lenge of activated noncitizenship for States built upon liberal democratic principles.
 Irregular migration exists because it is defined into existence.16 While indi-
viduals choose to migrate, often knowing this is going to leave them in irregular 
situations, a person cannot be an irregular immigrant except by definition by a 
State – or by non- attribution of status by a State. In a liberal theory of justice 
there is no underlying moral reason to render the activity in which such persons 
engage (border- crossing, work, setting up a home) illegal or wrongful in itself. 
And it is not trivial to argue that an individual should be impeded in these basic 
activities. This is not to suggest that there are no good reasons to exclude, and no 
good reasons to define some forms of migration as irregular. It may be neces-
sary, for example, to stop someone escaping justice, or causing disorder.
 This can be seen in one of two ways. Either it is a matter of social coordin-
ation (such as that which allocates on which side of the road we can drive), or it 
is a matter of administration, or a mix of the two. In any case, the construction of 
irregular immigration is bureaucratic. Yet, where (even mostly beneficial) bur-
eaucratic rules end up harming the vulnerable, this provides a reason to override 
them – or at least a reason why their enforcement needs to be justified.17 The 
argument in this book so far has suggested that the vulnerability of many noncit-
izens within the current State system is a symptom of a deeper theoretical 
problem. The construction of irregularity not only makes such individuals more 
vulnerable. It also creates a new sort of vulnerability. Seen in this way, irregular 
migration is for the most part symptomatic of a failure of theoretical and policy 
14 Bridget Anderson (2008) ‘ “Illegal immigrant”: Victim or Villain?’, ESRC Centre on Migration, 
Policy and Society Working Paper No. 64, University of Oxford.
15 Anderson 2008 ibid.
16 For example, argued in Dauvergne 2008 ibid., p. 15.
17 Robert Goodin (1986) Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities, 
University of Chicago Press.
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frameworks to take full account of reality.18 In becoming irregular immigrants, 
some individuals become vulnerable to the State and to individuals with regard 
to their access to the most basic goods. For some of those, as with the Americans 
in Australia, discussed above, the vulnerability is mitigated by other factors, 
such as citizenship elsewhere. For others, the vulnerability might be extreme – 
and indeed recent self- immolations in Australian immigration detention facilities 
are testament to the impact that it has had on individuals.19
 There is another aspect to this. When irregular migration is constructed as crimi-
nal in itself, this also needs to be seen as a criminalisation of asylum- seeking.20 
Efforts to prevent irregular migration, including mobilisations against smuggling, 
make it difficult for people fleeing humanitarian calamities to find somewhere safe 
to be.21 This is because such persons are most often moving irregularly. This means 
that even if you take a very narrow view on entitlement to move, including only the 
principle of asylum, then efforts to criminalise and to prevent irregular movement 
also impede asylum. In addition, by constructing irregular migration as criminal 
and irregular migrants as villainous means that people in these situations are more 
easily dehumanised. This also leads to a secondary form of criminalisation and 
another aspect of dehumanisation. Often without access to legal work or welfare, 
living undercover, sometimes in debt to people smugglers, ‘unwanted’ noncitizens 
may have to participate in criminal activity such as theft, for example, in order to 
survive. This further excludes such individuals from the State system. It removes 
from affected individuals the moral choice to be law- abiding and constrains their 
freedom to avoid activities that they consider to be wrong.
 Some irregular migrants are seeking asylum, others may be fleeing conditions 
such as famine or State collapse. There are many other reasons, and 
combinations of reasons, why people move. They may move in order to be better 
located within the international system to which they are vulnerable. This move-
ment in turn may put people into a situation of further vulnerability. However, it 
should also be seen as active and as challenging to that system. The movement is 
challenging because it demonstrates illiberal realities of States built upon liberal 
18 Lea Ypi (2008) ‘Justice in Migration: A Closed Borders Utopia?’ pp. 391–418 in Journal of 
Political Philosophy 16(4), p. 395.
19 For example, 23-year-old Iranian detainee Omid Masoumali died in May 2016 after setting 
himself on fire on camera at the Nauru detention facility, declaring that he was ‘exhausted’, 
adding ‘I cannot take it any more’, referring to his life in the camp; see Ben Doherty and Helen 
Davidson (2016) ‘Self-immolation: desperate protests against Australia’s detention regime’, in 
the Guardian, 3 May 2016. The August 2016 release of the Nauru Papers shows the devastating 
extent of suicide attempts and self-harm in the detention facility on the island. This is also dis-
cussed in Chapter 3.
20 For example, see Matthew Gibney (2004) The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy 
and the Response to Refugees, Cambridge University Press; Vicki Squire (2009) The Exclusion-
ary Politics of Asylum, Palgrave Macmillan.
21 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (2011) Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Globali-
sation of Migration Control, Cambridge University Press; Valsamis Mitsilegas (2015) The Crimi-
nalisation of Migration in Europe: Challenges for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Springer.
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democratic principles and forces such States to encounter people with whom 
they would rather not relate.22 Irregular migration is closely tied both to border 
controls and to the reasons people have to move. As such, an individual who is 
already vulnerable to the citizenist system of States may well move in order to 
reposition her/himself within it and so to alter the impact of that vulnerability. 
The vulnerabilities of irregular migrants are continuous with the vulnerabilities 
of those who do not move, including those unable to move. This can be under-
stood in terms of a shared relationship of noncitizenship.
Stateless persons
I was born in 1990 on December 10th in Newcastle here in South Africa. In 
1994, I moved to Kenya with my mum. When my mum was murdered, we 
left for Uganda. In 2007, I tried to allocate my citizenship. My potential 
target was to locate some of my relatives here in South Africa. On my 
approach to Newcastle, that was the first time I was arrested, because I 
didn’t have any legal document. From there I was detained for almost a 
month, then I was taken to the Repatriation Centre in Lindela.
[…]
I have been arrested several times. I cannot even count how many times. 
Every time I’m arrested, I am assaulted. They can kick you, they can hit 
you. They can do anything they want, because you don’t have any rights. 
The only thing they can say: “Eish, we are tired of foreigners here in South 
Africa!” These arrests, I don’t think it is going to stop. Every time I’s being 
asked to identify myself, I cannot. But there is no solution to my problems. 
There is no country where I am known.
[…]
People do not believe that on this planet there are stateless people, but I do 
exist: I am a stateless person.
(Khumbulani Frederik Ngubane, stateless man in South Africa, 
speaking in 201423)
Officially, a stateless person is someone who is not recognised as a ‘national’ by 
any State under the operation of its laws.24 The implications of statelessness 
22 Movement as itself a noncitizenist act is examined further in Chapter 11.
23 Taken from the documentary film, Belonging, 2014, produced by Lawyers for Human Rights, 
South Africa, UNHCR and OneTwoDee www.youtube.com/watch?v=s07egavs3FM (accessed 
14 June 2016).
24 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954 Article 1(1). The number of stateless 
persons in the world is unknown. Using UNHCR and NGO data, the Institute for Statelessness 
and Inclusion estimates that there are more than 15 million stateless persons. It is also possible to 
take a wider definition, including also all who cannot call upon their citizenship, which makes 
the number of persons affected much greater. For a problematisation of the use of ‘national’ here, 
see for example Katherine Tonkiss (2017) ‘Statelessness and the Performance of Citizenship-As-
Nationality’, pp. 241–254 in Tendayi Bloom, Katherine Tonkiss and Phillip Cole (eds) (2017) 
Understanding Statelessness, Routledge.
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demonstrate, perhaps more than anything, the inconsistencies written into exist-
ing citizenist frameworks and the resulting vulnerability that can be invisible to 
insiders. Stateless persons may be subject to every sort of privation.25 Such indi-
viduals are extremely vulnerable to States and to the State system as they largely 
have no recognised place within it. This vulnerability may well not be accom-
panied by any mitigating protections, neither in theory nor in fact. As can be 
seen in Khumbulani Frederik Ngubane’s story above, which is not unique to 
South Africa, stateless persons can be caught within a State system that is not 
structured to acknowledge them. They may be arrested as irregular immigrants 
but cannot be deported to anywhere. They may be punished for not having docu-
ments while being given no means to obtain any. The inconsistency of this is 
also illustrated by Gohar Dashti’s photograph at the end of the last chapter, 
where individuals seek shelter in the desert, though they have no shelter and it is 
unclear how they will be able to live.
 While someone like Ngubane, quoted above, urgently needs access to a 
recognised formal citizenship, it is also necessary to recognise the claims of 
justice he has against the States concerned even without it. That is, stateless 
persons have liberal theoretical (as well as legal) claims of justice upon States, 
even as stateless persons. A stateless person also has a noncitizen relationship 
with the State(s) in question. Addressing stateless persons’ claims within liberal 
democratic discourse is theoretically important and urgent from a practical per-
spective. The language of noncitizenship can help.
 On the face of it, one could suppose that statelessness should not occur within 
a well- functioning liberal democratic system. But even in such a system there 
could be persons who were stateless (this is taken up particularly in Chapter 6). 
Irrespective of this, let us look at the reality of statelessness today. It can arise in 
a number of ways.26 For example, some ethnic groups experience inherited state-
lessness, such as the Rohingya in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Myanmar or the 
Roma communities in some parts of Europe. Some other populations, because of 
poverty, prejudice, or inefficient administration, may find it difficult to register 
life events, so that children end up unable to prove a citizen relationship with 
any State.27 This can also occur for other reasons. For example, laws in some 
countries which prevent mothers passing their citizenship to their children will 
leave children of a woman without a male citizen spouse unable to claim any cit-
izenship. Children may also fall between systems of citizenship laws. For 
example, some States allocate formal citizenship mostly based on birth to citizen 
25 This is detailed, for example, in Laura van Waas (2009) Nationality Matters: Statelessness Under 
International Law, School of Human Rights Research. For a theoretical analysis, see Kelly 
Staples (2012) Retheorising Statelessness: A Background Theory of Membership in World 
Politics, Edinburgh University Press.
26 For a comprehensive analysis see van Waas 2009 ibid.; van Waas and de Chickera 2017 ibid.
27 Zahra Al Barazi and Jason Tucker (2017) ‘Challenging the Disunity of Statelessness in the 
Middle East and North Africa’, pp. 87–101 in Tendayi Bloom, Katherine Tonkiss and Philip 
Cole (eds) (2017) Understanding Statelessness, Routledge.
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parents (jus sanguinis), while others allocate formal citizenship based on birth 
on the territory (jus soli). A child born on the territory of a jus sanguinis State to 
citizens of a jus soli State will struggle to claim any citizenship.28 Other factors, 
like disruptions to normal birth registration, can also make it difficult for chil-
dren to be allocated a citizenship. This might happen in the context of war, 
migration or epidemic, for example.
 People can also become stateless as adults. For example, when a person’s 
State of citizenship ceases to exist or changes in form, s/he may find her/imself 
outside citizenship frameworks. Widespread instances of this have occured 
during periods of decolonisation (e.g. the ending of the British Empire and the 
USSR), with effects that are still being felt.29 The recent splitting of the State of 
Sudan is now also making it difficult for some people to assert a citizenship.30 In 
some countries people may have their citizenship removed, or renounce their cit-
izenship voluntarily. Consider the case of the Dominican Republic, where 
persons identified as having Haitian heritage had their formal citizenships 
removed. This shows how administrative status interplays with existing systems 
of prejudice and constructions of entitlement.
 The Dominican Republic shares the Caribbean island of Hispaniola with 
Haiti. The two States have a complex and intertwined history of colonisation, 
slavery and war, and of repressive dictatorships in both countries. In 2013, the 
Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic ruled to uphold a Constitutional 
amendment to, as one commentator has described it, ‘revoke the citizenship 
rights of children born to undocumented immigrants in the Dominican Republic 
(who are predominantly of Haitian origin).’31
 Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic has a long history, from those 
moving to work in the sugar industry in the twentieth century to those who fled 
the dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s. In 2010, Haitians again fled to the 
Dominican Republic and elsewhere to escape the after- effects of a major earth-
quake.32 There has long been discrimination in the Dominican Republic against 
people who, because of their darker complexion, are seen as being of Haitian 
28 For example, consider the case of Daniella, born to Cuban parents in South Africa, and after over 
eight years at the time of writing still unable to make use of a citizenship. Liesl Muller (2016) 
‘South African courts confirm the right to nationality of a stateless child – 20-year-old legal prin-
ciple protecting steels children is finally implemented’, European Network on Statelessness 13 
September 2016 www.statelessness.eu/blog/south-african-courts-confirm-right-nationality- 
stateless-child-20-year-old-legal-principle (accessed 4 April 2017). Despite the positive decision 
described in this post, at the time of writing, Daniella has still not acquired a passport.
29 See for example, Bronwen Manby (2009) Struggles for Citizenship in Africa, Zed Books.
30 See for example, Mike Sanderson (2014) ‘Key Threats of Statelessness in the Post-Secession 
Sudanese and South Sudanese Nationality Regimes’, Open Research Exeter, University of 
Exeter.
31 Jillian Blake (2014) ‘Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Race-based Statelessness in the 
Americas’, Georgetown Journal of Law and Modern Critical Race Perspective 6, p. 141.
32 Blake 2014 ibid. p. 147.
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origin.33 Not least, in 1937, Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo gave 
orders leading to the deaths of thousands of people identified as ‘ethnic 
Haitians’.34 The complex use of ethnicity, indigeneity and race in the construc-
tions of power and entitlement – and of irregularity and status – on Hispaniola 
illustrates how contingent these matters can be.35
 Like many in the Americas, the 1929 Dominican Constitution gives auto-
matic jus soli citizenship to anyone born within the State’s territory, with the 
exception of those born to persons ‘in transit’ or to diplomats. This ‘in 
transit’ exception has dogged those identified as Haitians in the country. 
They were reportedly often classified as being in transit, on the basis that ‘all 
Haitians were “in transit” ’.36 In 2013, what changed was that also persons 
with formal Dominican Republic citizenship, considered to be ‘of Haitian 
descent’, would lose their citizenship, and those without any other citizen-
ship, would thereby become stateless.37 The rationale given was that these 
individuals had been irregular immigrants and, as such, had only ever been 
‘in transit’. The notion of ‘irregularity’ was wielded in order to render people 
stateless and the statelessness in turn made them irregular immigrants and 
apparently deportable.
 The individuals affected were already suffering racial discrimination, imped-
ing their ability to exercise their formal citizenship fully. The removal of formal 
citizenship formalised and deepened their noncitizen- vulnerability in the context 
of the State system.38 This case demonstrates the need for protection of, and 
access to, appropriate citizenship. And yet, it also shows that the problems asso-
ciated with statelessness result not so much from the loss of citizenship alone as 
from the much wider situation of discrimination that was behind the loss of cit-
izenship in the first place.39 Kristy Belton describes excluded persons of Haitian 
descent in the Dominican Republic and elsewhere in the Caribbean as ‘nonciti-
zen insiders’.40 She describes statelessness in this case, then, as ‘a form of forced 
displacement that immobilizes them in situ’.41
33 For example, see Junot Díaz’s now classic novel on the Dominican Republic: Junot Díaz (2008) 
The Brief and Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao, Faber & Faber.
34 Bridget Wooding (2003) ‘Contesting discrimination and statelessness in the Dominican 
Republic’, pp. 23–25 in Forced Migration Review 32, p. 23; Blake 2014 ibid. p. 144.
35 Bridget Wooding (2008) ‘Contesting Dominican Discrimination and Statelessness’ pp. 366–375 
in Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice 20.
36 Blake 2014 ibid. p. 149.
37 Blake 2014 ibid. p. 163.
38 Consider Lindsey Kingston’s discussion in: Lindsey Kingston (2014) ‘Statelessness As a Lack of 
Functioning Citizenship’, pp. 127–135 in Tilburg Law Review 19. Introduced in Chapter 1.
39 For example, see Lindsey Kingston (2017) ‘Worthy of Rights: Statelessness As a Cause and 
Symptom of Marginalisation’, pp. 17–34 in Tendayi Bloom, Katherine Tonkiss and Phillip Cole 
(eds) (2017) Understanding Statelessness, Routledge.
40 Kristy Belton (2011) ‘The Neglected Non-Citizen: Statelessness and Liberal Political Theory’, 
Journal of Global Ethics 7(1).
41 Kristy Belton (2015) ‘Rooted Displacement: The Paradox of Belonging Among Stateless 
People’, Citizenship Studies 19(8) p. 908.
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 More generally, constructing someone as an ‘unwanted’ noncitizen forces 
displacement (‘expulsion’ to use Saskia Sassen’s terminology42) from the current 
understanding of the State system, one in which it is States that get to choose 
who can fall within their scope of concern. Using the apparently legalistic mech-
anisms of formal citizenship and of immigration control can obscure race, class 
and other arbitrary discrimination in this expulsion. With Kelly Staples, this 
book rejects the idea that people cannot be recognised as people if they are not 
recognised as citizens somewhere. However, it acknowledges that, in practice, in 
a world of States, the recognised relationship a person has with a State will 
impact upon this.43
Problematising humanitarian exceptionalism by considering 
when it is denied
No failed asylum seeker need face destitution if they comply with the law and 
the decisions of our courts and go home when required and able to do so.
(Statement in BBC broadcast, attributed to UK Home Office44)
A key way in which the assumption of exclusion is often considered to be over-
ridable is where a humanitarian exception is identified. This is presented even by 
liberal nationalists who presume particularly closed borders alongside the ‘prin-
ciple of asylum’, whereby if someone arrives at a State’s borders having fled for 
their life, they should be admitted.45 In practice, this usually means that if a 
person arrives at a State and can prove that s/he is a victim of some atrocity that 
can be defined as persecution, then s/he can be included, on terms dictated by the 
receiving State. The most important version of this is refugee status, but there 
are also other humanitarian statuses found in different States in different ways. 
These statuses are vital in the context of the citizenist interpretation of liberalism 
in most existing States built upon liberal democratic principles. They enable 
some of those most ill- affected by exclusion from the existing State system to 
find some way of accessing it.
 Yet, it is also problematic. This will be shown here by considering an 
example of refused asylum seekers in the UK.46 Unable to prove the 
42 Saskia Sassen (2014) Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in Global Economy, Harvard University 
Press. Though this is only one element of Sassen’s expulsion. She uses the word more broadly.
43 Kelly Staples (2012) Retheorising Statelessness, Edinburgh University Press.
44 Quoted in Catrin Nye, ‘Glasgow’s destitute asylum-seekers’ (2013) BBC News Scotland website 
www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-21835432 (accessed 16 June 2014).
45 David Miller (2005) ‘Immigration: The Case for Limits’, pp. 193–206 in Andrew Cohen 
and Christopher Heath Wellman (eds) (2005) Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 
Blackwell.
46 I want to thank Anne Kershen who kindly allowed me to draw heavily upon this chapter: Tendayi 
Bloom (2015) ‘London’s Role in the Policy of Destitution of Asylum Seekers: The ‘Ghosts’ in 
the British Migration Infrastructure’, in Anne Kershen (ed.) (2015) London the Promised Land, 
Ashgate.
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humanitarian exception, some people are seen to be legitimately excluded from 
any relationship with the State with most power over them. This is despite a 
strongly activated individual- State relationship. Irrespective of the validity of 
such individuals’ humanitarian claims, the argument here is that they in fact 
have relationships with the State in question. A citizenist discourse makes it pos-
sible to ignore, and indeed quite difficult to characterise, these relationships. In 
addition, the assumed citizenism risks legitimising or obscuring other, for 
example ethnically based, reasons for exclusion. A recognition of (unhyphen-
ated) noncitizenship helps the interrogation of these exclusions.
 There is no internationally recognised definition of asylum seeker.47 In 
the UK:
‘claim for asylum’ means a claim made by a person […] that it would be 
contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the [1951 Refugee] 
Convention for him to be removed from, or required to leave, the United 
Kingdom.48
An asylum seeker according to this definition is someone who has made such a 
claim. After examination, if the claim is considered unfounded, or insufficient 
for that person to be recognised as a refugee or to be eligible for some other 
quasi- citizen humanitarian status, then it is rejected. In many cases, this leaves 
people with no individual- State relationship on which to call and so no State in 
place to protect their rights. Such individuals are, then, irregular immigrants.
Some commentators have suggested that this puts people into a situation that 
looks like statelessness.49 There are no reliable data on how many refused asylum 
seekers are in the UK, but one 2009 LSE study put the number at between 
417,000 and 863,000, and given people continue to arrive and continue to be 
refused asylum, while few are deported, the number may well be much higher.50
 Once someone has been refused asylum in the UK s/he has a window in 
which to appeal or to leave. After that period, the person, still forbidden from 
working, for the most part becomes ineligible for cash benefits, housing and 
47 For example, see David Weissbrodt (2008) The Human Rights of Non-Citizens, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, p. 111; Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam (2007) The Refugee in International 
Law 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, section entitled ‘The Concept of Asylum’.
48 (1993 Act (1)).
49 Brad Blitz and Miguel Otero-Iglesias (2011) ‘Stateless by Any Other Name: Refused Asylum-
Seekers in the United Kingdom’, pp. 1–17 in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37(4).
50 Jennifer Allsopp et al (2014) Poverty among refugees and asylum seekers in the UK, IRiS 
Working Paper Series, No. 1/2014, University of Birmingham, p. 10; Nando Sigona and Vanessa 
Hughes (2012) No Way Out, No Way In, Research Report, May 2012, ESRC Centre on Migra-
tion, Policy and Security, Hollywell Press, Oxford, p. 7; Ian Gordon, Kathleen Scanlon, Tony 
Travers and Christine Whitehead (2009) Economic impact on the London and UK economy of an 
earned regularisation of irregular migrants to the UK, LSE report for the Greater London 
Authority, London.
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other welfare support, falling into the broad category of ‘irregular migrant’.51 
Some people can apply for some limited help, but few do so.52 Such a person is 
forbidden from working and so has no legal means of subsistence other than 
charity. The apparent contradiction that leads to destitution (no legal work and 
no benefits) is not a legal oversight. In 2007, a Home Office document explained 
the thinking behind the policy:
[refused asylum seekers] should be denied the benefits and privileges of life 
in the UK and experience an increasingly uncomfortable environment so 
that they elect to leave.53
As well as being unable either to work or to claim benefits, since 2004, refused 
asylum seekers have also been ineligible for public National Health Service 
(NHS) hospital care beyond emergency treatment and screening for infectious 
diseases.54 Despite these conditions, many remain in the country. Three primary 
reasons for this have been suggested:55 (1) Removal is not possible; (2) Fearing 
compulsory return, they abscond; and/or (3) Desire to ensure that the claim is 
given proper consideration.
 Destitution impacts upon individuals’ capabilities, and is reported to make people 
feel ‘useless’.56 This is mentioned across the studies and reports that highlight 
wasted human resources, deskilling, negative psychological effects and dehuman-
isation. The absurdity of this is demonstrated through individual cases, such as those 
of persons who were respected professionals prior to seeking asylum, but following 
a rejected claim are left destitute.57 It is striking to consider the difference in such a 
person’s status before and after the decision on her/is asylum claim, even though 
nothing about her/im, as a person, had changed, and no new information about her/
im had come to light.
 Studies show the policy has driven people neither to leave nor to stop claim-
ing asylum, though it has driven them to become more invisible once refused.58 
Destitution is not short- term. In a 2009 UK- wide study of visits by destitute 
51 Alice Bloch (2013) ‘Living in Fear’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40(10).
52 Additional support is available, for example for children or those who applied at port of entry. 
Heaven Crawley, Joanne Hemmings and Neil Price (2011) Coping with Destitution, Oxfam 
Research Report, February 2011 p. 26, 5; Bloch 2013 ibid. p. 1512.
53 UK Home Office (2007) Enforcing the Rules, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, p. 17.
54 See Amnesty International (2006) Down and Out in London, Amnesty International UK.
55 For example, Crawley et al 2011 ibid. p. 17. These are explored in more detail in Bloom 2015 
ibid.
56 For example, in response to the interview question, ‘How did you feel about being refused 
asylum?’, including reference to the destitution that has resulted, a respondent explained: ‘I feel 
useless. My confidence shattered.’, in Kamena Dorling, Marchu Girma and Natasha Walter 
(2012) Refused, Women for Refugee Women, p. 14.
57 Bloom 2015 ibid.
58 For example, Blitz and Otero-Iglesias 2011 ibid.; SHSH (2007) Briefing paper on destitute 
refused asylum seekers, Still Human Still Here; OECD 2011.
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persons to Red Cross support centres, 62 per cent of refused asylum seekers had 
been destitute for over six months.59 The length of destitution is often longer, 
with 31 per cent of refused asylum- seeker visits from persons who had been des-
titute for over two years.60 Other studies have suggested that less than half of 
rough- sleepers in London are formal UK citizens.61
 This makes such individuals vulnerable. Forced to be destitute, to rely upon 
NGOs, religious groups and community members for survival, individuals 
falling into this category are not only vulnerable to the State, but thereby also to 
everyone within the State. Their personal security is compromised, as is their 
security of stay, such that they are constantly at real risk of personal attack or 
deportation. Such individuals are vulnerable with regard to their basic and less 
basic capabilities. While the example of destitute refused asylum seekers in the 
UK is quite extreme, this level of exclusion (expulsion) is symbolic of a more 
general form of vulnerability experienced by noncitizens. While many nonciti-
zens are able to access labour and/or welfare systems, they are still dependent 
upon employers to support their visas, landlords to accept their documentation, 
and the State to continue, in its beneficence, to allow them to stay.62 If not, they 
become ‘unwanted’ and so vulnerable to new forms of exploitation which 
further challenge liberal norms.
 Refugees are often seen as the quintessentially ‘good’ migrants, and put- upon 
victims. However, before a person becomes a ‘refugee’, s/he is in a weird limbo, 
denoted by the makeshift title of ‘asylum seeker’. Given that people are assumed 
excludable, even excluded until they can prove otherwise, many asylum seekers 
are irregular immigrants (though by no means all). Except in the limited cases of 
refugee resettlement, in order to claim asylum a person must find her/is own way 
to enter the territory of the State where s/he plans to claim asylum. This may 
involve travel on a visa, but especially in cases of urgent flight, it may well mean 
travelling irregularly. Those who need to move urgently are likely to be unable 
to perform the administrative tasks needed for regular migration even in the case 
that such options would be open to them. Not all countries offer asylum seekers 
any protection or access to national systems – and where it is available, this 
access is often restricted.
59 Calculated from Kate Smart (2009) The Second Destitution Tally, Asylum Support Partnership 
Policy Report p. 6.
60 Calculated from Smart 2009 ibid. p. 16.
61 S. Fitzpatrick, H. Pawson, G. Bramby, S. Wilcox and B. Watts (2015) The Homelessness 
Monitor, England 2015, Crisis. Note that those formal citizens who are homeless may well also 
be experiencing activated noncitizenship.
62 This ‘enduring asymmetry’ is developed in a very different way in Chapter 6. The phrase ‘endur-
ing asymmetry’ in this context comes from Jeremy Harding (2012) Border Vigils: Keeping 
Migrants Out of the Rich World, Verso.
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 Two systemic responses suggested by theorists to address this situation for 
irregular immigrants are Joseph Carens’s ‘firewall’,63 creating an administrative 
barrier between migration enforcement and public services, and Christina 
Boswell’s ‘benign neglect’,64 whereby the State turns a blind eye to its irregular 
immigrant population. Measures like this could be vital to helping some people 
in the interim, but more is needed to respond to the more fundamental problem 
presented here.
 Carens’s firewall means that a State can at the same time consider some 
persons to be ‘unwanted’ and their claims illegitimate, while providing for those 
persons’ needs. Boswell’s ‘benign neglect’ is based on what she describes as the 
State’s source of effective legitimacy:
… the state mobilizes loyalty and compliance through guaranteeing its 
citizens privileged access to certain political rights and socioeconomic 
goods. Even though states are not always able to guarantee this privileged 
access in practice, their legitimacy remains contingent on (at least symbolic) 
attempts to do so.
The firewall and the policy of benign neglect are important for ensuring access 
to capabilities now, but they do not contest the methodological citizenism 
directly (and perhaps this is also what makes them such important interim tools). 
They offer interim ways to make the implications of citizenism less brutal.
 This book does not contest that there may be special claims for citizens, but it 
argues that there are also different special claims for noncitizens. While it is 
crucial to advocate ever more access to humanitarian protections and to citizen-
ships, to more exceptions to the overarching assumption of exclusion more 
generally, it is also necessary to continue to challenge it.65 Even if every indi-
vidual alive today were allocated some citizenship or quasi- citizenship status 
that was satisfactory to her/im; even if all individuals could satisfy their basic 
and even less basic physical needs using a combination of citizenships, quasi- 
citizenships and firewalls; the possibility of completely excluded noncitizens 
renders the liberal democratic framework as currently interpreted, theoretically 
unjust, and likely to be unjust in practice as well. The reality, in which people 
are in fact experiencing utter exclusion/expulsion, makes this theoretical problem 
urgent to address.
 Irregular immigrants and stateless persons provide a paradigmatic example of 
how rights, usually presumed to be held by all, are also believed to be legitimately 
63 Joseph Carens (2008) ‘The Rights of Irregular Migrants’, pp. 163–186 in Ethics and Inter-
national Affairs 22(2).
64 Christina Boswell (2008) ‘The Elusive Rights of an Invisible Population’, pp. 187–192 in Ethics 
and International Affairs 22(2).
65 I am not suggesting advocates of the firewall or banal reject are not troubling the status quo, but 
am arguing that I do not think that these approaches solve the specific problems raised in this 
book.
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withheld from some. Indeed, even discussing whether irregular immigrants are 
eligible for access to goods considered to be human rights allows the possibility 
that such persons implicitly (or perhaps even explicitly) can be considered not 
fully human. This goes deeper than the question of access to specific rights. While 
noncitizens in situ do not always fare badly, ‘unwanted’ noncitizens often do. 
Without access to a humanity- confirming status, ‘unwanted’ noncitizens are often 
forbidden from working and unable to access welfare systems. Consequently, 
such persons may find life, or core aspects of life, effectively legally forbidden.66 
And yet it is the liberal State and the State system that have created the categories 
of irregularity and created the conditions that push people to enter into them. One 
commentator has described the situation for stateless persons as a continuing 
‘blind spot on the international community’s agenda’.67 The same can be said for 
noncitizens more broadly, since while specific noncitizen groups are given spe-
cific sets of protections by virtue of some form of quasi- citizenship, there is not a 
general appreciation of the vulnerability of noncitizenship and the obligations that 
this places on States.
‘Unwanted’ by whom? Unrecognised noncitizenship and its 
effect on citizenship
I went to Rodbyhavn and was met with scenes that I’d never seen before in 
Denmark. There were refugees everywhere. Complete chaos. Adults, 
children, single mothers, teenagers – wary people with tired faces, most of 
them with just small plastic bags containing their belongings and some with 
nothing but the clothes they wore. Those faces. Not desperate but stern. 
Weary. Committed. I phoned Mikael, my husband, and said: “Listen, I’m 
going to offer some of them a lift.” He said: “But of course you are. Bring 
them home, I’ll make coffee.”
[It turned out that the family she picked up were from Damascus, travelling to 
meet their father and husband in Helsingborg in Sweden. She drove them to her 
home in Solrod Strand where her husband served coffee, soda and cinnamon 
buns. Then he drove the family to the train station still within Denmark.]
A few hours later, we got a call from their father. He was overjoyed, and 
grateful. That was good. But we felt bad. We had done so little, and yet it 
had meant so much to these six people. […]
 That was in September. The following month, my husband and I were 
contacted by the police. They were investigating us on the charge of people- 
smuggling, and wanted us to come in for questioning. […] In judicial terms, 
66 This is picked up again in Chapter 5.
67 Kirsty Belton (2013) ‘Statelessness and Economic and Social Rights’, in Lanse Minkler (ed.) 
(2013) The State of Economics and Social Human Rights: A Global Overview, Cambridge 
University Press p. 223.
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our crime consisted of aiding, transporting and harbouring persons without 
valid travel documents. That’s the lift and the coffee. […] I was not aware 
of the law, and the idea of asking the family for valid travel documents 
never entered my mind. I have never asked anybody for valid travel docu-
ments when offering them a lift.
 [She and her husband received a 45 Danish Kroner fine, which was paid 
by public donations.]
 I never knew that decency, generosity, charity – whatever you choose to 
call it – was reserved for people with valid travel documents.
(Lisbeth Zornig Andersen, describing her experience 
in Granta, 7 December 201668)
An additional dimension of the construction of some noncitizens as ‘unwanted’, 
expelled by a State built upon liberal democratic principles is the implication that 
this has for the free- association of citizens, and their decisions about how to live 
their lives. In the Danish example above, the construction of individuals out of a 
recognised relationship with the Danish State was challenged by the relationship 
(albeit brief ) that was developed between Lisbeth Zornig Andersen, who related 
with Denmark as a citizen, and the six individuals to whom she gave a lift. 
Andersen and her husband were punished for an activity that was made criminal by 
the way in which the individual- State relationships were constructed and the non- 
recognition of noncitizenship. This impacted upon both the autonomy of all the 
individuals involved and their capabilities to act in a way that they consider to be 
moral.
 As such, limits placed upon, and vulnerabilities of, ‘unwanted’ noncitizens 
also constrain citizenship. Beyond the extreme example given here, controls 
on who is able to enter through regular channels, who can enter labour 
markets and access social and other communities, limits citizens in who they 
can marry, befriend, work for, buy from, employ, or, indeed, give a lift to. In 
turn, this risks activating noncitizen relationships in the formal citizens who 
are affected. Citizens then also participate in the disobedience and politicisa-
tion associated with noncitizenship. Perhaps the most famous example of 
State checks on private citizen support of irregular immigrants is the tellingly 
named French ‘delit de solidarité’ (crime of solidarity), whereby helping an 
irregular immigrant (including providing shelter) has been prohibited in 
France, with a potential prison sentence and fine.69 Yet though the French 
example is particularly well known, as the testimony of Zornig Andersen 
demonstrates, cases can increasingly be found across States ostensibly built 
68 Lisbeth Zornig Andersen (2016) ‘When Denmark Criminalised Kindness’, Granta, 7 December 
2016.
69 See www.gisti.org/spip.php?article1791 (accessed 27 January 2011).
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upon liberal democratic  principles.70 This further demonstrates the interrela-
tionship of citizenship and noncitizenship and the need to recognise the reality 
of noncitizenship.
 In Denis Bosnic’s photograph, taken near Rome, Elena and Ramadan embrace 
outside the caravan where they live with their sons. They are some of a number 
of individuals who have worked with Bosnic in order to raise awareness in Italy 
about the situation for stateless persons. Elena has Romanian citizenship, but 
because Ramadan is stateless, they have not been able to register their marriage. 
Their children are not registered as Ramadan’s, but instead as fatherless. In this 
way, they have been able to claim the citizenship of their mother. The entire 
family is affected by a noncitizen, indeed a stateless vulnerability to the State 
and the State system. That is, statelessness not only affects Ramadan’s ability to 
act in the world, but also makes those close to him vulnerable to the State system 
70 A discussion of the impact of Swedish border checks of travellers from Denmark and how it fits 
within wider developments is found, for example, in Tim Marshall (2016) Prisoners of Geo-
graphy: Ten Maps that Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics, Elliott & 
Thompson Ltd, p. 107. For more on the involvement of non-State actors in border management, 
see for example Gallya Lahav (2003) ‘The Rise of Non State Actors in Migration Regulation in 
the United States and Europe: Changing the Gatekeepers or Bringing Back the State?’, 
pp. 215–241 in Nancy Foner, Rubén Rumbaut and Steven Gold (eds) (2003) Immigration 
Research for a New Century, Russell Sage Foundation.
Figure 4.1 Elena and Ramadan outside their caravan (Denis Bosnic, 2015).
60  Introducing ‘unwanted’ noncitizens
in new ways. It activates new forms of noncitizenship in individuals who would 
otherwise not be excluded in this way.
 The vulnerabilities associated with noncitizenship also change the meaning of 
citizenship at a more fundamental level. If formal citizenship or quasi- citizenship 
is needed for recognition or protection, then all must pursue citizenship of some 
kind for satisfaction of basic needs. If it is seen in this way, then citizenship 
cannot be seen as a consensual relationship, or even hypothetically consensual. 
If citizenship is needed for access to basic human needs, it is hard to imagine 
many people withholding their consent from it (though, as we will see in Chapter 
6, some try to do so). As a result, it becomes distasteful to speak in even quasi- 
contractarian terms. The non- recognition of ‘unwanted’ noncitizens, then, also 
constrains the meanings of citizenship on several levels.
 When the relationships of ‘unwanted’ noncitizens with the States where they 
live is denied, such individuals suffer from an artificial constriction of capability 
that is often rendered invisible, or even conceptually non- existent. As has been 
shown in this chapter, irregular immigrants and stateless persons may be healthy, 
strong, highly qualified. Yet they can be artificially impaired in their capabilities 
by the institutional situation in which they find themselves. In this way, indi-
viduals may also be forced to be in opposition to the States where they live in 
order to perform unavoidable activities. Both irregular immigrants and stateless 
persons are explicitly rejected by the States where they live. Both are often 
impeded in travelling regularly and both are often subject to significant vulner-
ability and substantial privations. They are also both at risk of being subject to a 
vicious cycle of dehumanisation.
5 Banal dehumanisation
Drawing upon sociologist Michael Billig’s notion of ‘banal nationalism’, ‘banal 
dehumanisation’ refers to a mundane denial of a person’s humanity so that, 
through the activities and speech acts of daily life and underlying institutional 
arrangements, someone can be constructed out of the scope of consideration for 
justice.1 This comes in three forms. First, there is the dehumanisation that locates 
individuals as below other people in a hierarchy of concern. Second, there is the 
dehumanisation that denies individuals’ existence altogether. Finally, there are 
the alterations of the frame within which s/he can live out her/is own humanity.
 All three of these take place in two ways. On the one hand, the dehumanisa-
tion can be inadvertent, constructed through the theoretical framework itself. On 
the other hand, it may be part of an intentional project. These need not occur 
exclusively of each other. For example, dehumanisation may initially be inad-
vertent, but then generate a future desire to dehumanise, or dehumanisation may 
be intentional to an extent, but some of its consequences may be unintended. 
This chapter particularly addresses the role of the liberal democratic theoretical 
framework as currently understood in banal dehumanisation of noncitizens, and 
implications for the institutional and social frameworks based upon it.
Making people less than human
[L]abels do not exist in a vacuum. They are the tangible representation of 
policies and programmes … labels develop their own rationale and legiti-
macy and become a convenient and accepted shorthand.
(Roger Zetter, writing in Journal of Refugee Studies in 20072)
Much has been written about how terminology has enabled the dehumanisation 
of persons and groups, leading to some of the worst actions of humans against 
1 This draws on Michael Billig’s notion of ‘banal nationalism’: Michael Billig (2002) Banal Nation-
alism, Sage [first published in 1995].
2 Roger Zetter (2007) ‘More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of 
Globalization’, pp. 172–192 in Journal of Refugee Studies 20(2). This builds upon his classic 
paper, Roger Zetter (1991) ‘Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic 
Identity’, pp. 39–62 in Journal of Refugee Studies 4(1).
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other humans.3 In recent history, ‘Tutsi’ has been made synonymous with ‘cock-
roach’ and ‘Jew’ with ‘rat’ before genocidal projects could be possible.4 In these 
cases, perpetrators have avoided seeing their victims as less than human.5 Banal 
dehumanisation is not so obvious. It involves small, implicit, and incremental 
instances that combine to construct and reinforce a framework that defines some 
people as being of lesser worth than others.
 The banal dehumanisation of ‘unwanted’ noncitizens can be seen in several lan-
guages’ colloquial references to irregular immigrants and stateless persons. The 
Arabic term ‘bidoon’, for example, is an adjective meaning ‘without’. Short for 
‘bidoon jinseeya’, or ‘without nationality’, the word is commonly used as a noun to 
refer to a person. Broadly, it can refer to anyone without relevant documents, but 
narrowly it is used to refer to those persons who did not obtain citizenship when the 
modern States of the Arabian Gulf were formed, and the descendants of those per-
sons.6 Something similar can be seen in the French and Spanish adjectival phrases 
‘sans papiers’ and ‘sin papeles’, respectively, meaning ‘without papers’, used as 
nouns to describe fully persons and their relationships with the States in question.7 
3 For example, Jonathan Glover (2012) Humanity: A Moral History of the 20th Century 2nd Edition, 
Yale University Press.
4 See analysis by Gregory Stanton, which also provides wider insight in this context: Gregory 
Stanton (2004) ‘Could the Rwandan Genocide Have Been Prevented?’, pp. 211–228 in Journal of 
Genocide Research 6(2). Stig Hornshoj-Moller, for example, examines the rat metaphor and the 
role of the media more generally. See also Stig Hornshoj-Moller (1998) ‘ “The Eternal Jew” – A 
Blueprint for Genocide in the Nazi Film Archives’, paper presented at the Genocide Studies 
Program Seminar, Yale University, 15 October 1998; Ben Kiernan (2008) Blood and soil: A 
World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur, Yale University Press; 
David Livingstone Smith (2012) Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate 
Others, St Martin’s Press; see also Jess Melvin (2018 forthcoming) Mechanics of Mass Murder, 
Routledge. Kristy Belton refers to more recent references to those denationalised in the Caribbean 
as ‘pigs, hogs, and dogs’: Kristy Belton (2015) ‘Rooted Displacement: The Paradox of Belonging 
Among Stateless People’, Citizenship Studies 19(8), p. 912.
5 For example, see Richard Rorty (1993) ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’, reprinted 
at pp. 107–131 in Aakash Singh Rathore and Alex Cistelecan (eds) (2011) Wronging Rights? Phil-
osophical Challenges for Human Rights, Routledge; Michael Ignatieff (2001) ‘Human Rights as 
Politics’, Human Rights p. 3; Steven Lukes (2005) ‘Liberal Democratic Torture’, British Journal 
of Political Science 36 p. 15. See also Glover 2012 ibid.
6 Zahra Al Barazi and Jason Tucker (2017) ‘Challenging the Disunity of Statelessness in the Middle 
East and North Africa’, pp. 87–101 in Tendayi Bloom, Katherine Tonkiss and Phillip Cole (eds) 
(2017) Understanding Statelessness, Routledge. Also, Maureen Lynch (2010) ‘Without Face or 
Future: Stateless Infants, Children and Youth’, pp. 117–140 in Marisa Ensor and Elzbieta 
Gozdziak (eds) (2010) Children and Migration: At the Crossroads of Resiliency and Vulnerability, 
Palgrave Macmillan.
7 For example, see Andreu Casero Ripollés (2007) ‘Discurso mediático, inmigración e ilegalidad: 
legitimar la exclusión a través de la noticia’, pp. 69–90 in Ricard Zapata-Barrero and Teun A. Van 
Dijk (eds) (2007) Discursos Sobre La Inmigración en España: Los medios de comunicación, los par-
lamentos y las administraciones, Fundació CIDOB; Anne McNevin (2006) ‘Political Belonging in a 
Neoliberal Era: The Struggle of the Sans-Papiers’, pp. 135–151 in Citizenship Studies 10(2).
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It has been suggested that the American English ethnic slur ‘WOP’, used against 
Italian Americans, comes from the letters that were put onto the documents accom-
panying Italian deportees, standing for ‘With Out Papers’.8
 Sometimes, ‘illegal’ is used in English as a noun, implying that a person’s 
very existence is illegal. Catherine Dauvergne describes it as ‘one of the most 
derogatory terms’ applied to those engaged in irregular border crossings.9 This 
view is shared, for example, by the ‘No One Is Illegal’ campaign, a global move-
ment calling for an end to borders and immigration controls. In its very name, 
this movement draws attention to a nonsensical linguistic construction. It applies 
the adjective ‘illegal’ to a person, rather than to her/is actions.10 A comment 
attributed to Nobel- prize-winning author Elie Wiesel perhaps best shows the 
incoherence:
You who are so- called illegal aliens must know that no human being is 
illegal. That is a contradiction in terms. Human beings can be beautiful or 
more beautiful, they can be fat or skinny, they can be right or wrong, but 
illegal? How can a human being be illegal?11
Moreover, using language in this way enables the development of an underlying 
sense that such persons have no relationship with the State(s) under discussion, 
making often extreme privations seem acceptable. The emphasis of lack in the 
hyphenated terminology of ‘non- citizenship’ is similar. Allowing an assumption 
of exclusion, ‘non- citizenship’ hides the substantive relationship of (unhyphen-
ated) noncitizenship that an individual may have with a liberal State.
 Banal dehumanisation also takes place in the construction of an atmosphere 
that assumes some persons to be appropriately omitted from consideration. This 
occurs with respect to noncitizens far away from, at the borders of, and within, 
the States in question. The media plays an important role in this. In one inter-
national study, for example, researchers conducted a series of experiments using 
negative news stories with research subjects, concluding:
These studies suggest that the uncertainty surrounding immigration, paired 
with the media’s proclivity to focus on negative rather than positive news 
 8 For example, see Alan Dundes (1971) ‘A Study of Ethnic Slurs: The Jew and the Polack in the 
United States’, The Journal of American Folklore 84(332). Thank you to Danny van Gelder for 
drawing my attention to this example.
 9 Catherine Dauvergne (2008) Making People Illegal: What Globalisation Means for Migration 
and Law, Cambridge University Press, p. 4.
10 Dauvergne 2008 ibid., p. 10. Indeed, the illegalising of people themselves is associated with 
some of the most problematic regimes in history. See, for example, Trevor Noah (2016) Born a 
Crime, Random House, about his experience of being born to a Black mother and a White father 
in apartheid South Africa.
11 I have not been able to find the first source of this widely cited quotation, but it is likely to have 
been said by Elie Wiesel in the late 1980s or early 1990s and to have been directed at irregular 
immigrants in the US.
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stories, can lead to extreme negative reactions to immigrants and refugees – 
their removal from the human race through dehumanization.12
This banal dehumanisation in the media and elsewhere also makes way for less 
banal expressions. For example, in Spring 2015, in response to migrant boats 
sinking in the Mediterranean Sea, UK journalist Katie Hopkins of The Sun news-
paper published an article entitled ‘Rescue boats? I’d use gunships to stop 
migrants’. In the article, she refers to those migrants crossing the Mediterranean 
as ‘cockroaches’ and describes them as unworthy of rescue.13 This echoes words 
used in genocidal projects mentioned above, something observed also by Zeid 
Ra’ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights.14
 The extreme sentiments expressed by Hopkins were, I argue, made possible by 
the banal dehumanisation of irregular migrants as illegal, by hyphenated non- 
citizenship and its assumption of exclusion, as well as by other localised anti- 
migrant tropes.15 Hopkins was writing within a framework in which some 
noncitizens are fairly uncontroversially assumed excludable from institutional 
schemes. This is also a period in which the power of banal dehumanisation is ampli-
fied through the use of social media, which has changed the ways in which ideas are 
spread. This includes what have become known as ‘echo chambers’, such that 
social media users, as well as those who use online search engines, can find their 
own views amplified unchallenged, rather than being confronted with alternative 
perspectives, helping to reinforce their own way of understanding the world.16
 The dehumanisation also involves securitisation and militarisation of dis-
course (and the connection between this and a narrow understanding of sover-
eignty). Consider the language used in a UK government document from 2007, 
Managing Global Migration. The 20-page document has 40 references to ille-
gality of migration, describing government responses in the form of ‘tackling’, 
‘fight’, ‘combat’ and ‘target’, for example.17 Something similar happens globally 
12 Victoria Esses, Stelian Medianu, and Andrea Lawson (2013) ‘Uncertainty, Threat, and the Role 
of the Media in Promoting the Dehumanization of Immigrants and Refugees’, pp. 518–536 in 
Journal of Social Issues 69(3).
13 Katie Hopkins (2015) ‘Rescue boats? I’d use gunships to stop migrants’, in the Sun 17 April 2015.
14 ‘UN Human Rights Chief urges U.K. to tackle tabloid hate speech, after migrants called “cock-
roaches” ’, 24 April 2015, www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=158 
85&LangID=E (accessed 4th April 2017).
15 For example, see Didier Fassin (2005) ‘Compassion and Repression: The Moral Economy of 
Immigration Policies in France’, pp. 362–387 in Cultural Anthropology 20(3) p. 363. For UK 
context (the location for the above case study), see also Scott Blinder (2015) ‘Briefing: UK 
Public Opinion Toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern’, Migration 
Observatory briefing paper 20 August 2015.
16 Alex Krasodomski-Jones (2016) ‘Talking to Ourselves? Political Debate Online and the Echo 
Chamber Effect’, DEMOS.
17 Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2007) ‘Managing Global Migration: A 
strategy to build stronger international alliances to manage migration’, HO and FCO June 2007. 
Note that this document was released the year after the 2006 UN High-level Dialogue on Inter-
national Migration and Development and the year after the release of UK-made dystopian film, 
Children of Men, in which ‘illegal immigrants’ are kept in cages around London and at the 
coasts: Alfonso Cuarón (2006) Children of Men, Universal Pictures.
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in the splicing of discussions of irregular migration with those of national 
security and the ubiquitous threat of terrorism. This, what one commentator has 
called ‘[u]nfocused war rhetoric’,18 risks muddying discussion with prejudices 
and emotions. Some have argued that this construction of combat and fear of an 
enemy, once normalised, has been used in the 2010s to support increasingly far- 
right politics in several liberal democracies.19 Also crucial to this dehumanisa-
tion are the binary constructions of some ways of being as ‘normal’ (settled, 
citizen, majority- member) and then, derivative from this, some ways of being as 
non- normal or sub- normal (nomadic, non- citizen, minority- member), where 
normal is implicitly seen as human and non- normal as not quite human.20
 Billig describes his ‘banal nationalism’ (upon which the ‘banal dehumanisa-
tion’ used here is based) as, for example, a flag hanging unnoticed in the corner 
of a room.21 It includes the use of ‘we’ in newspapers and ‘the country’ in 
weather forecasts as subtle reminders that there is a ‘we’ and there is an assumed 
country from which that ‘we’ looks out.22 For Billig, the use of national symbols, 
unnoticed, throughout daily encounters is also crucial to the creation of a sense 
of a national identity sufficiently strong to muster an army when needed. Sim-
ilarly, methodological citizenism, coupled with the banal construction of some 
people out of that ‘we’, generates a dehumanisation that helps to lessen the sense 
of outrage when those relating to a State primarily as noncitizens are treated in 
ways usually considered to be unacceptable. As Nussbaum puts it, dehumanising 
people puts them beyond the ‘scope of our empathy’.23
 This banal dehumanisation is not only relevant in the eyes of those located 
within the normative position with regard to some dehumanised other. It is a 
general and insidious banal dehumanisation, that may involve everyone. It could 
include the shaming or stigmatising of individuals in their own behaviours and 
their sense of their own entitlements, to see themselves as non- normative. This 
can be seen in the work of Stefan Zweig. In his autobiographical book, The 
World of Yesterday, Zweig recalls that he used to have a romantic view of state-
lessness as not being beholden to any State.24 Then one day, like many others 
caught up in the xenophobia of the twentieth century, he found himself not 
18 Margaret Beare (1999) ‘Illegal Migration: Personal Tragedies, Social Problems, or National 
Security Threats?’, pp. 11–41 in Phil Williams (ed.) (1999) Illegal Immigration and Commercial 
Sex: The New Slave Trade, Frank Cass, p. 14.
19 For example, Valeria Bello (2017) International Migration and International Security: Why 
Prejudice is a Global Security Threat, Routledge.
20 For example, see María Lugones (2010) ‘Toward a Decolonial Feminism’, pp. 742–759 in 
Hypatia 25(4); Walter D. Mignolo (2000) Local Histories/Global Designs, Princeton University 
Press, where he discusses what he refers to as ‘the colonial difference’.
21 Billig 2002 ibid. p. 38, p. 155.
22 Billig 2002 ibid. p. 154.
23 Martha Nussbaum (2013) Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice, Harvard University 
Press.
24 Stephan Zweig (1964) The World of Yesterday, University of Nebraska Press. This is seen more 
broadly, for example, in Clark Hanjian (2003) The Sovrien: An Exploration of the Right to Be 
Stateless, Polyspire.
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recognised as a citizen anywhere. He describes struggling to demonstrate that he 
was still a ‘gentleman’, even to himself, and the recognition that with his citizen-
ship he had lost something that he had unknowingly assumed necessary for 
being ‘in good standing’.25
 Zweig describes how he had become an object of suspicion even to himself. 
This is because States and citizenships currently hold sway over how we con-
struct our world. In his case we can see how the perception one has of nonciti-
zenship and its role in the political construction of reality can change depending 
on one’s own experience of it, but it can also affect how we see our own position 
in the world. Zweig discovered himself to believe citizenship and good standing 
to be intertwined at the same time as he found himself stateless. As a result, he 
describes his personal struggle to maintain his own sense of himself as a ‘gentle-
man’. The dehumanisation of (hyphenated) non- citizens, then, also affected 
Zweig’s own sense of his place in the world and his entitlement to be there.
 This did not only happen in Zweig’s extreme experience of statelessness. 
Consider Wei Ming Kam’s reflection on being a child of Chinese immigrants in 
the UK.26 She recalls her mother’s excitement whenever she saw someone with a 
Chinese face on the television. Ming Kam explains that while she used to ridi-
cule this behaviour, she later realised that her mother was exhibiting a sense of 
belonging. She describes it as ‘a rare acknowledgement of our existence in the 
UK. Look, my mum was saying. We’re here’27 (emphasis in the original). While 
this was not something that Ming Kam felt she needed herself, she realised that 
it was necessary for her mother. Ming Kam reflects that her mother sought 
affirmation of her rightful place in the State where she lived, through the banal 
means of seeing people that looked like her featured in popular media. So, seeing 
Chinese faces on television might be part of a banal recognition of such indi-
viduals as insiders amongst majority culture, Ming Kam suggests that it was also 
important for those who saw themselves reflected in those faces. This leads to a 
further conclusion. The same tools that could support banal dehumanisation 
could also be used banally to humanise.
 The banal dehumanisation, then, is a pervasive force that affects how all sorts 
of relationships can be developed and envisaged across society. While for the 
most part the focus here is on the obligations that develop for the State, it is 
important also to recognise the obligations of individuals, including insiders to 
that State system. By virtue of the structure of exclusion, individuals who bear 
the brunt of banal dehumanisation cannot be the only ones to change the struc-
ture that dehumanises them. Audre Lorde writes as a formal citizen of the US 
who also experiences overlapping minority memberships, which can be seen as 
activating her noncitizenship in some dimensions: ‘[t]here is a constant drain of 
energy which might be better used in redefining ourselves and devising realistic 
25 Zweig 1964 ibid.
26 Wei Ming Kam (2016) ‘Beyond “Good” Immigrants’, pp. 84–95 in Nikesh Shukla (ed.) (2016) 
The Good Immigrant, Unbound.
27 Ming Kam 2016 ibid. at p. 84.
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scenarios for altering the present and constructing the future.’28 And, for those 
written out of formal citizenship entirely, the burden becomes even greater. 
Insiders, then, though excused from any default burden, have an obligation to 
react against dehumanisation when they come to recognise it, however banal it 
seems, and to seek it out when it is obscured.
Invisibility and nonsensical deprivation
While admitting that ‘Yes, as human beings [they exist] because they are 
present,’ the officer emphasizes that they ‘do not exist in the civil sense of 
the word’.
(Kristy Belton, 2015, reflecting on comments of the UNDP officer in the 
Dominican Republic.29)
Dehumanisation can also be existential. That is, rather than being constructed as less 
than human, persons are constructed out of recognised existence altogether. This 
results in the sort of situation described by the UNDP officer to Kristy Belton in the 
quotation above, such that some people seem not to exist legally at all. And yet there 
are some actions that a person must perform, even if the State in which s/he lives 
would rather that s/he did not perform them – even if s/he would like to comply.
 Consider Jeremy Waldron’s argument relating to homelessness. Homes and 
States are not analogous, but Waldron’s style of argumentation is useful here.30 
In his examination of homelessness, Waldron himself explicitly mentions that he 
is referring to homeless American citizens in American cities.31 In one paper he 
does mention statelessness as a potential parallel,32 though he does not develop it 
and indeed seems explicitly to remove ‘undocumented aliens’ from the sphere of 
those who can count amongst the homeless persons under discussion.33
 Taken from his various papers on the topic, and with some rearrangement, his 
core argument can be presented as follows:34
28 Audre Lorde (1984) ‘Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference’, pp. 114–123 in 
Audre Lorde (1984) Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches, Crossing Press, at p. 115.
29 Belton 2015 ibid. p. 911.
30 This argument is developed much further in Tendayi Bloom (2016) ‘Migration in a World of 
Citizens, Nonsensical Morality and Academia’s Role in Addressing Hidden Poverty’, in Helmut 
Gaisbauer, Gottfried Schweiger and Clemens Sedmak (eds) (2016) Ethical Issues in Poverty 
Alleviation, Springer.
31 Jeremy Waldron (1991–1992) ‘Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom’, UCLA Law Review 39; 
Jeremy Waldron (2000) Homelessness and Community’, University of Toronto Law Journal 50; 
Jeremy Waldron (2009) ‘Community and Property – For Those Who Have Neither’, Theoretical 
Inquiries into Law 10.
32 Waldron 2009 ibid. p. 189.
33 Waldron 2009 ibid. p. 185.
34 This distillation of Waldron’s argument is taken directly from Tendayi Bloom (2016) ‘Migration 
in a World of Citizens, Nonsensical Morality, and Academia’s Role in Addressing Hidden 
Poverty’, pp. 247–258 in Helmut Gaisbauer, Gottfried Schweiger and Clemens Sedmak (eds) 
(2016) Ethical Issues in Poverty Alleviation, Springer.
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1 Persons with homes can perform activities either in their homes or in 
public.
2 Persons without homes can only perform activities in public.
3 There are some activities that city authorities would like to ban in 
public (urinating, defecating, cooking, having sex) as this would make 
public space more pleasant.
4 If persons without homes can only perform activities in public and these 
activities are made illegal in public, this effectively makes urinating, 
defecating, cooking and having sex illegal for persons without homes.
For Waldron, rules that ban such activities in public without providing altern-
ative provision work on the incorrect assumption that everyone has a home, 
while in the real world there are people without homes and, for those people, this 
represents an unacceptable constriction of freedom.35 Waldron goes on to note 
that as such, homeless persons end up bearing the burden for property- 
ownership, through their loss of human rights protection.36
 However, the problem that Waldron sets up represents something deeper than 
a constriction of freedom. He describes people who are forbidden from public 
urination in a context without public toilets. This constrains something more 
basic than human rights and freedom. It is simply nonsensical. Even if a person 
wants to comply, it is practically impossible to do so. As such, a set of regula-
tions that could effectively outlaw urination for some people in some place at 
some time fails adequately to acknowledge human life as it really is. The 
problem is not that people have a basic interest in urination or even a need to 
urinate so much as that people just do urinate. Similarly, forbidding a person 
from standing in any place represents a non- acknowledgement of life. This is 
dehumanisation at its most brutal. It goes deeper than Jean- François Lyotard’s 
concern that some humans are not seen as interlocutors. In this case some people 
are not even seen (recall Esrafil from Chapter 3 who felt that he had to set 
himself on fire in order to be seen).
 Photographs 5.1 and 5.2 are part of the series, ‘Still Human Still Here’, produced 
by photographer Abbie Trayer- Smith, working with refused asylum seekers in the 
UK. Anne, who Trayler- Smith describes as trying not to spend too long looking out 
of the window that is shown in Figure 5.1, arrived in the UK after both experi-
encing and witnessing extreme violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo:
She had been detained and beaten for condemning the forced recruitment of 
child soldiers after her son was taken by rebel forces and her husband killed. 
On the second occasion, she was raped by the rebels. After forming a 
women’s group to protest against rebel activity she was forced to watch, 
paralysed with horror, as three of the women in her group were buried alive 
35 Waldron 1991 ibid.
36 Waldron 2009 ibid.
Figure 5.1 Curtain, Still Human Still Here (Abbie Trayler-Smith, 2013).
Figure 5.2 Cooker, Still Human Still Here (Abbie Trayler-Smith, 2013).
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by the rebels. Following the rejection of her asylum claim Anne spent the 
next three years living in total destitution, much of the time sleeping 
outside.
In the UK, Anne is reported to have experienced further violence. At the time of 
the Still Human Still Here project, she had shelter but not security. She was 
living without any legal means of subsistence.
 Abbie Traylor-Smith describes Figure 5.2 as taken in a squat in Leeds, UK, 
home to a number of people who had been refused asylum. Some of those 
involved in the Still Human Still Here project had been professionals, activists 
and journalists before leaving their homes. Now in the UK and forbidden from 
working and from studying, they were stuck in a limbo. Where there was no 
legal means of subsistence, some turned to sex work or theft, for example, to 
cover daily needs. Some described living on the street without access to food, 
some were indentified as living on £2–£3 per week. Many had significant phys-
ical and psychological scars from violence they had experienced both before and 
after arriving in the UK. At the time of the project, all of them were reported to 
be destitute.
 In Figure 5.2 the stove is being used for cooking, but it also recalls the stove 
described in Heather Johnson’s 2015 paper, which was used to efface the finger 
prints of someone in such a limbo. Johnson opens the piece with a quotation:
Take a strong painkiller. Then turn the front two oven rings of your oven on 
and wait until they are red hot. Then lay four fingers of your right hand on 
the right oven ring and the four fingers of the left on the left ring.
Johnson describes the ‘fine lines’ of the finger prints as the borders between 
those assumed eligible for rights and protection and those assumed excluded. 
Both of these photographs are of mundane items. As has been shown, the experi-
ences of those living with the items pictured can be driven by the extent to which 
their individual relationships with a particular State are recognised. In this way, 
they also recall the pile of belongings in Gohar Dashti’s photograph in 
Figure 3.2, the use to which they can be put is affected by dehumanisation and 
lack of recognition.37
 When a person resides upon a territory effectively controlled by a particular 
State, s/he becomes vulnerable to that State in a very basic way. It is the State’s 
institutions that regulate social life and ensure that people can survive together. 
It regulates, and enforces the regulation of, persons’ behaviour. This includes the 
unavoidable activities of being human. And yet, the citizenism inherent in the 
way we understand our institutions of justice and politics allows that some basic 
37 Heather Johnson (2015) ‘These Fine Lines: Locating Noncitizenship in Political Protest in 
Europe’, pp. 951–965 in Citizenship Studies 19(8). This example is taken up again in subsequent 
chapters.
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activities be outlawed for people whose relationships with the States that have 
the most power over them is unwanted and so ignored by those States.
 The problems with this go deeper than that which is uncovered by Waldron in 
his discussion of homelessness. In 2010, Joseph Carens warned that ‘… we 
should be wary of efforts to criminalise actions that irregular migrants take 
simply to live ordinary lives’. Carens explains that if a person needs documents 
in order to work, and needs to work in order to eat, it becomes nonsensical to 
impose even what seem to be ‘sensible laws intended to prevent fraud’ against 
someone using false documents if this in effect means preventing her/im from 
eating.38 In this case, the ‘unwanted’ noncitizen bears the brunt of the failure of 
existing political systems, based on existing political- theoretic systems, to recog-
nise reality as it actually is. And, by being written out of recognition, such an 
individual is also denied official means to contest it.
 Speaking of detainees in Nazi concentration camps, Jean- François Lyotard 
observes that they were not spoken to, they were ‘treated’. They were not seen 
as interlocutors. They were not enemies because they were ‘not human’.39 An 
important part of the dehumanisation of ‘unwanted’ noncitizens is their con-
structed voicelessness, their exclusion also from institutions of expression. As 
will be developed in the next chapter, often even the realities of noncitizen pol-
itics are suppressed. This hides the ability of the individuals concerned to be 
interlocutors, or forces them to try to act as citizens or as victims in order to be 
interlocutors, and silences them if this becomes impossible. Despite this, as will 
be developed through the second half of this book, noncitizens, even ostensibly 
silenced noncitizens, are not voiceless, are substantively political, and in fact 
successfully challenge their constructed voicelessness in many ways.
 The comparison between homelessness as conceived by Waldron and the 
‘unwanted’ noncitizens introduced in Chapter 4 also becomes useful because of 
the disanalogy. For example, while homeless persons do have access to public 
space in the city (even if activities are restricted), in the world as a whole, there 
is no globally public space. That is, there is no inhabitable land that has no State 
of some sort attached to it. In addition, the limit of the politics of recognition is 
largely drawn along State lines. The region with most claim to be stateless in 
this sense is probably the High Seas, though no one can stand there without a 
boat. Other spaces are similarly inhospitable.
 This means that leaving it to territorial States to decide whether or not to relate to 
a noncitizen (in the way that a home- owner can decide whether or not to allow a 
homeless person into her/is home) makes it theoretically possible and in fact the 
case that a person can be denied the right to stand lawfully anywhere on earth within 
a system that does not offer her/im the opportunity to consent to it or to reject it. The 
person’s political reality, then, is denied, as well as her/is physical humanity. S/he is 
rendered vulnerable in a particularly abject way to the State system.
38 Joseph Carens (2010) Immigrants and the Right to Stay, MIT Press p. 46.
39 Lyotard 1993 ibid. p. 144.
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Shame, stigma and the scope of justification
Banal dehumanisation cannot, however, only be understood with regard to how 
resultant policies affect physical realities. It is also part of a process that gives 
rise to conditions which in turn contribute to further banal dehumanisation. 
When the relationship of noncitizenship goes unacknowledged, the individuals 
in question are not only excluded from recognised relationships with a particular 
State. They are also potentially excluded from the scope of consideration within 
the theoretical framework itself. As such, a stateless person for example could 
not either accept or reject the reason for her/is exclusion from theory within a 
theory that has no space for her/im. This is because s/he is simply not recognisa-
bly present within it unless a State chooses to allocate her/im some status therein. 
It is not conceptually possible for someone reasonably to share reasons for 
excluding her/imself even from the conceptual possibility of consideration, 
because it is not clear how one would give meaning to her/is reasons for so doing 
within that framework. This represents a vulnerability that is difficult to under-
stand within dominant understandings of the existing theoretical framework.
 First, some persons, as ‘unwanted’ noncitizens, are forced to continue to 
break laws and administrative regulations in order to survive, feeding into the 
construction of irregular immigrants as criminals, and stateless persons as 
untrustworthy. At the same time, in order to obtain rights- protection, including 
protection of the very basic goods needed for life, it is for the most part neces-
sary for individuals to engage with the States that exclude them by assumption 
and prove eligibility for recognition. The citizenist State system requires indi-
viduals to submit to its logic in order to claim this recognition, rather than allow-
ing contestation and debate of the system itself. Insofar as they do not have the 
usual protections of citizens and those with citizen- like relationships, ‘unwanted’ 
noncitizens are rendered even more vulnerable through their unacknowledged 
existence. As implied by the quotation from the official at the head of the 
previous subsection, things that happen to such persons may even not seem real. 
But this does not mean such persons are apolitical or only vulnerable.
 As was reflected above in the examples of Stefan Zweig and the mother of 
Wei Ming Kam, this banal dehumanisation is not only dehumanisation in the 
minds of others. It also risks undermining an individual’s self- respect, while 
denigrating and humiliating attitudes play a role in the destruction of self- worth 
as well as enabling others to justify their actions.40 This also highlights the resili-
ence of those who maintain self- respect despite such dehumanisation. Some con-
temporary understandings of self- respect have been framed as the capability to 
stand up in public without shame (Sen, Nussbaum), and even a condition for the 
pursuit of a good life (Rawls).41 In fact, in A Theory of Justice, John Rawls 
40 See, for example, the results of studies presented in Chapter 4.
41 Amartya Sen develops this from the statement by Adam Smith as a capability-deprivation taking 
the form of social exclusion. Amartya Sen (1993) ‘Capability and Well-Being’ in Amartya Sen 
and Martha Nussbaum (eds) (1993) The Quality of Life; Amartya Sen (1983) ‘Development: 
Which Way Now?’, pp. 745–762 in The Economic Journal 93.
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describes self- respect as ‘perhaps the most important primary good’.42 Joel Fein-
berg adds one further dimension to this, describing self- respect as the recognis-
able capacity to assert claims.43 It seems likely that all of these elements are 
important. As such, if we are to examine claims- making from a theoretical per-
spective, it is crucial also to acknowledge social and psychological factors that 
affect the sorts of claims that can be imagined.
 The reasons given for the ‘expulsion’ of ‘unwanted’ noncitizens described 
here include the protection of national coherence, integrity and safety. These are 
similar to the justifications sometimes given for torture and it is helpful to con-
sider parallels.44 Different perspectives on torture can be traced particularly 
through the evolution of the work of Henry Shue. In his 1978 discussion paper, 
Shue initially allowed that there are some situations in which torture could be 
justified where it would prevent extreme catastrophe. However, in his 2005 fol-
low- up, explicitly responding to the release of the so- called ‘Guantanamo 
Papers’, he had changed his mind. His reasons for this are useful to consider in 
the current context.45
 Shue argues that there is no guarantee that the dehumanising practices of 
torture will remain rare if they are ever allowed.46 That is, if torture is considered 
to be acceptable in some urgent and exceptional cases, then the scope of these 
cases can easily become less and less exceptional. While in 1978 he thought that 
there might be situations in which torture would be defensible, Shue explains 
that, in the light of what occurred at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre, 
where American army guards subjected inmates to widespread inhumane and 
degrading treatment, this point of view cannot be sustained. That is, he argues 
that even if, morally, there were (he says that there are, I am not sure that there 
are) some situations where, all other things being equal, torture might be justi-
fied, unavoidable real- world ramifications counteract this. For Shue, the worry is 
that even allowing torture theoretically risks it becoming more widely 
acceptable. I add that it also changes the theoretical basis for society built on 
42 John Rawls (1971) A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press.
43 Feinberg 1970 ibid. p. 257.
44 Legally, torture is defined by the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Article 1: ‘Torture means any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflated on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for 
an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such 
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions.’
45 Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel (eds) The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib, Cam-
bridge University Press.
46 Henry Shue (2005) ‘Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb’, Case Western 
Reservation Journal of International Law 37 p. 238; see also Henry Shue (1978) ‘Torture’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 7(2).
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liberal norms if there are some occasions when some humans could legitimately 
be subjected to such treatment as part of the self- reproduction of that society.
 Shue argues that, once such practices become acceptable in exceptional cir-
cumstances, it is naïve to suppose that lawyers and governments will not use 
loopholes and specious reasoning to allow torture in this or that other instance. 
Something related is seen in the case of ‘unwanted’ noncitizenship and the con-
ditions to which it gives rise. Those without a recognised relationship with a 
State may be without a clearly protected legal personhood. According to reports, 
this denial of the self is damaging, as are the physical conditions to which it 
allows people to be subject. The banal dehumanisation of noncitizens seems to 
facilitate the supposition that there is some category of ‘featherless bipeds’ 
towards whom such treatment is acceptable (whether because they are lesser 
humans or their existence is unacknowledged).
 This is deeply problematic for any theory that claims to be just according to 
liberal democratic principles. It also, as we can see, has not been narrowly 
applied, but instead, the banal dehumanisation has allowed the denial of any 
individual- State relationship to affect large numbers of people thereby rendered 
extremely vulnerable – and the extent of this expulsion has been allowed to 
spread. Where the assumption is exclusion, and the voices of the excluded are 
muffled, it becomes possible to exclude more individuals and to subject them to 
more abject vulnerability.
 Finally, it is important to interrogate who is constructed as unwanted. Con-
temporary immigration regimes imply that there are ‘proper and improper reasons 
to migrate’.47 This also includes implicit assumptions about the sort of people that 
could properly have those reasons. For example, consider the experiences of the 
protagonist, James, in Ra’anan Alexandrowic’s 2003 film, James’s Journey to 
Jerusalem, seen in Figure 5.3. James leaves his home in South Africa on the advice 
of his pastor to pray in the holy city of Jerusalem. The film follows James’s route 
from South Africa to Israel, and his journey in Israel. He finds that no one is 
willing to see him as a pilgrim, or his purpose as spiritual. Because of the way he 
looks and where he comes from, it is assumed that he must be hoping to work 
irregularly, to defraud, or to commit crime, and he is mocked when he tries to 
explain otherwise. Eventually, because of the way his relationship with the State 
system is constructed, he is in fact forced to work irregularly and to live according 
to those expectations. The language of noncitizenship can help in the examination 
of the multi- dimensional prejudices behind the constructions of irregularity.
Dehumanisation and a special sort of vulnerability
It can be tempting to focus on migration, but this is a red herring. As was shown 
in Chapter 4, even in examples that involved movement, it was not generally the 
physical movement itself that made people particularly noncitizen- vulnerable 
47 Dauvergne 2008 ibid. p. 18.
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(though it may lead to other sorts of vulnerability). In fact, their lack of any recog-
nised relationship with a State was created administratively and it was the 
implications of this lack of relationship that made people vulnerable, including 
making their physical movement particularly dangerous, for example. In turn, that 
lack of relationship was found to be constructed, and may well be illiberal and 
arbitrary. Chapter 4 observed that US citizens made up one of the largest groups 
of irregular migrants in Australia, yet Americans were not found in immigration 
detention facilities. They were not subjected to the same vulnerability as others in 
an ostensibly similar situation. Conversely, James, the pilgrim from James’s 
Journey to Jerusalem, was assumed to be nefarious and in need of control.
 There are four aspects to the vulnerability and to the dehumanisation discussed 
here: (1) Protection of basic interests is out of one’s control; (2) Personal security 
is not protected; (3) Agency is undermined, including the freedom to make moral 
choices; and (4) A person is shamed; his or her dignity is not protected.
 All four of these stem from the need for an individual to demonstrate that s/he 
has a relationship with the State in question in order to receive recognition and 
respect.
 In the context of a liberalism obscured by methodological citizenism and 
assumed exclusion, for recognition as human, an individual must demonstrate 
why a particular State needs to take note of her/is interests – and this must be 
done through obtaining a citizen or quasi- citizen status. Noncitizen- vulnerability, 
then, is not mitigated or even recognised as problematic. The vulnerability of 
Figure 5.3  James (Siyabonga Melongisi Shibe), still from the film James Journey to 
 Jerusalem (Ra’anan Aleixandrowicz, Lama Prodcutions, Zeitgeist Films, 2003).
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‘unwanted’ noncitizens is not only vulnerability to a State. It also creates 
vulnerability in relation to other individuals (employers, landlords, spouses, 
etc.), as well as a more general vulnerability in terms of self- respect and rights- 
claiming. ‘Unwanted’ noncitizens may struggle to obtain basic nourishment and 
shelter, medical care and education, but also police protection and access to legal 
justice. As this book will go on to show, this also relates to noncitizenship more 
generally – including that experienced by formal citizens.
 Feminist literature has highlighted the relevance of vulnerability, including 
vulnerability to, and dependency upon, other individuals, to thinking about polit-
ical systems. Scholars within this tradition have examined the social structures 
that create vulnerability and have argued that a State built upon liberal demo-
cratic principles must acknowledge changing needs and address the changing 
nature of vulnerability that results.48 This has, for example, in turn driven new 
understandings of support for disabled persons and financial and other benefits 
for parents. These are persons who have traditionally been assumed necessarily 
reliant to different extents upon family structures, even dysfunctional family 
structures, for basic life needs. It is now widely recognised in liberal democratic 
discourses that structures that place a person’s basic interests in the hands of 
another individual enable coercion based on the threat or the reality of withheld 
basic needs. It is worth noting the power that the State can give in this context to 
some individuals over others.49
 State institutions can artificially make otherwise independent individuals 
dependent on individual and collective others through the State’s citizenist insti-
tutional structure. Such individuals become dependent upon employers, for 
example, not only for employment (such that they could take their labour else-
where if they wanted), but also for immigration documents, for example, when 
they are tied to a particular employer. Power over people by virtue of their quasi-
 citizen, or lack of citizen, status is also given to landlords, who may be required 
or allowed to check a person’s documents and threaten reporting.
 When people are prevented from working and from claiming access to 
welfare systems, this risks making those who are already sick or physically 
weak, or those who are already vulnerable in other ways, more vulnerable. It 
also renders particularly vulnerable those who otherwise would not be. Such 
persons become unnecessarily dependent upon employers or charitable institu-
tions, for example, for the satisfaction of their basic needs. As was presented in 
Chapter 2, this is contrary to a liberal political theoretical framework that 
48 For example, consider the discussion among interviewees of the case study of ‘Francis’ in a 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation Report whose situation was described by one respondent in this 
way: ‘He has no control over his own destiny’; Suzanne Fitzpatrick, Glen Bramley, Janice 
Blenkinsopp, Sarah Johnsen, Mandy Littlewood, Gina Netto, Filip Sosenko and Beth Watts 
(2015) ‘Destitution in the UK: An Interim Report’, Joseph Rowntree Foundation Programme 
Paper, March 2015.
49 This is addressed in Chapter 10, where the lessons that can be learnt from the development of 
feminism are explored in more detail.
Banal dehumanisation  77
upholds the importance of the individual, of individual liberty, dignity, equality, 
as well as the capacity for solidarity. It actively inhibits individuals’ capabilities.
 Putting someone into this situation of vulnerability is made possible by banal 
dehumanisation, while making someone vulnerable to others in these ways con-
tributes to her/is dehumanisation. Being vulnerable to someone or some thing 
means that one’s capacity to act with agency in particular instances is impaired. 
This also may include a lack of confidence that a course of action will be pos-
sible, a lack of self- esteem, or fear of a loss of basic functionings. That is, for 
example, Chapter 4’s ‘unwanted’ noncitizens may refrain from reporting to law 
enforcement authorities when they are the victims of crime or avoid seeking help 
in other ways, for fear of deportation or loss of other rights. It also impedes an 
individual’s freedom to be moral and the freedom to follow the rules. That is, an 
individual may be forced to steal in order to eat and be prevented from helping 
others. At its most basic and most symbolic, those who find themselves in acti-
vated noncitizen relationships and unable to realise their most basic of capabil-
ities may feel themselves obliged to cross State borders (internal, like those to 
labour markets and external, like those to the territory) irregularly in order to 
access those capabilities otherwise denied to them.
 Vulnerability is inevitable when humans come into contact with each other. State 
institutions can institutionalise it, protect against it, or mitigate its effects. In and of 
itself, this vulnerability may not be a bad thing. In fact, some have written of the 
importance of our human dependency upon each other.50 However, it is important 
to examine how this dependency is managed and distributed within the existing 
structure, and so how it is experienced by individuals. In the activated noncitizen 
relationship, a person is exposed to a vulnerability that is not matched by structural 
mitigation and is not distributed fairly. As such, persons with activated noncitizen-
ship bear burdens of the creation and sustaining of the State that are not associated 
with its benefits.
 Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth open their 2005 paper on the relationship 
between autonomy, vulnerability, recognition and justice by stating that ‘[o]ne 
of liberalism’s core commitments is to safeguarding individuals’ autonomy. And 
a central aspect of liberal social justice is the commitment to protecting the 
vulnerable’.51
 They see autonomy as a ‘set of capacities to lead one’s own life’ and focus on 
the implications of a liberal obligation to reduce autonomy- related vulnerability. 
This book moves slightly away from Anderson and Honneth’s position by refer-
ring specifically to vulnerability to the State in question as a motivator of obliga-
tions in that State. Indeed, the challenge posed to this core liberal commitment 
by the raw vulnerability with which activated noncitizenship may currently be 
50 For example, see Judith Butler (2005) Undoing Gender, Routledge.
51 Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth (2005) ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice’, in 
John Christman and Joel Anderson (eds) Autonomy and the Challenge to Liberalism: New 
Essays, Cambridge University Press.
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associated – and that of ‘unwanted’ noncitizens in particular – generates forms 
of obligation that differ from those associated with citizenship because the vul-
nerability is of a different sort. It may be an abject vulnerability even to the 
theoretical system itself and forces people to engage with the State and with 
other individuals from a position of weakness. The vulnerability of noncitizens 
needs to be understood as a whole and as a fundamental part of the existing 
liberal theoretical and political system of States infrastructure.
Dehumanisation and the politicisation of ‘unwanted’ 
noncitizens
… a mother, unable to find employment and desperate to feed her children 
[…] will be turned away if she tries to cross into another country (such as 
ours, for example) – and this not by crooks and thugs but by ‘the law’, by 
judges, immigration inspectors, the police, who, backed by our recognition 
or acquiescence, do their ‘duty’ in the name of human justice.
(Thomas Pogge, writing in Realizing Rawls, 198952)
For the most part, irregular migration is peaceful. It may include those disobey-
ing laws because they believe them to be unjust, but most likely mainly 
involves those who primarily disobey laws because they must, or they believe 
they must, irrespective of what they think of them. Disobedience has tradition-
ally been used by people who are constructed out of the scope of justice to draw 
attention to, and to challenge, the structures that exclude them.53 When instances 
of irregular migration are seen in this way, then, increasingly repressive 
attempts to control immigration can resemble the efforts of those who benefit 
from a repressive regime to maintain the status quo. And the reactions to irregu-
lar immigrants then seem reminiscent of attacks on those disobeying unjust 
laws in other contexts (though this does not assume all migration control is 
unjust). Civil disobedience is usually reserved for those who are citizens, who 
follow all the other rules except the unjust ones against which they are protest-
ing.54 The actions of those kept even from any recognised relationship with a 
State or the State system may not be actions of ‘civil disobedience’ of this form. 
But they can be seen as actions of informed and intentional ‘disobedience’ 
against  specific injustices.
52 Thomas Pogge (1989) Realizing Rawls, Cornell University Press, Ithaca p. 276.
53 Martin Borstelmann has referred to the global anticolonial movement as ‘the international civil 
rights movement’.
54 For example, John Rawls and Brian Smart seem to disagree on everything about civil disobedi-
ence except that it is for citizens. John Rawls describes it as a last resort, when ‘standard demo-
cratic processes have failed’. See John Rawls (1999) ‘Civil Disobedience’, pp. 244–253 in Aileen 
Kavangh and John Oberdiek (eds) (2009) Arguing About Law, Routledge, first published in Col-
lected Papers, Harvard University Press; Brian Smart (1978) ‘Defining Civil Disobedience’, 
pp. 249–269 in Inquiry 21.
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 When individuals are denied recognition in the world of States, or denied a 
favourable position within it, they might disobey the system that constructs them 
into this situation. Moving home, working, playing sports, need not be seen as 
political acts, but where these are impeded or criminalised, they also become 
politicised. Such individuals who undertake these activities irregularly when 
they have been inappropriately denied could, then, be seen as claiming that 
which is unjustifiedly and unjustifiably being kept from them.
 Forbidden from joining the labour market, when ‘unwanted’ noncitizens 
work, this act can be seen as a form of political disobedience. If ‘unwanted’ 
 noncitizens are forbidden from entering the cultural community of the State, are 
prevented from accessing the means to survive, then in participating in the com-
munity and in finding the means to survive, those persons can find themselves 
engaging in political acts. This is not disobedience simpliciter, though, it looks 
like a political disobedience.55 If these are seen as political acts (alongside other 
forms of protest), then even ‘unwanted’ noncitizens have political voice, and 
they have that voice even if attempts to mute traditional forms of political 
expression are successful.56
 Far from rendering persons apolitical, then, restrictions placed upon 
‘unwanted’ noncitizens, in deepening their vulnerability, also force even very 
basic actions to be politicised. Failing to recognise the reality of the noncitizen 
relationship with a State does not mean that the relationship disappears but that, 
in order to live out that relationship, individuals must perform acts of disobedi-
ence. ‘Unwanted’ noncitizens are forced, then, to become political actors, even 
if they would have preferred not to engage in politics at all. The failure to miti-
gate their special form of vulnerability, and allowing it to give rise to extremes 
of deprivation, contributes to a noncitizen politics that is challenging and can 
seem threatening. The banal dehumanisation in the denial of a recognised 
individual- State noncitizen relationship, then, overwhelmingly burdens those 
individuals most directly affected. But it also impairs the possibility of develop-
ing a system that is just according to liberal democratic principles more 
generally.
55 Consider, for example, Bonnie Honig (1993) Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, 
Cornell University Press; Peter Nyers (2012) ‘Moving Borders: The Politics of Dirt’, pp. 2–6 in 
Radical Philosophy 174; as well as the papers in Peter Nyers and Kim Rygiel (eds) Citizenship, 
Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement.
56 This is developed in Chapter 11.
6 Unwanted and ambivalent 
citizenship
In liberal political thought, citizenship is often taken uncritically to be emancip-
atory and so also to be desirable.1 Even critical approaches to citizenship often 
seem to assume its desirability in their reconceptualisations. There is a good 
reason for this. Full formal citizenship in some State is in fact mostly needed 
today for rights and recognition and in order to have a say (however symbolic) 
in how the local, regional and global systems are organised. Citizenship is made 
desirable within a system based upon liberal democratic principles because there 
is no other officially acknowledged option available within that system. The 
struggle for citizenship has, then, been the struggle for representation, for rights, 
and for recognition in the absence of an alternative. Yet, a resilient understand-
ing of citizenship requires an appreciation of what happens when it is experi-
enced in ways that challenge standard interpretations – when that citizenship is 
unwanted or ambivalent.
 By acknowledging that citizenship may be unwanted and that noncitizenships 
may be rationally claimed, it is possible to provide a more complex characterisa-
tion of the reality (including the theoretical reality) of those States built upon 
liberal democratic principles. It may be that, in the end, a more radical approach 
will be needed, but if we are to make a proper go of using liberal democratic 
frameworks, it will be crucial not only to acknowledge the function of the nonci-
tizen relationship within them, but also to use this in analysing the reality of 
unwanted or ambivalent citizenship. In earlier chapters, I already argued that the 
historic framing of citizenship needs to be examined from a range of perspec-
tives, which is not restricted to that of the European beneficiaries of the Enlight-
enment. Even as contemporary citizenship was being defined for some, others 
were being written out of the very structure of that citizenship, both theoretically 
1 For example, see these classic texts: Thomas H Marshall (2009) ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, in 
Jeff Manza and Michael Sander (eds) (2009) Inequality and Society, W.W. Norton and Co, New 
York. [first published 1950]; Will Kymlicka (2002) Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford 
University Press; Stuart White (2003) The Civic Minimum, Oxford University Press. See also 
essays in Engin Isin and Bryan Turner (2003) Handbook of Citizenship Studies, Sage. For a useful 
survey, see Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (1994) ‘The Return of the Citizen: A Survey of 
Recent Work on Citizenship Theory’, pp. 352–381 in Ethics 104(2).
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and in practice. This chapter and the one that follows observe how, as a result of 
its historical and political context, citizenship is not unambiguously positive for 
those who must then define their relationships with liberal States in this way.
The Iroquois National Lacrosse team and the 2010 World 
Lacrosse Championships2
The ‘Haudenosaunee’ are also referred to as ‘Iroquois’, a word with apparently 
uncertain roots.3 Haudenosaunee individuals traditionally live in parts of the east 
coast of North America, on both sides of the US- Canadian border. The Iroquois 
National Lacrosse Team is considered to be one of the best lacrosse teams in the 
world.4 It competes as a national team, alongside those of internationally recog-
nised States. The team members can claim formal citizenship of the US or 
Canada. And yet in championships they play lacrosse against US and Canadian 
teams. This has given rise to conflict which played out particularly publicly in 
relation to the 2010 Men’s World Lacrosse Championship. Examining this case 
through the language of unhyphenated noncitizenship helps to uncover addi-
tional ways in which noncitizenship can interact with formal citizenship.
 In 2010, the Men’s World Lacrosse Championship was held in Manchester in 
the UK. The Iroquois team was predicted to do well,5 but the players never made 
it to the tournament. Prevented from travelling on Haudenosaunee travel docu-
ments and unwilling to travel to the tournament on Canadian or US passports, in 
the end they returned home without having boarded the plane.6 An article in a 
2 This case is examined in more detail in Tendayi Bloom (2017) ‘Colonised Groups and the Right 
to Have Rights’, in Tendayi Bloom, Katherine Tonkiss and Phillip Cole (2017) Understanding 
Statelessness, Routledge. The Iroquois Lacrosse Team example, and the situation for the Haude-
nosaunee more generally is given more air time than the struggles of other peoples in the same 
continent, which may then be left unheard. Here I draw upon this example both because of the 
interesting symbolism it presents and because of the wealth of literature available on it, but recog-
nise that these discussions also affect other groups.
3 The name ‘Haudenosaunee’, meaning ‘People of the Longhouse’, encompasses six nations located 
in what is now southeastern Canada and northeastern United States, the Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, 
Onondaga, Seneca and Tuscarora peoples. See, for example, Audra Simpson (2000) ‘Paths 
Toward a Mohawk Nation: Narratives of Citizenship and Nationhood in Kahawake’, pp. 113–136 
in Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton and Will Sanders (eds) (2000) Political Theory and the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Cambridge University Press, at p. 127; and Capton Marques 2011 ibid. at 
p. 385. On the word ‘Iroquois’, Daniel K. Richter (1992) The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The 
Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization, University of North Carolina 
press, p. 1; for a survey of thinking about the origins of the word in the 1960s, see Gordon M. Day 
(1968) ‘Iroquois: An Etymology’, pp. 389–402 in Ethnohistory 15(4).
4 In 2002 and 2006, the Iroquois team came fourth in the world. In 2010, they were unable to 
compete. In 2014, they came third in the world.
5 For example, it was identified as the side’s ‘most dynamic team yet’, John Jiloty (2010) ‘Iroquois 
Grounded but Future Looks Bright’, Inside Lacrosse 16 August 2010.
6 Wil Haygood (2010) ‘Iroquois National Lacrosse Team asks White House to honor sovereign 
passports’, Washington Post 14 July 2010; Marques 2011 ibid. ‘Divided We Stand: The Haudeno-
saunee, Their Passport and Legal Implications of Their Recognition in Canada and the United 
States’, pp. 363–426 in San Diego International Law Journal 13.
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local newspaper, the Post- Standard, published at the time, included a particu-
larly interesting photograph of team member Marty Ward, taken while the team 
was waiting for a decision in New York. In this image (see Figure 6.1), which 
was taken by Mike Greenlar, Ward is seen from behind. He looks out over the 
Hudson River towards the symbolic icon of American freedom, the Statue of 
Liberty. The Statue of Liberty is emblematic for having greeted those denied 
freedom elsewhere as they arrived in America. In Greenlar’s picture, this liberty 
is seen from a different perspective, through the eyes of Ward, as he waits to 
learn whether he and his team will be able to leave New York or whether they 
will be grounded for contesting the State system and citizenship that is usually 
assumed to be emancipatory.
 For the team to board the plane with only Haudenosaunee documents, the UK 
required that the US would vouch officially that the players would be allowed to 
return after the tournament.7 As negotiations continued, the team reportedly 
missed matches, with effects on their potential performance in the championship 
as well as financial implications.8 When no satisfactory solution was offered the 
team eventually returned home.9 Joe Heath, General Counsel to the Onondaga, 
one of the six nations that make up the Haudenosaunee confederacy, is quoted in 
the press as describing the bureaucracy that would not let them travel as part of a 
‘racist colonial, assimilationist machine’.10 I interpret this to mean that he saw 
the travel restrictions as part of a framework that reinforces the status quo which 
was created by, and continues to support, colonial occupation of lands previ-
ously occupied by the Haudenosaunee, and forcing those that would contest this 
to conform. It is hard to disagree.
 In 2010, the lacrosse players were told that they must either submit to a 
framework that they contested or be prevented from fulfilling capabilities within 
it, symbolised by their inability to travel to the tournament. Since that frame-
work is the overarching global political framework within which rights are 
crafted and protected, the coercive threat in this is strong. This incident shows 
how the prevalence of the citizenist assumption renders contestation of it, and of 
one’s place within it, difficult. It also makes it easier for that contestation to be 
unacknowledged. The imposition of citizenship, including through the coercive 
refusal of travel to those unwilling or unable to make use of a recognised citizen-
ship, seems also to challenge the freely chosen and consensual (even if only 
hypothetically) nature of the citizen relationship itself. It forces those who are 
 7 Brian Kolva (2012) ‘Lacrosse Players, Not Terrorists: The Effects of the Western Travel Initi-
ative on Native American International Travel and Sovereignty’, pp. 307 in Washington Univer-
sity Journal of Law and Policy 40, p. 309; Thomas Kaplan (2010) ‘Iroquois Defeated by Passport 
Dispute’, New York Times 16 July 2010.
 8 Kolva 2012 ibid.
 9 The Economist (2010) ‘The Iroquois and their passports: unfair play’, 22 July 2010; Kaplan 2010 
ibid.; Lindsey Kingston (2011) ‘Opting Out of Legal Nationality: Identity, Passports and the Iro-
quois National Lacrosse Team’, Western Political Science Association 2011 Annual Meeting 
[unpublished].
10 The Economist 2010 ibid.
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contesting either to submit to citizenism or to bear the burden of the existing citi-
zenist State system without acknowledgement within it.
 One common way to defend the documentary requirements like those that 
grounded Ward and his teammates is security. In 2004 and 2008, the United 
States imposed new security requirements on documents used at its borders.11 
This impacted upon the ability of indigenous governments to make documents 
that would meet these requirements, with two sorts of implications. On the one 
hand, this measure demonstrated the power of the United States to decide for the 
whole territorial space the sort of documents could be used. On the other hand, it 
in fact forced individuals who wanted to travel to use US documents. Tracing 
the recent history of lacrosse teams alone uncovers inconsistency in whether the 
Haudenosaunee travel documents are recognised.
 Their recognition seems to depend upon decisions from those recognised 
States that control existing borders and territories. In 2012, members of the male 
under- 19 team travelled to Finland on Haudenosaunee passports, while in 2015 
members of the female under- 19 team were again unable to travel to the UK 
(other recent tournaments have been held in North America, so these issues did 
11 Haygood 2010 ibid.; Kingston 2011 ibid.
Figure 6.1  Iroquois national lacrosse player Marty Ward, of Syracuse, looks across the 
harbour to the Statue of Liberty National Monument from the dock of Battery 
Park in New York (Mike Greenlar, Advance Media, New York, 2010).
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not arise). Already in 1923, a representative used an official Haudenosaunee 
travel document to go to a meeting of the League of Nations.12 The State system, 
then, and the insiders to that system, decide whether individuals are able to act 
within it. The attempt to depoliticise and not acknowledge noncitizen challenges 
seems to have deepened their political nature, so that activities that could have 
been relatively apolitical (like playing in a sporting tournament) end up taking 
substantial political significance.13
 Another way to look at what is going on here might be to suggest that the 
Haudenosaunee players are not contesting citizenism, but are fighting to be part of 
the citizenist structure on their own terms, as citizens of another recognised State, 
the Haudenosaunee State.14 However, even if this were behind even some members 
of the lacrosse team’s refusal to use US and Canadian travel documents, the argu-
ment here would still stand. This is because, in doing what they are doing, what 
emerges is precisely a problematisation of the existing State structure that is able to 
ignore those who do not conform with its existing citizenist assumptions. Even if a 
new State were to be created, including a new Haudenosaunee citizenship that was 
internationally recognised in the same way as Canadian and US citizenships are 
today, this would itself pose the same problems to those who do not want that new 
citizenship and do not identify either with the newly formed State or any of the 
other existing States in the required way. As such, while it might address the con-
cerns of some Haudenosaunee today, it would not solve the underlying theoretical 
problem that space is needed within liberal democratic thinking for examining what 
happens when people contest it.
 And yet, formally, these individuals are citizens. In some cases, this may just 
be a formality, but in other cases it is not. Many individual Haudenosaunee have 
struggled historically for access to citizenship and continue to struggle for equal-
ity of that citizenship. Many serve and have served in the US army.15 Meanwhile, 
prominent Haudenosaunee leaders and thinkers have spoken out against the 
imposition of US citizenship, and individuals contest citizenship in a myriad of 
12 For example, see Nicole Terese Capton Marques (2011–2012) ‘Divided We Stand: The Haude-
nosaunee, Their Passport and Legal Implications of Their Recognition in Canada and the United 
States’, pp. 383–426 in San Diego International Law Journal 13. The contemporary form of this 
document has existed since 1977. One analysis of the importance of this is found in Grace Li Xiu 
Woo (2003) ‘Canada’s Forgotten Founders: The Modern Significance of the Haudenosaunee 
(Iroquois) Application for Membership of the League of Nations’, in Law, Social Justice and 
Global Development 2003(1).
13 This echoes Chapter 4’s analysis. Though, given the heritage of lacrosse, it is already political in 
this case. Not only was lacrosse created by the Haudenosaunee, but it also has particular spiritual 
significance, known by some as ‘the Creator’s Game’. Indeed, the Iroquois national lacrosse team 
has been described as ‘the Iroquois’s most public expression of sovereignty’, cited in Kolva 2012 
ibid. pp. 317, 318.
14 This is contested, for example, in Simpson 2014 ibid. and Dale Turner (2006) This is Not a Peace 
Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy, University of Toronto Press.
15 In 2013, 0.7 per cent of the US veteran population were recognised as American Indian or 
Alaskan Natives; United States Department of Veterans Affairs (2015) American Indian and 
Alaska Native Veterans: 2013 American Community Survey, May 2015, p. 5.
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other ways.16 This practical reality again reinforces the theoretical claim that the 
struggles for recognition of both noncitizenship and citizenship are not mutually 
exclusive and may in fact be mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, individuals 
may seek a formal citizenship, tied up with a contestation of the way in which 
full and equal memberships are allocated. On the other hand, the relationship 
between the individuals involved and the relevant States cannot be understood 
simply as citizenship or simply as a negation of citizenship. This relationship 
also involves what is described here as an activated noncitizenship, and a par-
ticular vulnerability to the existing State system, as a result.
Noncitizen citizens and being counted
I was born at a time when the Australian government knew how many sheep 
there were but not how many Aboriginal people […] I was 10 years old 
before the ’67 referendum fixed that. The first decade of my life was spent 
as a non- citizen.
(Linda Burney, MP, in her maiden speech to the 
Australian Parliament, August 201617 )
The progress of other indigenous movements in States ostensibly built upon 
liberal democratic principles can bring out further aspects of the complex inter-
play of citizenship and noncitizenship in these cases and beyond. Individuals 
have, as in the case of the Haudenosaunee, both fought to obtain citizenships and 
fended them off, sometimes as part of the same process. There is no singular 
experience. In 1967, Australia was preparing for a referendum on whether to 
include Aboriginal people in the national census.18 Some saw this as a referen-
dum on something more: on whether finally to ensure full citizenship rights for 
Aboriginal people (they officially became citizens in 1948).19 Exclusion from the 
census was seen as symbolic of non- recognition, as well as making it difficult to 
demonstrate the interests of those left uncounted (something similar can be said 
of the stateless persons and irregular immigrants of Chapter 4).20 In 2016, Linda 
16 Douglas M. George-Kanentiio (2006) Iroquois on Fire: A Voice from the Mohawk Nation, 
Praeger, p. 27; Audra Simpson (2014) Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of 
Settler States, Duke University Press, p. 119; Marques 2011 ibid. p. 392; Peter Nyers (2011) 
‘Alien Equality’, pp. 471–486 in Issues in Legal Scholarship 9(1) p. 474.
17 For example, see BBC (2016) ‘Australian Aboriginal MP Linda Burney vows to fight for 
change’, 31 August 2016.
18 For example, see Bain Attwood and Andrew Markus (2007) The 1967 Referendum: Race, Power 
and the Australian Constitution, Aboriginal Studies Press; an official research brief on the history 
of the referendum is given here: John Gardiner-Garden (2007) ‘The 1967 Referendum – history 
and myths’, Research Brief no. 11, 2006–07, Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, 2 
May 2007.
19 Attwood and Markus 2007 ibid. at p. 44. But see also David Mercer (2010) ‘ “Citizen minus”? 
Indigenous Australians and the Citizenship Question’, pp. 421–445 in Citizenship Studies 7(4).
20 For an interesting discussion of the politics of censuses and the relationship to citizenship, see 
Melissa Nobles (2000) Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics, Stanford 
University Press.
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Burney became the first indigenous Australian woman elected to the Australian 
Lower House. The extract from her maiden speech given at the head of this 
section demonstrates the symbolic as well as legal importance of the referendum 
and the way in which it related to individuals’ relationships with the Australian 
State and their experiences of citizenship and noncitizenship.
 This context helps to locate the words of activist Chicka Dixon in a public 
speech in 1967, in the lead- up to the vote:
There’s a simple reason why I want a huge ‘Yes’ vote on the Aboriginal 
question at next Saturday’s referendum: I want to be accepted by white 
Australians as a person. There are scores of other reasons why the vote 
should be yes. But for most Aborigines it is basically and most importantly 
a matter of seeing white Australia finally, after 179 years, affirming at last 
that they believe we are human beings.21
Dixon explains that he is fighting a form of dehumanisation that has played an 
important role in the ways in which today’s States have developed. It is not 
essential to theoretical liberalism, but it is certainly part of how it was created 
and how it has played out in practice.
 From the Latin, meaning ‘nobody’s land’, ‘terra nullius’ refers to the affirma-
tion that the land of Australia was empty of people before European settlers 
arrived.22
 There is dispute about whether or not terra nullius was official policy in the 
early years of the colony in Australia.23 However it happened, though, in Aus-
tralia the notion of terra nullius took hold. Seen in this context, Chicka Dixon’s 
statement and that of Linda Burney, for example, take on a yet thicker meaning. 
Indeed, in the context of this level of dehumanisation, it is clear that an important 
part of what such activists were seeking in citizenship was impossible without 
inclusion in the Australian census. They wanted to have a recognised existence 
21 Chicka Dixon, in the Sydney Sun-Herald 21 May 1967. This is cited, with the same emphasis, in 
several places. For example, see Russell McGregor (2011) Indifferent Inclusion: Aboriginal 
People and the Australian Nation, Aboriginal Studies Press; Attwood and Markus 2007 ibid.
22 For example, see Christabel Chamarette (2000) ‘Terra Nullius Then and Now: Mabo, Native 
Title, and Reconciliation in 2000’, pp. 167–172 in Australian Psychologist 35(2). The year 1992 
marks the end of a ten-year battle by Eddie Mabo and four other members of the Meriam people 
to prove their traditional claims to land on Murray Island in Northern Queensland. Importantly, 
the court also found that Australia was not a terra nullius at the point of European settlement, 
though it explicitly stated that this could not be used to challenge the sovereignty of Australia. 
Mabo v. Queensland 175 CLR 1 (1992). For a useful discussion of the case and its implications, 
see for example Gerry Simpson (1993–1994) ‘Mabo, International Law, Terra Nullius and the 
Stories of Settlement: An Unresolved Jurisprudence’, pp. 195–210 in Melbourne University Law 
Review 19.
23 For example, see Stuart Banner (2005) ‘Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in 
Early Australia’, pp. 95–131 in Law and History Review 23 (1); Merete Borch (2001) ‘Rethink-
ing the Origins of Terra Nullius’, pp. 222–239 in Australian Historical Studies 32.
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in the polity. They wanted to be ‘counted’. Within the existing system of States, 
the only mechanism that there is for such recognition is citizenship or quasi 
citizenship.
Citizen noncitizens and imposition
Members of indigenous groups in North America were initially defined out of 
citizenship. The policy of the United States began to change in the late nine-
teenth century. It increasingly became one of enforcing citizenship without 
consent. In 1887, the ‘Allotment Policy’ was introduced, giving people land that 
had previously been held in common by their national groups, in exchange for 
US citizenship.24 Official literature from the time presents this as part of an 
intentional effort to ‘civilise’ the people concerned, through a move towards 
individualistic ownership of land. It could also be seen as an effort to emancipate 
and so give power to the individuals concerned. Others have argued that the 
Allotment Policy also had the aim of breaking up national groups to increase the 
likelihood of peaceful submission to colonial rule and to enable US entities to 
take control of more ‘Indian land’.25
 The Indian Citizenship Act 1924 then imposed US citizenship on all those 
indigenous individuals who had been born within the territory of the United 
States but were not yet citizens. This was seen by some (mainly White activists 
including, reportedly, Eleanor Roosevelt) as emancipatory.26 Others saw it as a 
decisive next step in the project of colonisation.27 In his memoirs, Chief Clinton 
Rickard, who lived from 1882 until 1971 and founded the Indian Defence 
League in 1926, reflects upon the move towards imposing citizenship upon 
native peoples in the US: ‘We did not request this citizenship, did not want it, 
and opposed it.’28 This presents decisively the nature of the citizenship from his 
perspective, and it helps to demonstrate that the individual- State relationship for 
those thereby rendered citizens cannot be analysed in terms of citizenship alone. 
It requires recognition of a foundational relationship of a different sort. I propose 
to fill this gap with the analytical category of unhyphenated noncitizenship.
 In the mythology of early settler Americans, citizenship represented a rejec-
tion of monarchy, of imposed foreign rule, and a rejection of inherited privilege. 
For them, it was a move towards self- rule and equal ownership of society 
24 Through what was known as the Dawes Act.
25 For example, see Mark A. Michaels (1998) ‘Indigenous Ethics and Alien Laws: Native Tradi-
tions and the United States Legal System’, pp. 1565–1584 in Fordham Law Review 66(4), at 
p. 1576.
26 Laurence M. Hauptman (1999) ‘Eleanor Roosevelt and the American Indian: The Iroquois as a 
Case Study’, The Hudson Valley Regional Review 16(1).
27 For example, Douglas M. George-Kanentiio (2006) Iroquois on Fire: A Voice from the Mohawk 
Nation, Praeger, at p. 27; Laurence M. Hauptman (1999) ‘Eleanor Roosevelt and the American 
Indian: The Iroquois as a Case Study’, in The Hudson Valley Regional Review 16(1).
28 Clinton Rickard (1973) Fighting Tuscarora: The Autobiography of Chief Clinton Rickard, 
Syracuse University Press, at p. 126.
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through the demos. The indigenous peoples of North America did not share this 
history. This has been presented particularly succinctly by one scholar: ‘Native 
peoples saw no need to be emancipated from a feudal, medieval social order they 
had never experienced.’29 This makes no claims about the political structures of 
the colonised peoples themselves. It only observes that their experience of sub-
jection to the British crown functioned differently to that of the White settlers, 
and their experience of the coming of republican citizenship was also different 
(indeed some reportedly saw the British as at least protecting against settler 
expansion westward).30
 Consequently, the imposition of this liberal democratic citizenship cannot be 
seen only as emancipatory. It also represented subjection to a colonising regime. 
Some indigenous individuals also worried that changing the nature of the rela-
tionship between themselves and the United States might undermine the system 
of rights- protections that had been negotiated through treaties. That is, whereas 
individuals had previously been treated as citizens of foreign nations, if their 
predominant relationship with the US would be one of formal citizenship, many 
worried about the status of the original treaties.31 One writer poses the rhetorical 
question: ‘How can a citizen have a treaty with his own government?’32
 Citizenship and noncitizenship are not mutually exclusive relationships 
with a State. Yet, so long as the theoretical framework within which the State 
system functions assumes that they are, a person who wants to claim a nonciti-
zen relationship might in fact have to claim hyphenated non- citizenship and 
wholly reject citizenship and everything that goes along with it. When that cit-
izenship is the only way in which a person can have a recognised relationship 
with a State, including what this means for the protection of rights and inter-
ests, this drives a choice between protected rights within an acknowledged 
individual- State relationship on the one hand; and rightslessness, dehumanisa-
tion and claiming a reality that will still probably not be recognised on the 
other hand.
 In this, the noncitizen challenge is made clear. It is a challenge both to the 
noncitizen and to the State. In cases where citizenship is unwanted, it is difficult, 
within traditional interpretations, for such persons to express their rejection of 
the theoretical framework of the State built upon liberal democratic principles. 
Their position is assumed out of the framework. Not recognising noncitizenship 
as a real relationship between an individual and a State makes the choice even 
more constrained. And it can make the struggles seem more threatening.
29 Alexandra Witkin (1995) ‘To Silence a Drum: The Imposition of United States Citizenship on 
Native Peoples’, pp. 353–383 in Historical Reflections/Reflexions Historiques 21(2), at p. 355.
30 For example, the Royal Proclamation of 1703 which had attempted to forbid European settlement 
west of the Appalachians. Colin Calloway (1995) The American Revolution in Indian Country: 
Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities, Cambridge University Press.
31 George-Kanentiio 2006 ibid. p. 27. See detailed study in Vine Deloria Jr and David E. Wilkins 
(1999) Tribes, Treaties, and Constitutional Tribulations, University of Texas Press.
32 Rickard 1973 ibid. p. 56.
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 This also challenges the reality of citizenship, for if it can be experienced as 
imposition by some, then even if most individuals would not contest their 
citizenship, it is hard to understand it as consensual or free more generally. The 
lacrosse case discussed above shows one example of what happens when indi-
viduals contest liberal democratic citizenship and indicates that the consensual 
nature of US citizenship (in this example) is more tenuous than it can sometimes 
seem. This extends beyond colonial contexts.
 The European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) on Citizenship 
keeps up- to-date information on the rules surrounding the renunciation of cit-
izenship in 77 States in Europe and the Americas.33 Only 16 per cent of the 77 
States included in the survey allow someone to become stateless if that person 
chooses to renounce her/is citizenship. Conversely, 16 per cent require that a 
person already has citizenship of another State before citizenship can be 
renounced, and 27 per cent require that the individual be resident overseas in 
order to renounce citizenship. This makes sense, seeing as most of the States 
in the survey are signatories of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of State-
lessness. These measures stop a person from becoming stateless (with its asso-
ciated deprivations), but they also inhibit the possibility of contestation. 
Looking in more detail at the results, also indicates a distinction in this 
between citizens who became citizens at birth and those who became citizens 
through choice later in life.
 An anomaly that occurs in five of the States studied in the EUDO project with 
regard to naturalised citizens raises wider questions for the interweaving of 
citizenship and noncitizenship. Citizens- by-birth of Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico and 
Nicaragua cannot renounce their citizenship. Citizens- by-birth of Venezuela can 
only do so if they already have citizenship of somewhere else. Yet, for natural-
ised citizens (those who have chosen to become formal citizens) of these States 
the situation is quite different. They can renounce their citizenship (though natu-
ralised Haitians must be residing abroad, and naturalised Mexicans, like natural-
ised Venezuelans, must receive another citizenship). The legal reasons for this 
aside, this seems to suggest that there are those who can make decisions about 
their citizenship and there are those who cannot. That is, someone who has 
chosen to take up Mexican citizenship can also choose to renounce it, while 
someone born into Mexican citizenship cannot make such a choice. This seems 
strange. But it also relates to something found in a much broader range of States.
 EUDO scholar Henio Hoyo has analysed the reasons for this discrepancy in 
some of the States involved in the project. He suggests that it arises in the Mexican 
context as a result of ethno- national identity- formation.34 Hoyo observes that, while 
33 EUDO CITIZENSHIP (2016) ‘Mode L01: Renunciation’ in Global Database on Modes of Loss 
of Citizenship, san Domenica di Fiesole, European University Institute. Data correct as of 1 
January 2016.
34 Henio Hoyo (2015) ‘Apertura externa, exclusión interna: El nacionalismo Revolucionario y los dere-
chos de migrantes, mexicanos por naturalización, y dobles nacionales en México’, Working Paper 
No. 87, desigualdades.net Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America.
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for the most part in South American countries, a person can obtain a new citizen-
ship without having to renounce the previous one, and voting rights are extended 
quite widely, this is associated in some cases with a restriction on the rights of 
those persons thereby made formal citizens by naturalisation. For Hoyo, this sug-
gests that naturalised Mexican citizens are not seen as full and equal citizens.35 He 
finds that the discrimination against citizens by naturalisation extends far into the 
State, so that Mexicans by naturalisation are limited in the jobs and appointments 
they can take. They are excluded from the diplomatic service for example, some 
government positions, and cannot serve on the board of governors of some cultural, 
higher educational, or research institutions. In one sense, they have greater ability 
to consent to or withhold consent from Mexican citizenship. In another sense, they 
are unable fully to enjoy Mexican citizenship.
 Hoyo observes that such discrimination is not unique to Mexico. He recalls 
that the US President or Vice President must be citizen by birth.36 And other 
authors have identified much wider distinctions, that go beyond being able to sit 
in key positions of power (see, for example, discussions in the work of Linda 
Bosniak, Kelly Staples and Katherine Tonkiss).37 Ayelet Shachar critiques what 
she describes as ‘birthright citizenship’, the assumption that citizenship should 
be assigned at birth and that citizenship that has been allocated at birth, takes 
precedence over other relationships.38 Peter Nyers, like Shachar, draws attention 
to instances that are referred to as ‘accidental citizenship’, for example, where 
the implicit assumptions of citizenship can become more explicit.39 There is, 
then, also a strange hierarchy in the membership of the global community of 
citizens, and from the EUDO index and the work of Hoyo, we can see that the 
fully recognised citizenship in practice seems to be the one you cannot choose 
and cannot reject. This further challenges the freedom of citizenship. The lan-
guage of noncitizenship, and the sense that unhyphenated noncitizenship inter-
twines with both formal and informal citizenship, can help us to examine what is 
happening here.
35 Recall also the passage from the New Testament Acts Chapter 22 Verses 27–29: ‘The com-
mander went to Paul and asked, “Tell me, are you a Roman citizen?” “Yes, I am,” he answered. 
Then the commander said, “I had to pay a lot of money for my citizenship.” “But I was born a 
citizen,” Paul replied. Those who were about to interrogate him withdrew immediately. The com-
mander himself was alarmed when he realized that he had put Paul, a Roman citizen, in chains.’ 
Reference suggested by Daniel Gorman (2006) Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of 
Belonging, Manchester University Press.
36 Hoyo ibid. p. 5 n. 7.
37 Linda Bosniak (2010) ‘Peasants and Citizens in Consittuional Thought’, pp. 9–29 in I.CONN 8; 
Kelly Staples (2012) Retheorising Statelessness, Edinburgh University Press; Katherine Tonkiss 
(2013) ‘Constitutional Patriotism, Migration and the post-National Dilemma’, pp. 491–504 in 
Citizenship Studies 17(4–3).
38 Ayelet Shachar (2009) Birthright Citizenship: Citizenship and Global Inequality, Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
39 Peter Nyers (2006) ‘The Accidental Citizen: Acts of Sovereignty and (un)Making Citizenship’, 
pp. 22–41 in Economy and Society 35(1).
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Plural and transnational citizenships
[one should] as soon tolerate a man with two wives as a man with two 
countries.
(George Bancroft, writing in a letter to Lord Palmerston in 184940 )
Historically, plural formal citizenship has often been presented as the counterpart to 
statelessness.41 It has been seen as a related upshot of malfunctions in the State 
system. This logic can be found, for example, in the League of Nations Convention 
on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws 1930 which 
stated that ‘it is in the general interest of the international community to secure that 
all its members should recognise that every person should have a nationality and 
should have one nationality only’.42 Plural citizenship, then, like statelessness, has 
been seen as a problem in and of itself. It challenges the logic of the State system. 
To use Christian Joppke’s words, ‘dual citizenship breaks with the segmentary logic 
of the classic nation- state, according to which one could only belong to one state at 
a time’.43 As a result, plural citizens, like stateless persons, have been seen as suspi-
cious and subject to social moral opprobrium.44 At one extreme, and as suggested in 
the above quotation from George Bancroft, such individuals have been likened to 
those engaging in bigamy, assumed to be odious. At another extreme, they have 
been seen as enemy aliens and interned.
 The anti- binary approach presented in this book, including the acknowledgement 
of noncitizenship, allows a more nuanced understanding of plural citizenship (both 
formal and informal), and the individual- State relationships that it involves. The 
complexities of plural citizenship and the relevance of this to the problematic of cit-
izenism have been thrown into relief during recent debates in several States built on 
liberal democratic norms. Those debates relate to denationalisations of persons 
suspected of terrorism.45 If the assumption is that a person is either a full citizen 
40 George Bancroft (historian, politician, US ambassador), writing in a letter to Lord Palmerston 
(UK politician) in 1849. George Bancroft (1849) ‘Letter to Lord Palmerson’, 26 January 1849, 
cited in Rey Koslowski (2003) ‘Challenges of International Cooperation in a World of Increasing 
Dual Nationality’, in Kay Hailbronner and David Martin (Eds) (2003) Rights and Duties of Dual 
Nationals: Evolution and Prospects, Kluwer Law Publishers.
41 Or the ‘antithesis’ to statelessness, see for example Tanja Brondsted Sejersen (2008) ‘ “I Vow to 
Thee my Countries” – The Expansion of Dual Citizenship in the 21st Century’, pp. 523–549 in Inter-
national Migration Review 42(3) at p. 528. I presented the situation of statelessness in Chapter 4.
42 League of Nations (1930) Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of National-
ity Laws, League of Nations Treaty Series 179 (4137), 18 April 1930.
43 Christian Joppke (2003) ‘Citizenship between De- and Re-Ethnicization’, pp. 429–458 in Euro-
pean Journal of Sociology 44, p. 441.
44 Peter Spiro explores this use of the development of social norms, for example in Peter Spiro 
(2010) ‘Dual Citizenship as Human Right’, pp. 111–130 in I.CONN 8(1) at p. 114.
45 Sandra Mantu (2015) Contingent Citizenship: The Law and Practice of Citizenship Deprivation 
in International, European and National Perspectives, Brill; Christian Joppke (2016) ‘Terror and 
the Loss of Citizenship’, pp. 728–748 in Citizenship Studies 20(6–7). For example, consider 
Audrey Macklin and Rainer Bauböck (2015) ‘The Return of Banishment: Do the New Denation-
alisation Policies Weaken Citizenship?’, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research 
Paper No. RSCAS 2015/14; Matthew Gibney (2013) ‘Should Citizenship Be Conditional? The 
Ethics of Denationalization’, The Journal of Politics 75(3); Peter H. Schuck (2011) ‘Citizen 
Terrorist’, pp. 61–73 in Policy Review 164.
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with sole allegiance or is not a citizen at all then these developments make sense. 
And yet individuals’ lives are more complex than this. This will become particu-
larly clear below, in the discussion of nomadism. However, first let us examine 
some core areas of contention that have been raised in the context of plural cit-
izenship. Major arguments against plural citizenship include the question of how 
and whether a person could satisfy or fulfil her/is duties with regard to each of 
the States with which s/he holds citizenship.46 This is particularly clear in the 
cases of military service and voting, and so I will pick up on these here.
 It is important to note that historically, the belief that a person has another 
allegiance beyond a particular formal citizenship is not dependent only upon that 
person being a formal citizen of another State. This is particularly tragically clear 
in the case of those US citizens of Japanese descent who did not need to be 
formal Japanese citizens in order to be assumed to have some allegiance with 
Japan and so to be interned. Their ethnic heritage was considered sufficient to 
generate a fear that they would side with Japan against the US in the Second 
World War. The apparently crisp legalistic notion of plural citizenship, then, was 
(as in the cases of other citizen noncitizens above) conflated with ethnic identifi-
cations of membership. As a result, Ben Herzog notes that ‘5,589 American 
citizens of Japanese descent were forced to renounce their citizenship.’47 This is 
related to Henio Hoyo’s naturalised citizens in the South American countries 
discussed above, where full citizenship was not only about legal and formal 
citizenship, but also about birth and blood.
 Distrust of plural citizenship, then, is not only about concerns relating to the 
shared allegiance of formal citizens. It is also tied up with assumptions about 
birth, blood, ethnicity and race. As such, as Shachar has also pointed out, birth-
right citizenship, however it is construed (whether by birth to citizen parents or 
by birth upon a particular territory) can also be a proxy for other distinctions that 
are difficult to align with liberal democratic principles. The analytic tool of ‘non-
citizenship’ can help us to interrogate this.
 Let us consider what this means for voting. The loyalties of plural citizens 
came under the spotlight in Australia in 2000 when there was concern about 
Italian citizens living in Australia voting in Italian elections. Italy had introduced 
new rules allowing postal votes and creating expatriate constituencies in the 
Italian parliament (these persons may or may not have also held Australian 
citizenship).48 The public debate in Australia at the time uncovered a wider issue 
46 For example, see Tanja Brondsted Sejersen (2008) ‘ “I Vow to Thee My Countries” – The Expan-
sion of Dual Citizenship in the 21st Century’, pp. 523–549 in International Migration Review 
42(3) at p. 526.
47 Ben Herzog (2015) Revoking Citizenship: Expatriation in America from the Colonial Era to the 
War on Terror, New York University Press, p. 95.
48 In 2001, the Italian Parliament created four overseas constituencies: Europe; South America, 
North and Central America; Africa, Asia and Oceania; and Antarctica. Arguably, the overseas 
electorate was key in electing Berlusconi in the 2006 election, in which 1 million expatriate 
Italians voted (Dauvergne 2008, p. 133). Catherine Dauvergne (2007) ‘Citizenship with a 
Vengeance’, pp. 489–508 in Theoretical Inquiries in Law 2(6).
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of whether citizenship as a membership status should be prioritised or whether 
presence within the territory of a State was key when it came to voting – and 
what happens when two States with two different approaches to this interact 
through the movement of persons.
 Core to this was the debate about whether or not individuals should be able to 
relate in a citizen- like way with more than one State at a time. A former 
Australian ambassador to Rome has explained the fear:
… an Australian resident, possibly with dual citizenship, could come to hold 
the balance of power in the Italian parliament and be tempted to use that 
power to induce the Italian government to intervene in issues of an 
Australian domestic character.49
The right to vote is often seen as a core symbol of citizenship, and stakeholder-
ship in State governance. The Australian fear was that Italians might use their 
vote in Italy to effect change in Australia, the State where they had a primary 
stake. This would, it was feared, devalue Australia’s independence and auto-
nomy. In this case, we can see an important element of the concerns around 
plural citizenship. That is, the concern is centred around how the relationship 
between States could play out through individuals and vice versa. The relation-
ship between citizenships and noncitizenships and what this means for the rela-
tionships between States has arisen several times in this book (consider for 
example the differential experiences of irregular immigrants discussed in Chap-
ters 3 and 4). In this Australian/Italian case of plural citizenship and voting, we 
can see particularly clearly the perceived threat in an individual’s symbolic rela-
tionships with more than one State, in terms of the challenge this poses to the 
States involved. It involves the intertwining of citizenships, but also the activa-
tion of noncitizenships as a result. Unhyphenated noncitizenship, then, also 
provides a way in which to talk about what happens when the relationships 
between States play out through individuals. When the individual- State relation-
ships in this context can only be described in one dimension – in terms of grada-
tions or versions of one citizenship – something important in the nature of the 
relationship is not only lost but becomes challenging to the theoretical and polit-
ical framework as a whole.
 Some sociologists suggest that transnational migrants should be seen as able 
to be participants in both societies at the same time.50 Seen in this way, we can 
understand individuals as functioning as citizens in more than one place, but we 
49 Bruno Mascitelli and Simone Battison (2009) ‘Challenging the Australian Government Approach 
Towards Expatriate Voting: The Case of Italy’, pp. 513–519 in Australian Journal of Political 
Science 44(3) at p. 515.
50 For example, Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Szanton Blanc (1995) ‘From Immig-
rant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration’, pp. 48–63 in Anthropological Quar-
terly 68(1); Aihwa Ong (1999) Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality, 
Duke University Press.
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can also understand them as functioning as noncitizens too – a noncitizenship 
which, if recognised, need not be so challenging to the States involved. Charac-
terising the situation in this way can also help us to see the complexity of the 
ways in which people live out their lives. Crucially, as Takeyaki Tsuda has 
argued, it shows how ‘we need to explore the dynamic relationship between 
immigrants’ incorporation in the receiving country and their transborder engage-
ment with the sending country as one coherent transnational social process.’51 
In this book, the suggestion is that the complex and changing interrelationships 
of an individual with more than one State need to be considered and that this 
could be facilitated by the analytical tool of noncitizenship.
 Military service provides a differently symbolic case in which the relation-
ships between States play out through individuals, and one which further prob-
lematises the notion of allegiance and the idea that it can be shared. As in the 
case of overseas voting, it is particularly useful to look at a context in which this 
has come to a head. Patrick Weil describes how, in 1982, the first contingent of 
young men with citizenship of both France and Algeria reached the age of 
military service.52 Both countries are described as having an obligatory draft at 
the time. Weil reports that this gave rise to a campaign for those individuals’ 
release from French citizenship by the Algerian consulate, describing them as 
‘Frenchmen in spite of themselves’.53 This case differs in structure from that of 
the US citizens assumed to have allegiance to Japan discussed above for a 
number of reasons relevant here. First, as a result of colonisation and then 
decolonisation, the individuals involved were defined as citizens- by-birth on the 
territory of both the French and the Algerian States simultaneously.54 Second, it 
was also politically expedient for both France and Algeria to claim them as 
citizens – and to do so uniquely.
 According to Weil, many individuals applied to be ‘released’ from French cit-
izenship (758 in 1983; 2,949 in 1984; 1,034 in 1985; 872 in 1986), and for the 
most part the requests were rejected (72 per cent, 85 per cent, 71 per cent and 44 
per cent respectively).55 He reports that at some point during this debate, Alge-
rian discourse changed, recognising the Algerian population in France as likely 
to stay there after all, but seeing them as strategically useful in a new way, 
51 Takeyaki Tsuda (2012) ‘Whatever Happened to Simultaneity? Transnational Migration Theory 
and Dual Engagement in Sending and Receiving Countries’, pp. 631–649 in the Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies 38(4) p. 634.
52 By double application of jus soli they were both in France, and born to a parent born in 
pre-independence Algeria – considered to be French soil – Article 23 of Nationality Code. 
Patrick Weil (2008) How to Be French: Nationality in the Making Since 1789, Duke University 
Press, translated by Catherine Porter, p. 155.
53 Weil 2008 ibid. p. 155.
54 Olivier Vonk (2012) Dual Nationality in the European Union: A Study on Changing Norms in 
Public and Private International Law and in the Municipal Laws of Four EU Member States, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 198.
55 Weil 2008 ibid. p. 155 n. 7.
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 providing a political lobby within France.56 And French discourse also changed, 
so that this period was followed directly by successful efforts by the French right 
to restrict access to French citizenship and to French voting rights for individuals 
from North Africa. Plural citizenship was, then, shown not to be a problem in 
itself or a good in itself, but to be dependent upon the political reality of the 
time, including the relationships between the States involved. The ways in which 
individuals were understood as formal or informal citizens, as noncitizens or 
non- citizens, affected and were affected by the ways in which the States involved 
related to each other.
 The situation of military service was somewhat resolved in France with the 
agreement, signed on 11 October 1983, that a dual citizen could choose in which 
country to perform his (for at the time it related to men, not women) military 
service.57 These individuals were being asked to sacrifice their lives and to kill 
on behalf of the State. This, of any situation, prima facie seems least to admit 
nuanced relationships. But also perhaps, for this reason, nuance of explanation is 
most needed. People take sides militarily not only for reasons of sole formal 
 citizenship, but also because of conviction. Consider those like George Orwell 
who fought in the Spanish Civil War on the basis of principle, despite having 
little connection with Spain previously, and conversely, the US citizens who 
refused to fight in the Viet Nam War also for reasons of principle;58 and the 
young Israelis today who stand against military service and so are imprisoned as 
a result.59 These examples help to show the complexity in the ways in which we 
relate to States, even in moments of symbolic participation (as in voting) and 
ultimate sacrifice (as in military service).
 In these cases, fighting (or refusing to fight) was often ideological rather than 
based only on singular citizenship. In this context, it is particularly interesting to 
consider the position played by US army veterans of a range of backgrounds who 
have been supporting indigenous protesters against the Dakota Access Pipeline 
(DAPL).60 The DAPL is a project to lay a pipe carrying crude oil diagonally across 
a large part of the US from northwest to southeast. The most publicised protest has 
arisen in the area where the pipe would both run through land about which the 
Standing Rock Sioux must legally be consulted because of the place’s cultural and 
religious importance, and under water which feeds the sole supply of the Sioux 
drinking water. What is interesting in the case of the veterans engaging in the 
56 Weil 2008 ibid. p. 156.
57 Weil 2008 ibid. p. 156; Vonk 2012 ibid. p. 199; Christophe Bertossi (2007) ‘Ethnicity, Islam, 
and Allegiances in the French Military’, in Christophe Bertossi (ed.) (2007) European Anti- 
Discrimination and the Politics of Citizenship: Britain and France, Springer p. 207.
58 See George Orwell (1989) Homage to Catalonia, Penguin Books; Michael S. Foley (2003) Con-
fronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War, University of North Caro-
lina Press.
59 For example, see essays in Perez Kidron (ed.) (2004) Refusenik! Israel’s Soldiers of Conscience, 
Zed Books.
60 For example, A Sammon (2016) ‘A History of Native Americans Protesting the Dakota Access 
Pipeline’, Mother Jones 9 September 2016.
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DAPL protests is that the individuals involved have both demonstrated loyalty to 
the country and demonstrated their rejection of certain of its actions. This shows 
that individuals can defend the integrity of a State militarily and see no inconsist-
ency (for there is no inconsistency) in also using force to oppose some of its 
actions. Indeed, their rejection arguably takes on symbolic significance because of 
their military service. In cases of voting and of military service, the potential ten-
sions in plural citizenships become apparent. And in these cases it also becomes 
clear that it is not only citizenship that is at play within these tensions. It is the 
interaction of citizenship and noncitizenship in the individuals’ relationships with 
the States in question in a context where noncitizenship is left unacknowledged.
Nomadism
New dimensions of this emerge when we consider nomadism, another way in 
which an individual may relate with multiple States. Settledness is, for the most 
part, implicit in traditional liberal democratic theoretical frameworks based 
around territorial States with mostly fixed populations. For this reason, the 
nomadic critique of liberal democratic theory is important to consider. There 
have long been difficulties in understanding the relationships of nomadic indi-
viduals with such States. On the one hand, there is the wider suspicion of people 
who move, whether between States or within States – and the relationship of this 
with the considerations of plural allegiances discussed above. On the other hand, 
there are the policies and structures that impose settledness, whether intention-
ally or unintentionally, and the implications of challenging them.
 The word ‘nomad’ refers here either to a member of a community which by 
tradition has more than one fixed place of residence, or to an individual who in 
fact has more than one or no fixed location of residence. The latter includes the 
temporary agricultural workers and the highly paid professionals who make use 
of globalised labour markets. For the purposes of this chapter, the two forms are 
similar. Both challenge standard citizenist understandings of how people 
organise their lives. In both cases this may include those who engage in patterns 
of circular movement, returning to certain fixed locations according to season, 
for example. It may also include those who move linearly, from place to place, 
without regular return.61 This movement can be within recognised States, or 
between them. And the individuals concerned may well be formal citizens in at 
least one of the States involved, but this might also not be the case. When move-
ment is between States, the challenges to the settled citizenist construction 
become particularly clear, but nomadic movement within a State also problem-
atises State structures that assume settled citizenship.
61 Judgement is withheld here on how long term the period of movement needs to be, or the periods 
of stays, to be considered nomadism. Instead, cases are considered where one of these types of 
nomadism is considered to pertain by some or all of those involved (e.g. the State, the individual 
movers, the local community) and examine ways in which this challenges settled liberal demo-
cratic citizenist assumptions.
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 Consider, for example, Tseng Yen- Fen’s analysis of Taiwanese business 
migrants (or, as he puts it, ‘migrants in postmodern terms’).62 These are nomads 
of the second form. Yen- Fen describes the individuals he studies as working in 
contracting manufacturing, facilitating businesses that wish to source manufac-
turing sites abroad. The migration pattern found amongst individuals in this 
group are, then, heavily driven by changing contexts in international markets and 
economic climates. Yen- Fen finds that the migrants he studies fall into two cat-
egories in terms of how they understand their relationships with States. First, 
there are those who regard themselves as having ‘flexible citizenship’.63 These 
individuals are at the top of the business hierarchy, able to pick and choose 
amongst States for the place where they are best able to do business.64 Yen- Fen 
describes citizenships and individual- State relationships for them as comfortably 
pragmatic. Second, there are the small- scale business- owners, who are tied to 
narrow profit margins. These individuals’ decisions about movement are based 
upon capitalist forces.65 Yen- Fen presents them as migrating repeatedly in order 
to find cheaper and more controllable labour, for example. They are relating with 
multiple States, each in different ways. And there is likely a mixture of citizen-
ship and noncitizenship, affected also by their location in the professional hier-
archy, as well as the implications of this in terms of class.
 Yen- Fen observes that these nomadic business migrants are highly skilled and 
highly mobile. They also experience discrimination as a result of their mobility. 
The research finds that they experience racism and distrust (based on their 
nomadism) in places where they live, alongside an increasing estrangement in 
Taiwan, the State they started from and of which they have formal citizenship. 
This complex experience of nomadism and the different experiences depending 
upon location in the hierarchy is also found in other studies. For example, Megha 
Amrith describes Filipino ‘semiprofessionals’ who move, and may move repeat-
edly, to work in the medical professions and distinguishes them from both 
domestic workers on the one hand and elites who deploy strategies of ‘flexible 
citizenship’ on the other hand.66 She finds that different categories of workers 
(medical, care, household) have different experiences of movement.
 The discussion of nomads can often focus on low- skilled agricultural and 
factory workers or on the members of traditionally nomadic communities. And 
these are important to consider. However, as the Taiwanese business people and 
62 Tseng Yen-Fen (2005) ‘Permanently Temporary: Taiwanese Business “Nomads” as Reluctant 
Migrants’, pp 179–193 In Beatriz Lorente, Nicola Piper, Shen Hsiu-Hua and Brenda Yeoh (eds) 
(2005) Asian Migrations: Sojourning, Displacement, Homecoming and Other Travels, National 
University of Singapore Press. Reference for parentheses: Yen-Fen ibid. p. 189.
63 This derives from Aihwa Ong’s classic book of this title – Aihwa Ong (1999) Flexible Citizen-
ship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality, Duke University Press.
64 Yen-Fen 2005 ibid. pp. 183–184.
65 Yen-Fen 2005 ibid. p. 184.
66 Megha Amrith ‘ “They Think We Are Just Caregivers”: The Ambivalence of Care in the Lives of 
Filipino Medical Workers in Singapore’, pp. 410–427 in The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthro­
pology 11(3–4) p. 411. See also Megha Amrith (2017) Caring for Strangers, NIA Press.
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the Filipino ‘semiprofessionals’ cases show, even if the broader experiences of 
the individuals involved are very different, the vulnerabilities associated with the 
lack of recognised individual- State noncitizen relationships are more generally 
pervasive. Moreover, the simplistic either/or approach to citizenship and the 
often assumed binary relationship between citizenship and (hyphenated) non- 
citizenship makes it difficult to explain the ways in which such individuals may 
have both citizen and noncitizen relationships with several States simultaneously 
– and the ways in which this interplays with ethnicity, migratory status, and 
class. Indeed, Yen- Fen reports that the individuals in his study describe estrange-
ment from Taiwan, though not a renunciation of citizenship. This demonstrates 
the need for a more complex understanding of how individuals relate to States 
that moves beyond binary understandings, citizenism and an assumption of 
settledness.
Rejecting binarity and acknowledging noncitizen politics
Recognising the many and diverse experiences of citizenship – including when it 
may be unwanted, ambivalent and plural – helps to demonstrate the need for a 
more complex way to theorise the ways in which individuals relate to States. 
This includes those who embrace and those who reject the citizenship(s) made 
available to them. It also includes those who relate as citizens in unusual ways or 
with more than one State. Steven Vertovec has observed that: ‘the modern 
nation- state container model has normally functioned with an implicit zero- sum 
understanding of social/cultural/political belonging: either one is in, or out.’67 
Criticism of the assumed citizen/non- citizen binarity is not new.68 This book pro-
poses that one way to address the complexity of the ways in which individuals 
relate to States is through the analytical category and mode of individual- State 
relationship of noncitizenship and an examination of the ways in which nonciti-
zenship and citizenship interact.
 The rejection of binarity presented in this chapter and throughout this book 
proposes the rejection of a much broader ‘either/or’ form of political understand-
ing, where someone must be either a citizen and wholly a citizen or not a citizen 
at all, where someone must be located in this or that or the other national com-
munity and that community alone. It embraces instead a complex and messy 
picture of lived reality. Noncitizenship provides a way in which to understand 
67 Steven Vertovec (2001) ‘Transnational Challenges to the “New” Multiculturalism’, paper pre-
sented at ASA Conference held at the University of Sussex 30 March till 2 April 2001, available 
from University of Oxford website. Container model terminology introduced p. 5, this quotation 
appears on p. 17.
68 For example, see Rainer Bauböck (2010) ‘Migration and Citizenship’, pp. 27–48 in Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies 18(1); Rainer Bauböck (1994) ‘Changing the Boundaries of Cit-
izenship: The Inclusion of Immigrants in Democratic Politics’, pp. 199–232 in Rainer Bauböck 
(ed.) (1994) From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigration in Europe, Avery, 
p. 203 – resident alien status as a chosen status.
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another type of relationship, and to explain what happens when it intertwines 
with citizenships. When a person is denied access to the full rights of citizenship, 
or when a person contests citizenship, this does not mean that s/he thereby has 
no relationship with a State, and no claims upon the State. While s/he may well 
still seek citizenship and full recognition of that citizenship, in the meantime, 
s/he still has a thick relationship with the State in question, and one that gener-
ates claims in its own right. Individuals can relate with States both as noncitizens 
and as citizens, and can do so simultaneously even with the same States.
7 Noncitizens overseas and 
migration
Unhyphenated noncitizenship provides an analytical tool for understanding 
the mechanisms connecting apparently different sorts of individual- State rela-
tionships. This chapter looks in particular at how an activated noncitizenship 
far from a State could feed into an individual’s relationship to that State at its 
border, and how it may be continuous with her/is noncitizen relationship with 
that same State in situ. For example, when the United States engaged in 
nuclear testing in Bikini Atoll, previously inhabited islands became uninhab-
itable. This changed the relationship between those individuals and the United 
States. In the case of the Bikinians, a connection was recognised between 
noncitizenship activated far away and obligations relating to migration and 
Bikinian migrants on the territory of the United States. Other examples are 
less clear- cut, and this chapter sets out several cases in order to trace how the 
individual- State relationships evolve over time and according to context, and 
to examine the obligations that result.
 These presentations also show a connection between different locations 
and forms of noncitizenship activation. In the cases of both Bikinians and 
people affected by anthropogenic climate change, for example, individuals 
have been forced, and have sought, to move. They have often moved into a 
physical relationship with those States that have been wholly or partially 
responsible for the reasons that have driven this movement (either directly or 
indirectly). The language of noncitizenship provides a way in which to see the 
connections between these scenarios. I propose that some of the continuities 
between discussions of global justice, and of migration justice in particular, 
can be seen more clearly through the language of (unhyphenated) noncitizen-
ship. This chapter takes historical injustices into account insofar as they are 
part of today’s system of structural injustice. Those individuals directly 
affected by a State far away are in a special sort of political relationship with 
that State – one of activated noncitizenship. When that relationship is made 
oppressive, through structural injustices, exclusions and lack of acknowledge-
ment, it becomes further activated, and infused with a special sort of 
noncitizen- vulnerability and challenge.
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Making someone’s life unsustainable: Bikinians and the 
United States
For our people, for the Marshall Islands, March 1, 1954 is the defining 
moment in world history. That is the Fourth of July, the Assassination of Pres-
ident Lincoln and Kennedy, Pearl Harbour and 9/11 all wrapped into one.
 That is the day the world stood still and also changed forever. That is the 
day we went from being an occupied nation to becoming a dependent nation.
(Rongelap Mayor James Matayoshi, Bravo Day, 1 March 2004, 
Marshall Islands1)
Bikini Atoll is located within the South Pacific State of the Marshall Islands. The 
Marshall Islands has long represented a strategic military position. The islands 
are named after the eighteenth- century English explorer John Marshall and have 
had periods under Spanish, German, British, Japanese and American colonial 
rule. The US took control in 1944, and in 1947 entered into an agreement with 
the UN Security Council to administer the country.2 In 1977, the Marshall 
Islands developed a constitution and in 1986 became an independent State. 
Today, the country remains militarily strategic and deeply and unambiguously 
affected by the effects of both colonisation and the Cold War.
 A State’s actions in another State may make individuals noncitizen- 
vulnerable, or ‘dependent’, to use Mayor Matayoshi’s word in the quotation at 
the head of this section. This is clearest when those persons’ lives are thereby 
made unsustainable in the place where they had been living. Bikini Atoll pro-
vides a clear example. Between 1946 and 1958 the United States carried out 66 
nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands, including 23 at Bikini Atoll.3 Tests in 
Enewetak Atoll completely obliterated two of its islands, while in Bikini Atoll, 
life became unsustainable on its principal island of Bikini.4 Since the tests, 
people across the Marshall Islands have reportedly been affected by disease and 
abnormal births, which have been associated with the nuclear activity.5
 The biggest part of the ‘Castle’ series of tests, codenamed ‘Bravo’, was in 
1954.6 It was a bomb 1,000 times more powerful than that dropped on Hiroshima 
and affected several atolls. The centre of the test was at Bikini Atoll and it ren-
dered its main island, Bikini, uninhabitable, cementing a special relationship 
1 This statement also opens Anita Smith’s paper: Anita Smith (2007) ‘Colonialism and the bomb in 
the Pacific’, pp. 51–72 in John Schofield and Wayne Cocroft (eds) (2007) A Fearsome Heritage: 
Diverse Legacies of the Cold War, Routledge.
2 For example, see Smith 2007 ibid. p. 56.
3 IAEA (1998) Radiological Conditions at Bikini Atoll: Prospects for Resettlement, International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna at p. 6.
4 Smith 2007 ibid. p. 56.
5 April L Brown (2014) ‘No Promised Land: The Shared Legacy of the Castle Bravo Nuclear Test’, 
in Arms Control Today, March 2014.
6 See the Marshall Islands Dose Assessment and Radioecology Program website: https://marshall 
islands.llnl.gov/bikini.php (accessed 9 December 2015).
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between the US and its former inhabitants. In some ways, it merely reinforced a 
citizen- like relationship already in place as a result of US administration of the 
Marshall Islands. This was not all it did, though. It also activated in a new way a 
noncitizen relationship between the individuals living in the Marshall Islands and 
the US, and continues to do so today. Despite its complexities, this case demon-
strates one (extreme and unambiguous) way in which noncitizenship can be acti-
vated overseas: when a person’s vital interests become dependent upon the actions 
of another State because of the actions of that State. The site of the Bikini Atoll 
Nuclear Test Site is now recognised as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO, as can 
be seen in Figure 7.1. As the image shows, this space now appears verdant and 
lush, but as we will see, it remains unsuitable for human habitation.
 In 1946, when US nuclear researchers labelled Bikini Atoll as ‘the most suitable 
and convenient location for the testing of atomic weapons’, the 166 or 167 Bikini-
ans were asked to relocate to one of a list of locations within the Marshall Islands.7 
They were moved to the much smaller uninhabited atoll of Rongerick, believing 
that they would soon be returning home. The Bikinians struggled to produce 
enough food in Rongerick and struggled with their displacement from their ances-
tral land in Bikini. The US Administration was exploring other options. They 
moved the Bikinians to Enewetak Atoll but then, wanting Enewetak as an addi-
tional test site, moved them again.8 Finally, they offered the Bikinians relocation 
either to Wotho or Kili. Leonard Mason, who was involved with the community at 
the time of the relocation, observes that this was not really a choice. He observes 
that the leader of Wotho Atoll had tried unsuccessfully to claim jurisdiction over 
Bikini in the past. Relocation there would have required the Bikinians to submit to 
his rule.9 In 1948, the Bikinians were transferred again, this time to the tiny island 
of Kili.10 After only a couple of years, the nuclear tests were already making them 
vulnerable to other individuals and to States in a new way.
 In Kili, it was again a struggle to secure sufficient food. While Bikini is an 
atoll of 23 islands around a sheltered lagoon, Kili is a single island.11 The winds 
reportedly made growing crops and fishing difficult. By the late 1950s, 
agricultural land and wild foods were made available on nearby islands. But an 
 7 It is worth noting that a commission in the US ‘felt that tests should be held overseas until it could 
be established more definitively that continental detonation would not endanger the public health 
and safety’, quoted in Jonathan Weisgall (1980) p. 76. One core text says there were 166 individuals 
(Tobin 1974), another core text says there were 167 (IAEA 1998 ibid.), and the other sources say 
one or the other. The first of these texts is: Tobin, Jack (1974) Background Information Paper – The 
Bikini Situation, Majuro, Marshall islands, April 5, 1974, pp. 2–4. Accessible at: https://evols.
library.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10524/23043/1/DU%20720.9%20B5%20T62.pdf (accessed 9 
December 2015). It is interesting that the Broadway musical, South Pacific, opened in 1949 and ran 
until 1954.
 8 Vesper 2015 ibid. p. 55.
 9 Leonard Mason (2001) ‘Foreword’, pp. xxxi–xxxix in Jack Niedenthal (2001) For the Good of 
Mankind: A History of the People of Bikini and Their Islands, Bravo Books.
10 Tobin 1974 ibid. p. 5.
11 Smith 2007 ibid. p. 57.
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increasing amount of the Bikinians’ food needed to be brought in from outside 
the Marshalls. This now included flour, sugar and processed meats.12 New liveli-
hoods needed to be found to pay for the products, for example through handi-
crafts.13 In 1958, Kili was hit by a typhoon. The Bikinians living there struggled 
on. The actions of the US had made them vulnerable for their vital needs to the 
US and to their own government of the Marshall Islands. They were also vulner-
able in a new way to other individuals and to other atolls and to weather events. 
Whereas before the tests Bikinians were able to pursue the development of their 
capabilities independently, after the tests this became impossible, and remains 
so. In 1956, the first compensation payment was reported to have been made by 
the US to the islanders, of US$325,000, which was put into a trust fund.14
 Nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands ended in July 1958. In the late 1960s 
it was announced that the largest islands of the Bikini Atoll were safe for 
habitation.15 Extensive clear- up work was carried out.16 However, after a series 
12 Mason 2001 ibid. at p. xxxiiv.
13 For example, see Mary Lanwi (2004) ‘Mission School to National Mission’, pp. 101–116 in 
Anono Lieom Loeak, Veronica C Kiluwe and Linda Crowl (eds) (2004) Life in the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands, Mour lo Republic eo an Majol, (written by Marshall Islanders), University 
of the South Pacific Centre, at p. 109.
14 Tobin 1974 ibid. at p. 9, 10.
15 IAEA (n.d.) ‘Radiological Conditions at Bikini Atoll and the Prospects of Resettlement, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency website, www-ns.iaea.org/appraisals/bikini-atoll.asp 
(accessed 9 December 2015); IAEA 1998 ibid. at pp. 6, 7.
  On 31 October 1958 the USSR, UK and USA agreed to stop atmospheric nuclear weapon testing.
16 Tobin 1974 ibid. at p. 10.
Figure 7.1  Bikini Atoll Nuclear Test Site (Marshall Islands) (Copyright UNESCO/Ron 
Van Oers).
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of additional tests a decade later, it was found in 1978 that inhabitants had 
worryingly high levels of radionuclide 137Cs in their bodies, and it was decided 
that they should be relocated back to Kili and other islands.17 In the 1980s, 
further experiments were conducted to try to make Bikini habitable, but there 
has been little progress and further tests in 1995 reconfirmed that radiation was 
dangerously high, with the majority of human exposure coming through the food 
chain.18
 Finally, in 1997, an International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Advisory 
Group concluded, after a further set of measurements, that:
Permanent resettlement of Bikini Island under the present radiological con-
ditions without remedial measures is not recommended in view of the radi-
ation doses that could potentially be received by inhabitants with a diet of 
entirely locally produced foodstuffs.19
As a result, Bikini continues to be uninhabited. The Bikinians receive compensa-
tion, which they are now able to spend either in the Marshall Islands or overseas, 
including in the US. In this case, then, the activated noncitizenship produced by 
making someone’s home uninhabitable has been recognised to generate obliga-
tions of compensation and to allow individuals to have certain freedoms within 
the obligated State’s territory and at its borders. Bikinians already had the right 
to settle in the US, but not to spend compensation money there – though the 
level of this compensation, its delivery and its form are still being contested.
 Let us examine when the noncitizen relationship became activated in the 
example as presented, putting aside for now the quasi- citizenship arising from 
US occupation. Suppose the first Bikini–US interaction had begun when the US 
government asked Bikinians to move aside for the nuclear testing (this was not 
the case). If this had been so, then this alone would have been the impetus to 
activate their noncitizenship.20 Indeed, from this moment, the people involved 
did experience a new and activated form of vulnerability particularly to the 
United States with regard to their basic capabilities. At the same time, this 
17 IAEA 1998 ibid. at p. 7; Weisgall 1980 ibid. p. 89; IAEA n.d. ibid.
18 IAEA n.d. ibid.
19 IAEA 1998 ibid. at p. 43. To put this into context, UNSCEAR estimates that the worldwide average 
effective annual exposure to natural background radiation is 2.4 mSv. In the northern Marshall 
Islands, natural radiation is significantly lower, giving an annual average of 0.22 mSv, though that 
from food is around 2.2 mSv/a (IAEA 1998 ibid. at p. 26). Two studies from the late 1990s offer dif-
ferent radiation levels in Bikini. One estimate is that there is an annual effective dose of 10.4 mSv. 
The other estimates about 17.4 mSv (IAEA 1998 ibid. at p. 27). Either way, it’s high.
20 This relationship began after a church service in Bikini on 10 February 1946, when the American 
military governor of the islands asked the islanders if they would be ‘willing to sacrifice your island 
for the welfare of all men’. After collective deliberation, it is reported that Chief Juda Kessibuki 
replied: ‘If the United States government and the scientists of the world want to use our island and 
atoll for furthering development, which with God’s blessing will result in kindness and benefit to 
all mankind, my people will be pleased to go elsewhere.’ Cited in Weisgall 1980 ibid. p. 77.
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presented a challenge to the United States in terms of the free pursuit of its inter-
ests, since some of its activities were creating a sort of vulnerability in nonciti-
zens that conflicted with its liberal democratic principles.
 At first glance, the initial relationship seems to have been contractual, but 
the Bikinians did not retain capability to make decisions about their vital inter-
ests after the initial contract had been brokered. In the real- world historical 
case, this was further reinforced by the fact that the United States already had 
a colonial relationship with the Marshall Islands so that the contract was not 
made between equals. With the testing, the relationship changed. As one com-
mentator puts it, ‘[a]lthough they are geographically and culturally 
Marshallese, the Bikinians effectively have become wards of the United 
States’.21 Their noncitizenship was activated in an extraordinary way. Even if 
it had been agreed upon by a contract between equal parties, the outcome was 
such that the individuals as a group lost the possibility of independence. From 
the point at which the tests took place, the US and the former inhabitants of 
the atoll became engaged in a pressing relationship giving rise to substantial 
obligations in the US towards the Bikinians – not only of compensation (and 
indeed the focus in this book generally is not upon compensation for historic 
wrongs), but also of ensuring individuals can develop their capabilities in 
ways that they can value. Indeed, the obligation is to support this capability 
development particularly in dimensions in which the State is otherwise impair-
ing it. Importantly, based upon the tests alone, it is also a special and directed 
relationship between each specific individual and the State of the US. But 
importantly, it is not a relationship of citizenship.
 A noncitizen relationship was again activated with the tests themselves, this 
time in another way. The US rendered the Bikinians vulnerable in their most 
basic need to be somewhere. This aspect of their relationship with the US, then, 
challenges the US in particular and the system of States in general. It challenges 
a system in which States control all the spaces within which someone can live. It 
also challenges the systems of power, and the legitimacy of the activity of the 
US in this case, within that structure. Today, Bikinians directly challenge the 
State’s legitimacy in their performance of everyday vital activities. This is 
because the US State is directly responsible, and continues to be responsible, for 
the constraints on their capabilities. It is important also to recognise that, even if 
we suppose that only the region of Bikini was made uninhabitable (in fact this is 
contested), while other areas within the State of the Marshall Islands were not 
(so that they could move within the Marshalls), this does not remove the claims 
of Bikinians against the United States.
 Now let us consider the changing quasi- citizen/noncitizen relationship 
between individual Bikinians and the US over the period of the case. During the 
Second World War, the United States fought, and beat, Japan for control of the 
21 Jonathan M Weisgall (1980) ‘The Nuclear Nomads of Bikini’, pp. 74–98 in Foreign Policy 39 
p. 75.
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Marshall Islands. One commentator who grew up on an American base in the 
aftermath of this period recalls how the rhetoric of the time meant that he:
… learned to picture Marshallese as happy bystanders, singing and cheering 
elatedly as these victors [the Americans] arrived, hands outstretched to 
receive chocolate bars and cans of SPAM – on the sidelines, watching the 
real world pass them by.22
They were, then, not seen as actors in the system of States. This implies that they 
were not really seen as citizens within it, but they were not really seen as any-
thing else either. This does not mean that they were not in fact any in relation-
ship with the State and the system of States, but it means that the nature of their 
relationship was not recognised. From the end of the Second World War until 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ independence in 1986, the Marshall Islands 
was under the administrative control of the United States. Under the terms of the 
‘Compact of Free Association’, initially signed in 1983, and replaced by a 
revised Compact in 2004, Marshall Islanders are granted visa- free work and 
study in the US and the US is responsible for the security infrastructure of the 
country.23 This makes it possible to consider the rights of Bikinians in situ in the 
US without it being clouded by the issue of contingent irregularity of presence.24
 Marshall Islands citizens today are also vulnerable to the US, even while they 
are in the Marshall Islands, in other ways. The Republic of the Marshall Islands 
continues to be dependent upon US aid and uses the American dollar as its cur-
rency. Indeed, the US has reportedly provided ‘millions of dollars, along with a 
series of medical programs and cleanup operations’. Though the Marshellese 
believe this to be insufficient, observing for example that those living outside the 
narrowly defined affected area have not yet been compensated despite continu-
ing to suffer the health and other effects of the tests.25 This again alters the nature 
of the relationship. In one sense, Marshall Islands citizens are not vulnerable in 
terms of their presence in the key State of their noncitizenship. They are allowed 
to live in the United States without visas or permits. Their noncitizen 
vulnerabilities are of another sort – and their case has enabled us to examine that 
aspect more generally.26
22 Greg Dvorak (2008) ‘ “The Mashall Islands”: Making Marshallese Masculinities between 
American and Japanese Militarism’, pp. 55–86 in The Contemporary Pacific 20, at pp. 58–59.
23 Compact of Free Association, Agreement between the United States of America and the Marshall 
Islands, Amending the Agreement of 25 June 1983, concerning the Compact of Free Assocation, 
As Amended Signed at Majuro April 30 2003 (entered into force 1 May 2004), Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series 04–501. Available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/173999.pdf 
(accessed 4 March 2017). It is worth noting that the Compact prevents individual lawsuits against 
the US.
24 Chapter 4 presented this contingency.
25 Smith 2007 ibid.; Brown 2014 ibid.; Lucy Westcott (2014) ‘Marshall Islands nuclear lawsuit 
reopens old wounds’, Newsweek 1 August 2014; Brown 2015 ibid.
26 See People of Bikini Atoll v. United States 2007–5175 06-CV-288 (2009).
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 Some Bikinians become full US citizens and this may become their over-
riding way of relating to the US State. Noncitizenship may even become unim-
portant to such individuals. Others do not become full US citizens and it would 
be inappropriate to require them to do so. Bikinians, then, in their relationship 
with the US, demonstrate that noncitizenship is about more than a shaky right to 
abode. Whether living in the Marshall Islands or in the United States, or else-
where, their legal right to be where they currently are, is not what is in question. 
In their situation, we can see a vulnerability to the US in the protection of their 
basic interests and their capabilities to function in the ways they want to func-
tion. As a result, they challenge the US State even with their performance of 
usually apolitical acts, through their need to eat and to sustain life somewhere 
that is uncontaminated.
Potentially making someone’s life unsustainable: sharing the 
Mekong river
In the Bikini example above, one State has overwhelming responsibility for the 
capabilities of individuals far away. It is a relatively simple case, with few actors 
and clear lines of responsibility. Things are rarely so clear- cut. This can be seen 
particularly in cases where multiple States interact with regard to a shared vital 
resource. River cooperation involves inequalities of power and special vulnera-
bilities irrespective of any historical or ongoing actions of the States involved. 
When States cooperate with regard to a river, there is a strong possibility of 
making the lives of persons far away unsustainable. This has been developed in 
the literature on water- sharing.27
 This section examines this through a brief sketch of one of the most famous 
river- sharing initiatives – that which is now known as the Mekong River Com-
mission. While the negotiations within the Commission and the discussions sur-
rounding it are principally about the relations between States, the claims against 
upriver States fall into two categories. On one hand, there is an obligation of one 
sovereign State to another to be mutually respectful of sovereignty. On the other 
hand, there is an obligation of one State not to damage wantonly the interests of 
individuals elsewhere who are directly affected by its actions. That is, while the 
discourse about river- sharing is primarily diplomatic, at its core it is also about 
activated noncitizenship.
 The Mekong is the eighth- largest river in the world and its river basin is 
characterised by wet and dry seasons, with widespread flooding and resultant 
27 The Notorious Harmon Doctrine from the US held that it was acceptable for those within one 
state of the United States to use water as much as they wanted, even if it might injure those in a 
neighbouring state (e.g. see Gleick 1993 p. 106). This has been rejected by most other water-
sharing agreements. For example, Malin Falkenmark’s ‘the water barrier’ estimates the level of 
water below which significant development constraints occur (e.g. see Falkenmark 1986). More 
recently, some theorists have also discussed mechanisms for cross-border involvement in deci-
sion-making when it will affect those not usually able to vote, for example.
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loss of life and livelihood during the wet season. It provides a vital resource 
for water and aquaculture, but also transport and other goods for those living 
in the region. The river is shared by six countries. From upriver to downriver, 
these are: China, Myanmar (Burma), Viet Nam, Laos, Thailand and 
Cambodia. There have been various efforts at formalising the sharing of the 
Mekong and in 1966, UN Secretary General U Thant described these attempts 
‘as one of the most important actions ever undertaken by the United 
Nations’.28 Mekong river- sharing has also been important in the complex geo-
politics arising out of the Cold War. As such, analysis of the Commission 
(and its other instantiations, starting from 195729) has focused on these issues. 
And yet, the importance of rivers as examples of potentially ahistorical 
unequal State power is also useful to study.
 The fact that individuals living downriver are vulnerable to the States that are 
upriver pertains by virtue of their position along the river though this interplays 
with other historical and contemporary power struggles. The thought experiment 
provided by considering a rarified picture of the Mekong river basin reflects real-
 world realities that play out well beyond the context of rivers. The historic and 
contemporary power struggles that feed into the Mekong context are similar to 
tensions that play out much more widely. This moves on from the Bikini Atoll 
case in some key ways.
 Consider three.
 First, there is an inequality of both obligation and vulnerability between 
States and between individuals. People living downriver are vulnerable to 
damming projects, pollutants, and all aspects of water management that take 
place upriver. At the same time, those downriver can pollute, dam and use the 
water to which they have access without the challenges caused by having others 
downstream (though we might argue that they have other reasons not to do so). 
Everyone involved must use the same water, then, but some have different con-
straints of justice than others with regard to its use. In the rarified river case, this 
derives from the situation that pertains today, irrespective of how it arose. The 
argument here is not that the States of the Mekong should see it in this way, but 
to use the Mekong as an example through which to consider a set of relation-
ships of this sort from a liberal perspective.
 Second, unlike in the above case of nuclear testing, in the river- sharing 
example, the activities that activate the noncitizen- State relationship need not 
be all that extraordinary. Instead, the individuals living downstream from 
State X are vulnerable to the general well- running of State X. They are vul-
nerable to the way in which it organises the satisfaction of the basic needs of 
those living within its territory insofar as these will impact upon water. That 
28 Greg Browder and Leonard Ortolano (2000) ‘The Evolution of an International Water Resources 
Management Regime in the Mekong River Basin’, pp. 499–531 in Natural Resources Journal 
40, p. 507.
29 Browder and Ortolano 2000 ibid. at p. 500.
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is, the claims of downriver individuals may even challenge the way in which 
State X manages its ordinary internal affairs.
 Third, obligations pertain simply because of those States’ geographic loca-
tion. Some States may have better locations than others because historical 
struggles secured them these positions, but the obligation itself arises simply 
because individuals downriver need water for the satisfaction of their vital 
needs and States upriver govern what happens to that water as it passes 
through their territories. A State may have powers, privileges and obligations 
irrespective of its previous activities and irrespective of whether the relation-
ship is chosen. While this is not a reason to ignore past injustices, it shows 
how the noncitizen relationship is not dependent upon agreement about why a 
certain state of affairs has come into being. What is important is access to 
capabilities today.
 This can help as a tool for understanding State obligations more broadly 
within global systems that put some States metaphorically upstream and some 
individuals metaphorically downstream. The Mekong case shows that even if we 
do not take historical injustices into account, metaphorically upriver States may 
well have special obligations towards the inhabitants of States that are meta-
phorically downriver. And if there is no metaphorical clean water downriver as a 
result, urgent obligations are generated. Financial flows, trade restrictions, and 
so forth, mean that some individuals become vulnerable to faraway States in a 
way that can be helpfully understood as an instance of activated noncitizenship. 
The States that have power over those individuals have special obligations as 
a result.
Shared responsibilities for making life unsustainable: 
anthropogenic climate change
Mr. Secretary- General, Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
 I address you today not only as a President, but as a father, as a grandfather, 
as a custodian of my culture, and as a representative of a nation that lies just 
two meters above sea level and risks being submerged by rising waves.
 Everything I know, and everyone I love, is in the hands of all of us 
gathered here today
(His Excellency Christopher J. Loeak, President of the Marshall Islands, 
speaking in France in 201530)
In the case of river- sharing, it was already necessary to take into account multiple 
State duty- bearers, though the group of States was still small and the line of causa-
tion was clear. The case of anthropogenic climate change is more complicated and 
30 His Excellency Christopher J. Loeak, President of the Marshall Islands, speaking at the Opening 
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s 21st Conference of Parties, Paris, 
France, 30 November 2015.
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writers on global justice have long been examining it.31 The noncitizen relationship 
can also be found in this context and is useful in analysing the nature of the rela-
tionships involved. This is the case even though there is a key difference between 
anthropogenic climate change and cases like that of river- sharing. That is, there is 
no single State or unambiguously defined body of States responsible. The line of 
responsibility is contested and of varying weight and intent. In addition, the indi-
viduals affected are spread throughout the world, such that many individuals are 
vulnerable to many States – and indeed these two groups are intersecting.
 Despite this, rising sea levels, loss of natural resources, and more extreme 
weather events will most affect those living in countries that are more exposed 
and less resilient to climate hazards.32 Those living in the countries that industr-
ialised earliest and to the highest level (and so have contributed significantly, 
and continue to contribute, to anthropogenic climate change) are most likely to 
be resilient to the changes. This also, then, activates the noncitizen- State rela-
tionship from afar. It shares the cataclysmic reality of the nuclear test example, 
but with the shared responsibility of river- sharing. And it takes both of these 
aspects well beyond their formations above. It is born of the reality of a complex 
and mutually dependent world, and yet its impact upon individuals is clear from 
the statement from President Loeak given at the head of this section.
 Anthropogenic climate change can be seen to give rise to two types of burden 
upon States with regard to securing the capabilities of individuals: mitigation of 
current and past activities’ contribution to ongoing atmospheric pollution, and 
adaptation of activities in response to the change that has already occurred or is 
occurring.33 Individuals in those States which are most badly affected by climate 
change are particularly vulnerable to the policies of those States which are most 
polluting and most able to change their pollution patterns. This is alongside 
being more broadly vulnerable in terms of the structures that make it particularly 
difficult for the poorest countries to mitigate for changes in climate. There arises, 
then, a structural obligation based upon the special relationship between affected 
31 For example, Simon Caney (2010) ‘Climate Change and the duties of the advantaged’, 
pp. 203–228 in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 13(1); Henry 
Shue (1999) ‘Global Environment and International Inequality’, pp. 531–545 in International 
Affairs 75(3); Dale Jamieson (2001) ‘Climate Change and Global Environmental Justice’, 
pp. 287–307 in Clark Miller and Paul Edwards (eds) (2001) Changing Atmosphere: Expert 
Knowledge and Environmental Governance, MIT Press; Steve Vanderheiden (2008) Atmospheric 
Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change, Oxford University Press. See also Jeremy Moss 
(ed.) (2015) Climate Change and Justice, Cambridge University Press; Nicholas Herbert Stern 
(2007) The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge University Press; and 
World Bank (2010) World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change, The 
World Bank, Washington DC.
32 World Bank 2010 ibid. at p. 7.
33 For example, see Simon Caney (2005) ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate 
Change’, pp. 747–775 in Leiden Journal of International Law 18, at p. 751; Simon Caney (2009) 
‘Climate Change and the Future: Discounting for Time, Wealth and Risk’, pp. 163–186 in 
Journal of Social Philosophy 40(2), at p. 204.
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individuals and States. This is of a form similar to that in the other cases given 
above and can be seen as activated noncitizenship experienced from afar.
 These different sorts of vulnerability also interact, layering States and obliga-
tions. Consider the Bikinians, now living on the Marshall Island of Kili, but also 
spread around the Marshall Islands and increasingly in the US. Rising sea levels 
and dramatic storm events associated with anthropogenic climate change are 
now reportedly making life increasingly difficult on Kili, salinating drinking 
water, harming crops and damaging infrastructure.34 Their lives are again being 
made hard to sustain because of other States’ activities – and they are also less 
resilient to this because of their more general vulnerability. As such, the vulner-
ability they experience toward those who can stop the pollution and those who 
can help with the adaptation to the changing conditions amplifies vulnerabilities 
resulting from the Bravo test discussed above. Again, the very fact of the 
Bikinians, living in the way they do today, enacting their capabilities despite, 
rather than thanks to, liberal States and the system of States, poses a challenge 
for those States and the system of States that have made Bikinians so existen-
tially vulnerable.
 Bikinians are in activated noncitizen relationships at least with those States 
that are increasingly making their homes uninhabitable, which have obligations 
as a result. Where States are mutually responsible for the vulnerability, we must 
conclude that they are mutually responsible for the response, experienced in dif-
ferent ways in different locations, in turn leading people to enter into new phases 
of noncitizenship, with different sets of mechanisms needed in order to fulfil 
obligations. The obligations, based upon the constraint of capabilities, must be 
met by enabling rather than further restricting individuals’ autonomy.
Activated noncitizenship and the drive to migrate
MIGRAR DEBE SER UNA ALTERNATIVA. PERO NO LA ÚNICA 
OPCIÓN.
Translation: Migration must be an alternative but not the only option.
(Statement on the shirts of migrant worker rights 
marchers in NYC, USA in October 2013)
While exclusion plays an important role both inside and outside the territories of 
States,35 at the border it is particularly clear how the exclusion works. In 2012, 
the Mediterranean Sea was recorded to have been the most surveilled sea in the 
34 For example, Sarah Kaplan (2015) ‘Exiled by nuclear tests, now threatened by climate change, 
Bikini islanders seek refuge in the U.S.’ in the Washington Post 28 October 2015; Oliver Milman 
and Mae Ryan (2016) ‘Lives in the balance: climate change and the Marshall Islands’, in the 
Guardian online, 15 September 2016.
35 Linda Bosniak (2007) ‘Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants’, 
pp. 389–410 in Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8(2).
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world, and yet it was also by far the one with the highest loss of life, accounting 
for 75 per cent of migrant deaths globally.36 This paradox shows how the phys-
ical barriers, and the experience of noncitizenship at them, are not only theoret-
ical. In the Mediterranean, and at the behest of liberal States, the barriers are 
fences and walls, reinforced by battleships and high- tech surveillance equip-
ment; and controlled by guards with guns. The physical border is also a site 
where the difference between the dehumanised noncitizen and the citizen is 
made particularly clear. Lea Ypi has put it as follows: ‘[borders] constitute a 
visible expression of profoundly unequal distribution of spatially- differentiated 
opportunities’37 – as are the ways in which different people experience them.
 In enclosing some portion of the world’s people, territory and resources, and 
excluding some individuals from using them, a State built on liberal principles 
cannot be justified in ignoring the needs of those thereby excluded. Obligations 
arise because the enclosure of people, territory and resources by each State has 
left some people unable to satisfy their basic needs or develop their capabilities 
to function. This draws upon the other cases above. Consider particularly that of 
river- sharing. Such persons can be seen as being in activated noncitizen relation-
ships with States, even States far away. Individual- State relationships from afar 
affect the ways in which people think about moving, the migration opportunities 
that are possible, and the way in which they experience the border and the space 
within the border.
 For example, as Saskia Sassen and others have observed, major receiving 
countries tend to receive immigrants from their ‘spheres of influence’.38 That is, 
individuals are in States with which they have ‘postcolonial and current neo- or 
quasi- colonial bonds’,39 economic links, and organised recruitment of workers, 
through kinship, family and other networks.40 States often receive immigrants 
from amongst those with whom they already have a particularly strongly acti-
vated noncitizen relationship as well as forms of quasi- citizenship – with indi-
viduals who are metaphorically downstream, or have citizen- like memberships 
in some dimensions.
 State coercion at borders cannot be understood in isolation from what plays 
out within them, and, importantly, what takes place outside them. It is, then, a 
mistake to see questions of global justice, and questions of migration justice, in 
isolation. Rather, it is necessary take into account the wider contexts. As a 
36 Tara Brian and Frank Laczko (2014) ‘Migrant Deaths: An International Overview’, pp. 15–44 in 
Tara Brian and Frank Laczko (eds) (2014) Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost During Migra-
tion, International Organization for Migration, p. 20.
37 Lea Ypi (2008) ‘Justice in Migration: A Closed Borders Utopia?’ pp. 391–418 in Journal of 
Political Philosophy 16(4), p. 395.
38 Saskia Sassen (1996) Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization, Columbia Univer-
sity Press, New York, at p. 71.
39 For example, almost all immigrants to Europe from the Indian subcontinent and from the English 
Caribbean in 1996 lived in the UK, and similarly with regard to North Africans and France, and 
other groups in other former colonial countries (Sassen 1996 ibid. at p. 86).
40 Sassen 1996 ibid. at p. 82.
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starting point, this could include examining individuals’ decisions whether to 
migrate and the ways in which those individuals were already in a substantive 
noncitizen relationship with a particular State or States from afar, at borders, and 
within. It will be necessary to examine their changing relationships with the 
States(s) in question in these different contexts.
 At the head of this section is the statement that was printed in yellow on white 
airtex shirts worn by marchers for migrant workers’ rights in New York City in 
October 2013 – as shown in Figure 7.2. As international diplomats and politi-
cians were discussing migration and development in the High- level Dialogue on 
International Migration and Development at the UN headquarters in Turtle Bay, 
these marchers were debating the same topics in the Church Building across the 
road and then as they marched through the city and over the Brooklyn Bridge. 
As indicated in the message on their shirts, an important part of understanding 
migrant rights for example is to understand also the right not to migrate. These 
protesters were also arguing that migration does not happen in a vacuum but is 
part of a global system. I would add that we can see it as a global system of acti-
vated noncitizenship. It is common to talk about those that flee war or violence 
Figure 7.2 Marchers in NYC, USA, October 2013 (Tendayi Bloom, 2013).
114  Noncitizens overseas and migration
and to recognise the lack of freedom in their decision to move. However, acti-
vated noncitizenship may play a role in preventing people from staying put or 
preventing people from moving in a much broader range of situations, and with 
a gradation of levels of coercion and choice. For some, it may be a difference 
between starvation and sustaining life. But for many, this is not the decision. For 
them, the decision to migrate is the decision to claim their part of the aspirational 
advantages of the global system.
 Consider the concern about ‘brain drain’. This is the idea that some countries 
experience a haemorrhaging of highly skilled professionals who move to coun-
tries where they can be better remunerated for their skills, or can enjoy better 
working conditions, for example. Some argue that there are good capability- 
based reasons for restricting movement, to stop highly trained professionals 
leaving the countries that need them the most. Yet, if such individuals struggle 
to function in the way they want to without moving, this suggests that more 
work is needed in order to enable those who can move to flourish without 
moving, and those who cannot move, to flourish tout court (which is also made 
more possible if their society’s doctors, nurses, dentists and other professionals 
are choosing to stay). In a citizenist world, it can be difficult to connect these 
noncitizen relationships overseas with relationships much more broadly, but the 
movement of highly trained professionals can help to show the connections 
between experiences of noncitizenship.
 This can be seen through the classic case of healthcare. Some countries 
now have extremely few medical professionals per capita and struggle to 
maintain a viable health system.41 And yet, it seems reasonable for those who 
have dedicated their lives to develop the skills necessary to work in such 
professions to move to a place where they can have better conditions, better 
salary, and be better able to develop as professionals. As it currently stands, 
this often leads medical personnel to take jobs in wealthy (often liberally 
based) countries. And those countries are happy to have them. But it is not 
only the workers themselves who have invested. It costs money to train health-
care professionals.42 When workers move, then, one State has paid for the 
training that another State can make use of. This then impacts upon indi-
viduals in those States thereby left with less adequate healthcare provision as 
well as those States which thereby have many more healthcare professionals. 
This is clearly a matter of global justice.
41 An interesting survey with a troubling, but common, omission of discussion of the individuals 
migrating: Simon Commander, Mari Kangasniemi and L. Alan Winters (2004) ‘The BrainDrain: 
Curse or Boon? A Survey of the Literature’, pp. 235–272 in Robert E. Baldwin and L. Alan 
Winters (eds) (2004) Challenges to Globalisation: Analysing the Economics, University of 
Chicago Press. See also Ronald Skeldon (2008) ‘Of Skilled Migration, Brain Drains and Policy 
Responses’, pp. 3–29 in International Migration 47(4).
42 Ashnie Padarath, Charlotte Chamberlain, David McCoy, Antoinette Ntuli, Mike Rowson and 
Rene Loewenson (2003) Health Personnel in Southern Africa: Confronting Maldistribution and 
Brain Drain, EQUINET Discussion Paper No. 3.
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 Before thinking this through further, note that the situation is even more 
complex than this initial summary can make it seem. When workers move, this 
doesn’t only allow the workers themselves to tap into global frameworks from 
which they would otherwise be excluded. There are two key ways in which home 
countries – and individuals in those countries – also benefit. First, in the early 
2000s, the world was becoming aware of the development importance of remit-
tances.43 Studies have found, for example, that families with access to remittances 
from overseas may well be able to access capabilities more easily than other fam-
ilies. Remittances may come from countries nearby or from countries far away. In 
Nigeria and Senegal in 2013, a World Bank study found that on average almost 
twice as many family members had a secondary education in households with 
remittances from outside Africa in comparison to families with no remittances.44 
Second, when skilled professionals are able to gain skills, knowledge and networks 
overseas, they are also able to help their home countries to tap into these systems.
 In the way in which systems are currently designed, however, this movement 
is not best serving the interests of migrants, their families, and systems of global 
justice. This puts an obligation upon those who design the systems to develop 
structures that enable capabilities more generally rather than focusing on capital 
(Chapter 11 takes up this discussion of human capabilities vs human capital). 
This includes finding mechanisms to invest in health systems and training insti-
tutions that supply highly skilled professionals, for example, and recognising the 
obligations associated with the noncitizenship of individuals overseas, which is 
activated when their health workers are attracted to a State far away. Migration 
justice and justice far away are deeply related. Careful rethinking is needed if 
migration is really to be an alternative, but not the only option.
Presence and the right to be present
Now turn to the presence itself. Earlier chapters have identified obligations gen-
erated in a State when an individual’s noncitizenship is activated when the 
person is present on its territory. If presence itself confers a claim against a State, 
could it coherently confer a claim to presence itself? To put it another way, once 
you are in a State, are you entitled to be there?45 Christina Boswell observes that 
there is a contradiction when, by virtue of being physically present, a person 
may have claims against a State, and at the same time may not be entitled to that 
very presence, and so to the entitlement to those rights in the first place.46 There 
43 Critiqued for example in Hein de Haas (2005) ‘International Migration, Remittances and Develop-
ment: Myths and Facts’, pp. 1269–1284 in Third World Quarterly 26(8). Developed in Chapter 11.
44 Dilip Ratha (2013) ‘The Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction’, 
Migration Policy Institute Policy Brief No. 8 September 2013, at p. 5 (though the direction of the 
causation is not clear).
45 I touched upon this already in Chapter 4’s discussion of the justified claims of ‘unwanted’ 
noncitizens.
46 Christina Boswell (2008) ‘The Elusive Rights of an Invisible Population’, pp. 187–192 in Ethics 
and International Affairs 22(2).
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may well be citizenship- related arguments to be made here, for example refer-
ring to an individual’s engagement- through-presence with the State and the State 
community as a citizen, or developing citizenship claims as a result of presence. 
I leave them to one side.
 The noncitizenship approach turns the question around. It is not the inclusion 
but the exclusion that needs to be justified. The nature of the justification needed 
may well change once the person is within the State. It is the vulnerability and 
challenge with regard to an individual’s capabilities that is important – and it 
may be heightened when a person is present in the State in question. It is not the 
presence that is relevant, then, but the vulnerability and challenge associated 
with that presence that gives rise to the obligations. As we have seen, this rela-
tionship did not come into existence when that person entered into the territory, 
but it did change in form. The problem of the conflations between residence and 
presence, and the difficulty in pinning down the nuances of the specific defini-
tions, can be avoided by instead looking at whether, in each case, the noncitizen 
relationship is being activated, and in what respects this activation is being 
experienced. That is, is the person noncitizen- vulnerable? And in what ways 
does this challenge the State?
 Whether it wants to or not, the State where a person is provides the roads 
upon which s/he walks and polices the towns in which s/he interacts. It supplies 
the park benches upon which s/he might sleep and controls the institutions that 
s/he must interact with for her/is immediate needs. As will now be presented, not 
only does that State in fact do these things, it also has an obligation to do so, as 
the entity with effective control over the territory concerned, excluding others 
from exercising power therein. This means that by virtue of a person’s living 
presence in a State and that State’s overall justification for its jurisdiction over a 
territorial space, the State cannot help but provide certain benefits to, and exert 
certain coercions upon, someone who is within its territory. And, if it is not to 
impede that person in her/is capabilities, thus activating her/is noncitizenship, 
that State also should do so.
 It is always important to be cautious when drawing parallels between States 
and entities that are very much not States, but consider for a moment the 
swimming pool of a private members club. Suppose someone sneaks in who is 
not a member. We may suppose that it is appropriate to deprive her/im of 
complementary towels, or even throw her/im out of the swimming pool. 
However, if s/he runs into difficulties in the water and needs the help of a life-
guard, I think few would suggest that s/he should be allowed to drown – and 
moreover, few would suggest that the obligation to save that person’s life is in 
conflict with the notion that there can be a private members club. Whatever 
we think about private members clubs and their swimming pools, now that 
you are in it, the club must take responsibility for saving you. You are 
dependent upon it, vulnerable to it, with respect to your basic capabilities. 
Similarly, even supposing the State’s right to exclude in some particular case 
is justified, this does not remove obligations to individuals that bypass the 
exclusion.
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 Noncitizenship can be activated far from the State, at its borders, and within 
its territory. While there may be different obligations associated with the activa-
tion at these different locations, the noncitizenship itself is continuous between 
them. By looking both at situations of noncitizenship activated overseas and at 
migration it is possible to see this continuity. It is necessary next to understand 
more about the mechanisms by which noncitizenship can be activated and the 
implications of this for State obligations towards the individuals concerned.
8 Activating noncitizenship
For the most part, the noncitizenship presented in this book is latent, but 
actions both of States and of individuals can activate it, making an individual 
both vulnerable and challenging to a State and the State system. There is 
something faintly idiosyncratic in presenting activated noncitizenship as a 
relationship of both vulnerability and challenge. While one makes the nonciti-
zen seem weak, the other emphasises the noncitizen’s power. This tension is 
important to understanding the relationship. Non- acknowledgement of a non-
citizen’s relationship with a State including heightening the deprivations asso-
ciated with noncitizenship, increasing both the individual’s vulnerability and 
the challenge that her/is situation poses to that State including to its legiti-
macy. The activation of noncitizenship, then, has two related components: a 
special sort of vulnerability and a special sort of challenge. Both of these 
operate bidirectionally: the individual is vulnerable/challenging to a State built 
upon liberal democratic principles and the State system; and such a State and 
State system are vulnerable/challenging to the individual. Vulnerability and 
challenge are not unique to noncitizenship, but in this relationship they take a 
special form and are deepened in special ways.
 By their very nature, the construction and maintenance of States built upon 
liberal democratic principles and the State system make people vulnerable to that 
structure in an organised way, something which has long troubled liberal polit-
ical philosophers. The focus of those addressing this has been upon the mitiga-
tion and justification of citizen vulnerability, and it is this that is written into 
most liberal democratic State constructions. Yet, this book argues that 
noncitizen- vulnerability is as central to the construction of a State built upon 
liberal democratic principles as that of citizens. This chapter turns more concert-
edly to the theoretical implications of this.
The subjection of noncitizens
Much work in liberal political philosophy has focused on establishing whether it 
is possible, and if so how, to justify the deferral or delegation of power to a State 
by citizens who, it is assumed, are the ones who defer or delegate that power. 
One concern amongst those who focus on contracts and consent is whether 
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citizens could ever really consent to be governed. A particularly well- known 
presentation of this is David Hume’s disparagement of what he refers to as ‘tacit 
consent’1 and its role as some sort of theoretical fiction. Others have used this 
consent for example as a device in a thought experiment to establish the con-
ditions to which people would consent if they were asked.
 Not all liberal theories focus on consent in this way, but a theory based on 
consent alone will perhaps find it particularly difficult initially to incorporate 
noncitizenship because the noncitizen- State relationship cannot, in an 
important sense, be based upon consent. I focus on such approaches in order 
to show how even they can incorporate the notion of noncitizenship presented 
here. There has been little work done to establish the justification of the sub-
jection of those who by definition cannot so consent. In addition, there has 
been little work to examine the contexts within which those persons who 
could consent (i.e. citizens) are non- consenting. This is the crux of the 
problem of noncitizen- vulnerability and by extension the noncitizen challenge 
addressed in this book.
 As was discussed in Chapter 1, there are two broad exceptions. First, there 
has been a body of work since the 1980s, growing in the 2000s, examining 
involuntary subjection of noncitizens in the context of migration. For 
example, and most famously, Joseph Carens presents an analysis of the hier-
archy of citizenship as a feudal system, in which it is absurd to suggest that 
there is any sort of consent on the part of the ‘alien’ who falls at the bottom 
of it.2 He examines justice in border- crossing, but also, and particularly, the 
just treatment of arrived migrants. A broad literature has now developed in 
this area.3
 Second, scholars working on ‘global justice’ have examined the involuntary 
subjection of those experiencing the relationship described here as noncitizenship 
1 Hume states: ‘Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his 
country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives, from day to day, by the small 
wages which he acquires? We may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely con-
sents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap 
into the ocean, and perish the moment he leaves her.’ David Hume (1971) ‘Of the Original Con-
tract’ pp. 147–166 in Ernest Barker (1971) Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau Oxford Univer-
sity Press, p. 156 [essay first published in 1748]. See also, for example, P.F. Brownsey (1978) 
‘Hume and the Social Contract’, pp. 132–148 in The Philosophical Quarterly 28(111).
2 Joseph Carens (1987) ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’, pp. 251–273 in The 
Review of Politics 49(2); Peter Brown and Henry Shue (eds) (1983) The Border that Joins: 
Mexican Migrants and U.S. Responsibility, Rowman & Littlefield.
3 For example, Seyla Benhabib (2004) The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens, 
Cambridge University Press; Linda Bosniak (2007) ‘Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the 
Rights of Immigrants’, pp. 389–410 in Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8(2); Christina Boswell 
(2008) ‘The Elusive Rights of an Invisible Population’, pp. 187–192 in Ethics and International 
Affairs 8(2); Matthew Gibney (2009) ‘Precarious Residents: Migration Control, Membership and 
the Rights of Non-Citizens’, Human Development Research Paper 2009(10); Bonnie Honig 
(2001) Democracy and the Foreigner, Princeton University Press; Lea Ypi (2008) ‘Justice in 
Migration: A Closed Borders Utopia?’, pp. 391–418 in Journal of Political Philosophy 16(4).
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far away from their State(s).4 Practical work on this has developed for example 
(but by no means exclusively) in the context of discourse responding to anthro-
pogenic climate change.5 Within this, some have debated whether persons would 
(and whether they could) consent to the actions of States far away when those 
actions affect them deeply, including impacting upon their ability to satisfy basic 
needs.6 In the (overlapping) literatures both of migration and of global justice, 
then, theorists have found challenges to the legitimacy of certain State actions or 
even to States themselves. Some writers observe how these discourses relate to 
each other, for example, developing the idea of some sort of global citizenship.7 
In this book, the suggestion is that this can be understood usefully through the 
analytical category of noncitizenship – and in particular that of activated 
noncitizenship.
A right to exclude and assuming a non- relationship
A key way in which noncitizenship has been activated in the cases discussed so 
far in this book has been when a State does not acknowledge that there is any 
relationship. This was central to the difficulties experienced by the ‘unwanted 
noncitizens’ – the irregular migrants and stateless persons – introduced in 
Chapter 4. That chapter found the non- acknowledgement of the noncitizen- State 
relationship to be problematic more broadly than in the cases discussed. It 
critiqued the citizenist assumption of exclusion which means that all individuals 
are assumed excludable from a State unless they can prove otherwise.
 In denying that it has any relationship with an individual noncitizen, a State 
may in fact give that relationship more substance and further entrench associ-
ated obligations. The creation of a State may produce noncitizenship. But it 
does not follow that the noncitizenship need be active. The way in which State 
institutions are constructed can make noncitizenship more or less strongly 
experienced. When the State constructs exclusions around its territory, its 
institutions, or its citizenry, the noncitizenship takes a new form. And there is 
4 In different ways: Charles Beitz (1975) ‘Justice and International Relations’, pp. 360–389 in 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 4; Charles Beitz (1979) Political Theory and International Rela-
tions, Princeton University Press; Gillian Brock (2009) Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account, 
Oxford University Press; Simon Caney (2001) ‘Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalising Opportun-
ities’, pp. 113–134 in Metaphilosophy 32(1); Nigel Dower (2007) World Ethics: The New Agenda, 
Edinburgh University Press; Jon Mandle (2006) Global Justice, Polity Press; Thomas Pogge (ed.) 
(2003) Global Justice, Blackwell Publishing; Thomas Pogge World Poverty and Human Rights: 
Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, Polity Press; Henry Shue (1980) Basic Rights: 
Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy, Princeton University Press; Peter Singer (1993) 
Practical Ethics, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press.
5 This is presented in Chapter 7.
6 This is also presented in Chapter 7.
7 Seyla Benhabib (2004) The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, consider particularly the last chapter; Luis Cabrera (2010) The Practice of Global 
Citizenship, Cambridge University Press.
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the potential for it to be activated when the individual’s projects are frustrated, 
or their capabilities impaired. This does not mean that individuals should never 
be excluded. It means that they should not be assumed excludable or even 
excluded.
 The most basic assumption usually made about those who are defined by their 
lack of citizenship of a particular State is the legitimacy of exclusion (from a ter-
ritory, from a labour force, from systems of contribution and benefit; including 
where inclusion is obtained on the basis of meeting some set of conditions that 
others do not need to meet). This is so even for ‘normal noncitizens’ (to draw upon 
Bas Schotel and Joseph Carens’s terminology) or ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ migrants. 
In many cases, such individuals may have quasi- citizen statuses, deriving from 
their having a particular salary or employer, or because of the country from which 
they come (i.e. based on another citizen relationship). Yet, the assumption is still 
that they remain vulnerable to exclusion and must prove their eligibility for inclu-
sion into the systems mentioned above based upon that quasi- citizenship.
 To explore this, it is useful to understand critical discourses surrounding the 
right of States to exclude in the first place. In his 2000 book, Philosophies of 
Exclusion, Phillip Cole argued that political theory as it currently stands is 
unable to account for the assumed right of States to exclude migrants:
I asked whether liberal political philosophy could answer the membership 
question in terms that were consistent with its central moral principles and 
commitments, and I have suggested that the answer to this question is that it 
cannot. Any solution that has been offered to justify exclusive membership 
– and therefore immigration and naturalisation regulations – has given rise 
to an incoherence between the liberal polity’s internal and external 
principles and practices, while those at the border are subjected to illiberal 
principles and practices.8
He laments that if theorists are unable to defend such exclusion from the liberal 
polity, liberal political theory has reached its limit. Cole’s work has proceeded 
from this point. Subsequent writings by others have responded by reinforcing the 
requirement to protect emergency migrants, using principles of rescue, and 
defending protection in extreme cases. This merely addresses some of the unfor-
tunate implications of assumed citizenist exclusion for those who are not defined 
as citizens without touching upon the underlying problematic that Cole was 
drawing attention to – that of an unjustified assumption of a State’s right to 
exclude.
 In his 2012 book, On the Right of Exclusion, Bas Schotel brought the discus-
sion back to this problematic, with a focus in particular on what is required and 
what is really possible within existing legal frameworks. He presented the 
8 Phillip Cole (2000) Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration, Edin-
burgh University Press, p. 202.
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situation of the ‘normal migrant’, not in an emergency context, not highly 
skilled, but the ordinary person who is excluded from a liberal polity.9 Schotel 
focuses on the assumption of exclusion itself, arguing that the discussion of 
special leniencies for emergency migrants reinforces that there is an assumption 
of exclusion, a ‘default’ which he argues is inappropriate and undefended.10 His 
way forward is:
First, authorities do not have the legal backing for today’s admission pol-
icies; it goes against the structure of law to exclude without justification. 
Second, not only must authorities justify exclusion, political theory sug-
gests that they should carry the first burden of justification. Third, it is also 
institutionally possible for the authorities to carry this first burden of 
justification.11
The problems Cole raises with assumed exclusion and Schotel’s movement of 
the justification burden from individuals to States are compelling. The under-
lying problem with which both are contending is the theoretical (as well as polit-
ical, legal, etc.) dominance of citizenship, and in particular of citizenship and 
quasi- citizenship as the core way in which to assign rights and the core designa-
tor of legal personhood.
 Yet, as was argued in Chapter 4, while work on migration and immigration is 
important to consider, it is not the movement that is important. Key is a person’s 
status in a State, or the way in which a relationship is recognised or not. I argue 
that the critique, then, is not of the assumed dominance of the needs of people in 
some place, or of those with established roots in one place rather than another, 
but the assumed dominance of a particular form of relationship with a State (and 
so with States in general) – and the largely arbitrary recognition of that relation-
ship. Many have railed against the arbitrariness of birth- based access to citizen-
ship, of the outdatedness of national notions of political belonging and the 
general inadequacy of existing citizenship regimes.12 All those things are true, 
but it does not avoid the fact that it just isn’t all about citizenship.
 Linda Bosniak troubles citizenship as the panacea it can sometimes seem, 
drawing attention to its apparent link in literature and in use to ‘nation’ and 
‘nationalism’.13 She is also disturbed by the fact that ‘despite the term’s apparent 
inclusiveness and universality, it actually betrays those ideals and conveys a 
 9 Bas Schotel (2012) On the Right of Exclusion: Law, Ethics and Immigration Policy, Routledge.
10 Schotel 2012 ibid. p. 201.
11 Schotel 2012 ibid. p. 201.
12 For example, see Ayelet Shachar and Ran Hirshl (2007) ‘Citizenship as Inherited Property’, 
Political Theory 35(3); Ayelet Shachar (2009) The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global 
Inequality, Harvard University Press.
13 Linda Bosniak (2010) ‘Persons and citizens in constitutional thought’, pp. 9–29 in I.CONN 8(1); 
Linda Bosniak (2008) The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas in Contemporary Membership, 
Princeton University Press.
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deeply exclusionary and parochial message’. Bosniak proposes ‘giving up on 
citizenship as an aspirational project altogether’.14
 This book presents an individual- State relationship which is not about mem-
bership. The noncitizenship described here is not like denizenship, which is often 
more of a not- quite-citizenship. Noncitizenship is a broader type of relationship, 
and an analytical category in its own right. Yet, the argument here is not for the 
creation of a legal relationship of noncitizenship, or not yet. It also does not 
suggest that those that need to be recognised in their noncitizen relationship 
actually should principally be relating as noncitizens. Instead, it argues for a 
theoretical, cultural and political recognition of the fact of noncitizenship and the 
obligations to which it gives rise.
 Most of the obligations presented here do not deviate from existing legal 
obligations under human rights frameworks. But they are obligations that are 
often unfulfilled. The reasons for this are, as I have argued, theoretical, cultural 
and political. It is because of an underlying assumption of a lack of relationship, 
or a relationship of lack. It is, then, this theoretical, cultural and political assump-
tion that needs to change if the obligations are to be recognised and fulfilled. 
That is, a major shift is needed, not only to recognise noncitizenship, but to 
recognise that there could be a political relationship with a State which is not 
about membership.
Introducing noncitizen- vulnerability
The non- recognition of noncitizenship makes individuals particularly vulnerable 
to States and the State system, raising difficult questions for contemporary lived 
liberal democracy. The failure to acknowledge this reality contributes further to 
the ‘activation’ of the noncitizenship. That is, noncitizenship thereby becomes 
an increasing burden, as individuals’ capabilities become dependent upon the 
decisions and actions of a State or States. Taking noncitizenship seriously means 
that, irrespective of whether you accept that there may be some sort of implicit 
citizen consent to State power, there must be non- consensual subjection in a 
world of States, including States built upon liberal democratic principles. This is 
troubling for many (if not all) forms of liberalism. However, once we acknow-
ledge it, we can examine whether a liberal theory could respond to it justly, and 
if so, how.
 The focus here is upon that aspect of human vulnerability that is engendered 
or exacerbated by the activated noncitizen- State relationship. That is, such that 
persons come to be dependent on a State’s decisions and actions for the realisa-
tion of their capabilities to function without structural means for participation in 
the sovereign body, for making demands, and indeed without recognition within 
the structure that such demands can be made. This is ‘noncitizen- vulnerability’. 
Its implications for States will be explored further in Chapter 9, through the 
14 Linda Bosniak (1998) ‘The Citizenship of Aliens’, pp. 29–35 in Social Text 56, p. 33.
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language of capabilities. It builds upon a large and growing literature on the 
nature of vulnerability.15
 Chapter 3 introduced the debate between David Miller, Arash Abizadeh and 
others on whether or not there is coercion at State borders – and so also on the 
nature of the coercion that there may or may not be with respect to noncitizens. 
It was argued that not only does coercion indeed take place at borders between 
States, but that, seen another way, this is part of a much broader vulnerability of 
individuals to States. That is, individuals are made vulnerable to States with 
regard to their basic, as well as less basic, capabilities. Consequently, they also 
become dependent upon others in new ways. The examples given throughout 
this book are of individuals whose capabilities are impaired by a State and its 
actions and by the State system, but also by the collateral vulnerability and 
dependency upon other individuals that arise as a result.
 Robert Goodin’s relational approach to vulnerability observes that a child is 
particularly vulnerable towards its parents because of the special relationship 
involved, and builds the particular responsibilities to vulnerable persons more 
generally in this way.16 He explains that for him the special vulnerability 
amongst citizens gives rise to special claims and special obligations in a similar 
way. For Goodin, ‘A is vulnerable to B if and only if B’s actions have a great 
impact on A’s interests’.17 The special relationships amongst citizens may well 
be arbitrary for him. That is, there may be nothing special about the members of 
a particular State community other than the fact that they are contingently vul-
nerable to each other. He argues that there are special obligations towards com-
patriots based upon this vulnerability. However, given the pragmatic reason 
behind the special obligations, they are not really all that ‘special’. In fact, they 
resemble something more like relationships of convenience. As a result, they can 
15 See a particularly useful survey in the introduction to Catriona MacKenzie, Wendy Rogers and 
Susan Dodds (eds) (2014) Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, Oxford 
University Press. Another way of thinking about vulnerability has been in opposition to resili-
ence. This is found in economics, child development and mental health literatures for example, 
as well as in recent discourses surrounding sustainable development. However, vulnerability here 
is also tied up with coercion and loss of independence. See Patrice Engle, Sarah Castle and 
Purnima Menon (1996) ‘Child Development: Vulnerability and Resilience’, pp. 621–635 in 
Social Science of Medicine 43(5). See also essays in Steven Southwick, Brett Litz, Dennis 
Charney and Matthew Friedman (eds) (2011) Resilience and Mental Health: Challenges Across 
the Lifespan, Cambridge University Press.
16 For example, Robert Goodin (1985) Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social 
Responsibilities, University of Chicago Press; Robert Goodin (1985) ‘Vulnerabilities and 
Responsibilities: An Ethical Defence of the Welfare State’, pp. 775–787 in American Political 
Science Review 79(3). Samuel Scheffler approaches this slightly differently, but it is useful to 
consider his explicit explanation of how this basis in vulnerability makes it possible for some 
special responsibilities to be trumped or created in unexpected ways; see Samuel Scheffler (1997) 
‘Relationships and Responsibilities’, pp. 189–209 in Philosophy and Public Affairs 26(3).
17 Robert Goodin (1985) ‘Vulnerabilities and Responsibilities: An Ethical Defence of the Welfare 
State’, pp. 775–787 in American Political Science Review 79(3), p. 779. Goodin explains that he 
is equating interests with welfare, following the work of Brian Barry 1965 p. 176.
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be overridden on the basis of a trumping vulnerability.18 For Goodin, the vulner-
ability itself gives rise to moral obligations. This book looks at the obligations 
arising with respect to vulnerability that has been constructed by the State 
system. That is, while Goodin’s vulnerability could be seen as interactional, this 
book presents interactions that it sees as institutional.
 It could be argued that, given the natural vulnerability of humans, the indi-
viduals referred to here would have been vulnerable to other persons or other 
collectivities in the absence of any particular liberal democratic State structure. 
Understood like this the particular vulnerability of a noncitizen to a State is not 
constructed by this institutional structure in the same way. Instead, there is 
merely a relocation of vulnerability. But I think that the individuals are rendered 
vulnerable to a State even if they would have been vulnerable if there were no 
such State. This is for two reasons. First, it is not possible to know whether a 
person might have been more or less vulnerable in any of a vast universe of pos-
sible worlds, and second, hypothetical alternatives are not relevant for today’s 
real world. The fact is that on the basis of the construction of the State and the 
State system, some people are in fact vulnerable to that institutional structure. 
And indeed, many people are in fact likely made vulnerable in ways that they 
would not otherwise have been.
Four dimensions of vulnerability
In the fields, la migra. My aunt saying, “No corran, don’t run. They’ll think 
you’re del orto lao”. In the confusion, Pedro ran, terrified of being caught. 
He couldn’t speak English, couldn’t tell them he was fifth generation 
American. Sin papeles – he did not carry his birth certificate to work in the 
fields. La migra took him away while we watched. Se lo llevaron. He tried 
to smile when he looked back at us, to raise his fist. But I saw the shame 
pushing his head down, I saw the terrible weight of shame hunch his shoul-
ders. They deported him to Guadalajara by plane. The furthest he’d ever 
been to Mexico was Raynosa, a small border town opposite Hidalgo, Texas, 
not far from McAllen. Pedro walked all the way to the Valley. Se lo llevaron 
sin un centavo al pobre. Se vino andando desde Guadalajara.
(Gloria Anzaldúa, 1987, writing in the opening to 
Borderlands/La Frontera19)
The depth and implications of noncitizen vulnerability are nuanced, affected by 
context and by recognition. These relate to different ways in which noncitizen-
ship is activated. These can be seen in different locations of burden- bearing:
18 Robert Goodin (1988) ‘What Is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?’ pp. 663–686 in 
Ethics 98.
19 Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, Aunt Lute Books, p. 4, 
emphasis in the original.
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1 On the territory of a State (territorially present noncitizen- vulnerability)
2 At State borders (frontier noncitizen- vulnerability)
3 Physically far from a State (territorially distant noncitizen- vulnerability), and
4 Potentiality (noncitizen- vulnerability in potentiality).
The quotation from Gloria Anzaldúa’s semi- autobiographical book above presents 
a situation in which noncitizenship is functioning in forms 1, 2, and 3, and it shows 
these forms of noncitizenship being activated in someone who is a formal citizen. 
Pedro lives in the US as a formal citizen (we are told that he is ‘fifth generation 
American’). His activated noncitizenship is activated while he is in the US and as 
he is relocated to Mexico. He then experiences activated noncitizenship from afar, 
though still at the same time a formal citizen. He then walks back to the US and 
experiences activated noncitizenship at the border. Pedro was assumed excludable 
and, unable to prove otherwise, was expelled. The tragedy of his case shows how 
noncitizenship in various locations interact, how noncitizenship and citizenship 
intertwine, and how the assumption of exclusion plays out in practice.
 The first form of noncitizen burden- bearing – territorially present noncitizen- 
vulnerability – pertains when an individual is vulnerable to a State whilst on that 
State’s territory. This form has been the most discussed in this book. Subject to 
that State’s laws, walking on its streets, perhaps sleeping on its park benches, the 
individual cannot help but encounter the State. And that State has jurisdiction 
over territory, resources and power in that space.
 For the most part, a State does not want other States to act within its territory, 
or have power over its resources. As such, that State may seek to prevent indi-
viduals from looking to other States for the satisfaction of their rights while they 
are within its territory. As was seen in Chapter 6, there is a concern that when an 
individual within the territory of State X looks also to State Y, this may involve 
State Y acting within State X’s space of effective control. There is concern about 
an individual’s split loyalties and about the implications of this for the relation-
ship between States. This makes those individuals, who are thereby unable to 
look elsewhere, vulnerable to the State in which they live in additional ways. 
This gives rise to obligations in that State, even towards individuals present 
without its consent. This means that the State has these obligations both by 
virtue of activated noncitizenship generally and by virtue of the special condition 
of activated territorially present noncitizen- vulnerability.
 There is something else to consider in this case. The State is not only com-
posed of territory, material resources and infrastructure. When an individual is 
on the territory of a State, s/he is also engaged bodily with the community of 
people in that State’s territory. As has been widely discussed, this may also lead 
to claims for formal and informal citizenship, defended in a variety of ways.20 
20 In very different ways, consider Katherine Tonkiss (2013) Migration and Identity in a Post-
National World, Palgrave Macmillan; Jonathan Seglow (2009) ‘Arguments for Naturalisation’, 
pp. 788–804 in Political Studies 57(4); Michael Walzer (1983) Spheres of Justice, Basic Books; 
Dora Kostakopoulou (2001) The Future Governance of Citizenship, Cambridge University Press.
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While I do not directly discuss access to citizenship in this book, it is important 
to recall the dynamic interactions of citizenship and noncitizenship and to note 
that nothing in this book should be taken to imply that individuals should not be 
incorporated as formal citizens. It is also important to consider the citizenry, 
because the way in which the State institutions are constructed may also make 
noncitizens vulnerable in noncitizen ways to individuals and in turn to make 
otherwise citizen individuals vulnerable in special ways. This is through rela-
tionships as employers, collaborators and lovers, for example. Recall Elena and 
Ramadan, pictured in Figure 4.1. When someone relating primarily as a citizen 
within the community of States and someone relating primarily as a noncitizen 
fall in love, their capabilities become intertwined.
 Second, noncitizen- vulnerability develops at the borders of a State. Let us call 
this frontier noncitizen- vulnerability. This is a complex and hard- to-understand 
space of coercive power,21 where the jurisdiction is ambiguous and the rules 
fuzzy, both theoretically and in fact. In the border- zone, an individual can seem 
to have no relationship with either/any of the States concerned. As such, indi-
viduals could find their positions in the world unacknowledgeable. However, the 
lens of noncitizenship suggests that they are in fact in strong relationships with 
all such States, all of which thereby develop obligations towards the individuals 
concerned. In this way their position can be more easily theorised and the 
implications more easily assessed.
 In her opening to the semi- autobiographical book, Borderlands/La Frontera, 
Gloria Anzaldúa describes in a mixture of Spanish and English the space in 
which she grew up. As was seen in the passage at the head of this section, this 
mixing of languages helps to demonstrate the ambiguity and flux of the border- 
zone. She explains that:
[a] borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the theoretical 
residue of a vulnerable boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The 
prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants.
She goes on:
Tension grips the inhabitants of the borderlands like a virus. Ambivalence 
and unrest reside there and death is no stranger.22
While she is describing the US–Mexico border, this is reflected also in the 
descriptions of other border areas. It is a space within which the nature of 
the State’s coercion is both overt and hidden, both explicit and implicit. It is 
ambiguous. This is even within the much smaller border- zone of the airport.23 
21 For example, Tendayi Bloom and Verena Risse (2014) ‘Hidden Coercion at State Borders: Why 
Carrier Sanctions Cannot be Justified’, pp. 65–82 in Ethics and Global Politics 7(2).
22 Anzaldúa 1987 ibid. p. 4.
23 Bloom and Risse 2014 ibid.
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As Anzaldúa describes, the border- zone is also an area in which extremes of 
State coercion can take place, and where its implications can be difficult to 
identify and difficult to mourn.24
 The border- zone exists and is maintained as part of the hegemonic State 
system. If there are to be borders, there must be border- zones, which are to a 
greater or lesser extent crisp. As was seen in the example of unwanted and 
ambivalent citizenship in Chapter 6, even those who do not agree with the delin-
eation of physical frontiers are made vulnerable in their ability to function by the 
constructed realities of these borders. This becomes particularly clear when con-
sidering members of groups whose lives function across recognised international 
borders. At the borderline and in the border- zone, the activation of noncitizen-
ship – and of citizenship – can also perhaps be seen most clearly. At a border, an 
individual must prove a special status for recognition. Even a formal citizen at a 
border must prove that s/he, qua human, should be associated with the citizen 
identity that is acceptable to the State and so prove that s/he has a claim to entry. 
In the moments before this proof has been made, there is a welling of both 
 noncitizenship and citizenship.
 In the third instance – territorially distant noncitizen- vulnerability – there is the 
relationship that develops physically far from a State. This is the sort of relation-
ship discussed particularly in the global justice literature. It includes a broad variety 
of types of relationship, concerning situations in which the individual is noncitizen-
 vulnerable to the State in question at a geographical remove. This may take place 
explicitly, in the direct activities of colonisation, war, and the seizure of resources, 
for example. This is seen particularly clearly in Chapter 7’s discussion of the rela-
tionships of the Bikini Atoll islanders with the United States as a result of 
American nuclear testing on their islands. It may also take place less directly, for 
example through the failure to regulate activities of others. This may occur when a 
State does not control the activities of registered companies, particularly when that 
State will be the only one able to carry out such controls.25
 Noncitizenship may also be activated when an unfavourable environment is 
created, for example by trade protectionism and unfair taxation systems.26 This 
is likely to be hard to pin down, such as in the case of anthropogenic climate 
change, in which the noncitizen relationship may be activated for an individual 
in a region severely affected by climate change with respect to many States 
24 For example, see Alexandra Délano Alonso and Benjamin Nienass (2016) Borders and the 
Politics of Mourning, special issue of Social Research 83(2).
25 This may happen in the area of industry more generally, but I have raised particular concerns 
with regard to some sectors directly related to the construction of noncitizenship: Tendayi Bloom 
(2015) ‘The Business of Noncitizenship’, pp. 892–906 in Citizenship Studies 19(8).
26 Fernando Tesón and Jonathan Klick (2012) ‘Global Justice and Trade’, in Chi Carmody, Frank 
Garcia and John Linarelli (eds) (2012) Global Justice and International Economic Law: Oppor-
tunities and Prospects, Cambridge University Press; Loren Lomasky and Fernando Tesón (2015) 
Justice at a Distance: Extending Freedom Globally, Cambridge University Press; Thomas Pogge 
and Krishan Mehta (eds) (2016) Global Tax Fairness, Oxford University Press.
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 contribute to excessive CO2 emissions.27 The language of noncitizenship helps to 
trace how the obligations developed in this territorially distant noncitizen- 
vulnerability form part of a much larger collection of obligations based on liberal 
democratic State construction – and a system of States along these lines. As 
such, these distant obligations are continuous with the obligations that arise close 
at hand – though their implications for practice may differ.
 A fourth dimension to the noncitizen vulnerability needs to be added here. This 
is the vulnerability that is found in a potential relationship. This is perhaps the most 
difficult dimension of the vulnerability to establish and arises where an individual 
wants to enter into a relationship of one of the forms mentioned above but is 
deterred from taking any steps in this direction because of potential problems asso-
ciated with doing so. This inhibits capabilities in ways that are particularly difficult 
to trace. Perhaps it relates to something like the notion of ‘adaptive preferences’ or 
Isaiah Berlin’s ‘sour grapes’.28 An individual may, then, even unknowingly, inhibit 
her/is preferences, in turn, based on her/is limited access to capabilities.
 Rabindranath Tagore’s story, ‘A Wife’s Letter’ is interesting to consider 
here.29 The story exposes how the structure of sexism makes women extremely 
vulnerable, and shows how they may develop unique ways to struggle for cap-
abilities despite rather than because of conditions that currently exist and in the 
context of institutional vulnerability. This story helps to illustrate that vulner-
ability, even extreme vulnerability, does not mean passivity or servility. In the 
story, one woman, having lost the love of her husband, develops her mental 
 capabilities. She writes poetry in secret and then falls in love with another 
woman in the family home. The second woman is unable to find satisfaction in 
life and eventually sets herself on fire as the only way to escape the suffering of 
her status. As such, this story, more than being one of abjection, is a story of the 
complex ways in which different individuals seek ways to express themselves 
and to flourish despite circumstances.30
 This also comes across particularly clearly through Iddrisu Wari’s analysis of 
his own decision- making and that of those he met during his migration from 
Ghana to Spain.31 He draws upon his own experience, both as a migrant who 
27 Alexandre Gajevic Sayegh (2016) ‘Climate Justice and Carbon Pricing’, published online (www.
nottingham.ac.uk/climateethicseconomics/documents/papers-workshop-2/gajevic-sayegh.pdf); 
Henry Shue (2014) Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection, Oxford University Press 
(accessed 4 April 2017).
28 Isaiah Berlin (1958) ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Isaiah Berlin (1969) Four Essays on Liberty, 
Oxford University Press.
29 Martha Nussbaum also considers this story in this context, though I propose a different interpre-
tation. Martha Nussbaum (2000) Women and Human Development: The Human Capabilities 
Approach, Cambridge University Press, p. 111.
30 Rabindranath Tagore ‘A Wife’s Letter’, pp. 604–619 in Fakrul Alam and Radha Chakravarty 
(eds) (2011) The Essential Tagore, Harvard University Press.
31 Iddrisu Wari (2016) ‘You Make a Decision and You Start Your Journey: Reflections of a 
Ghanaian Economic Migrant and Founder of the NGO, CEHDA’, in Belachew Gebrewold and 
Tendayi Bloom (eds) (2016) Understanding Migrant Decisions: From sub-Saharan Africa to the 
Mediterranean Region, Routledge.
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travelled irregularly, and as someone working with sub- Saharan migrants in 
Spain and North Africa, and would- be migrants in Ghana. His analysis also 
shows the part played by the potential activation of his noncitizen relationship 
with several States. Wari describes a number of factors that influenced his deci-
sion to migrate across the Mediterranean. A key one amongst these is the dis-
covery that countries of the north would not allow him to enter. That is, when he 
learnt of the potential activation of his noncitizenship, this in fact activated his 
territorially distant noncitizen vulnerability in a new way.
 From his analysis, it can be seen that he experienced his exclusion in two 
main types of ways. First, he was dissatisfied in his current situation, and was 
made more dissatisfied by the fact that certain options were being closed to him. 
Second, he believed that the desirability or value of that which was being kept 
from him in denying him entry could be measured by the lengths taken to 
exclude him. He experienced the awareness that he was excluded as a privation 
in itself, as a power that a State or States had over him, about which he, prima 
facie, could do nothing. This fourth dimension to noncitizenship is, then, 
important to understanding noncitizenship as a whole and the nature of the rela-
tionship between individuals and States.
 Wari experienced another sort of exclusion when he decided to move. At this 
point, the experience of the denial was more visceral. His aims were frustrated 
directly. This took place far from the States with which he was experiencing this 
dimension of the noncitizen relationship. It does not make sense to say that at 
the time when his movement was impaired he had no relationship with these 
States, since it is precisely the activities of these States that led him to act in a 
certain way and their actions that (amongst other things) impaired him in his 
travels. And yet, the relationship he had initially, while it may be related to terri-
torially distant noncitizen- vulnerability, cannot be completely explained in this 
way. Part of what made the relationship was Wari’s sense of what it could be, its 
potentiality.
 Wari travelled irregularly to Libya and then across the sea to Spain. At 
times, he implies that he had considered travelling to the UK or to Italy, but 
Spain is where he ended up. This route, as he notes, was much more expen-
sive and much more dangerous than it would have been if he had been 
allowed simply to board a plane. There is a relationship of power imposed 
with no check from the perspective of the noncitizen. The third stage of 
Wari’s activated noncitizenship took place as he experienced the danger of 
the journey he undertook, including shipwreck and internment, for example, 
but risking much worse.
 In each of these forms of noncitizen- vulnerability the noncitizen relationship 
is activated differently. That is, the person is rendered noncitizen- vulnerable in 
different ways. Often, these aspects are addressed as distinct, whether within 
migration justice, global justice or some other field of investigation. This book 
argues that they need to be understood as different forms of the same phenom-
enon: different instantiations of the noncitizen- State relationship. Recall Lea 
Ypi’s argument that borders are problematic, not in themselves, but because 
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‘they constitute a visible expression of a profoundly unequal distribution of 
spatially- differentiated opportunities’.32 The example above helps to demonstrate 
that the problem is broader. That is, both the difficulties associated with borders 
and the spatially differentiated opportunities are part of a much broader problem 
of a failure to acknowledge the necessary and foundational noncitizen relation-
ship and its implications.
 This is helpful in a range of ways. First, it is helpful to recognise the under-
lying similarities between these forms of relationship. They are all aspects of the 
same noncitizenship that is part of the liberal democratic State. Second, recog-
nising their relationship also helps to foster an overarching theory which makes 
it more possible to analyse what happens to the obligations when a person moves 
from one form of noncitizen- State relationship to another. Finally, it demon-
strates that the obligations arising from the noncitizen- State relationship do not 
only arise because of something in the individual, or something in the State. In 
fact, they are a function of a range of interacting factors, including also relation-
ships between States and between an individual and other States, as well as 
between that individual and other individuals. The individual’s own needs, inter-
ests, desires and priorities also affect the nature of the relationships and the asso-
ciated obligations.
 The extreme situations of abject vulnerability presented for example in 
Chapter 4 arise when two conditions hold. First, the noncitizen- State relationship 
goes unrecognised, even aggressively unrecognised. This is often seen in the 
enforcement of the hyphenated ‘non- citizen’ relationship which has also been 
used to legitimise atrocities carried out against some individual or group. 
Second, that person does not currently benefit from a strong State- citizen rela-
tionship in relevant ways with any State within the relevant systems of States. 
Core, then, there must be an obligation to recognise the noncitizen- State rela-
tionship as real and substantive, and to examine the complicated ways in which 
this interacts with other relationships.
 Since noncitizenship is not generally recognised either in theory or in prac-
tice, someone whose noncitizenship is activated may well live what s/he con-
siders to be a flourishing and fully human life despite a State and the State 
system, not because of it or thanks to it. Persons who are formal citizens of a 
State may also experience noncitizenship in some dimensions, pursuing 
capability- functionings despite, or even at odds with, not thanks to the State 
system. Judith Butler argues that the vulnerability of vulnerable persons can 
itself be used as part of their struggle for change.33 And indeed the vulner-
ability present here is intertwined with a form of challenge born of that 
vulnerability.
32 Lea Ypi (2008) ‘Justice in Migration: A Closed Borders Utopia?’, pp. 391–418 in Journal of 
Political Philosophy 16(4), p. 395.
33 Judith Butler, Zeynep Gambetti and Leticia Sabsay (2016) Vulnerability in Resistance, Duke 
University Press.
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Noncitizen challenge
The obligations of a State towards a noncitizen arise not only as a result of this 
vulnerability, but as part of the challenge arising from, and tied up with, it. This, 
in particular, is what sets noncitizen- vulnerability apart from other forms. There 
is a challenge in general arising from the vulnerability of unrecognised nonciti-
zenship. That is, the citizenist status quo is challenged and this challenge comes 
in three dimensions:
1 The theoretical normative challenge
2 The legitimacy challenge, and
3 The existential challenge.
These dimensions of noncitizen challenge are deeply intertwined with the 
noncitizen- vulnerability and its activation described above. As such, an under-
standing of the obligations that arise will require an understanding of the 
dynamics of noncitizen- vulnerability, the forms of challenge, and the complex 
interrelationship of States and individuals and their changing understandings of 
their own needs and interests.
 First, there is the theoretical normative dimension to the challenge which non-
citizen vulnerability poses to the way in which the State, based upon liberal 
democratic norms and the liberal State system, is understood. There is a friction 
between the liberal democratic theoretical nature of a State (with core values of 
equality, liberty and individuality, as well as universality of scope) and the defi-
nition of some people and their interests as less equal than others. This is com-
pounded by the structural relationship between (unhyphenated) noncitizenship 
and liberal States.
 That is, the problem is not merely that some individuals are seen as less than 
equal, but that the reality experienced by those individuals is necessarily tied up 
with that of the liberal State. While the core of this first dimension of the nonciti-
zen challenge is theoretical, it is also associated with the real- world difficulties 
that this theoretical challenge implies for individuals. This dimension of the non-
citizen challenge, I argue, is the most serious, as it challenges the theoretical, 
psychological and sociological basis of liberal democracy. It is the error in the 
theory – and in the mindset behind it – that supports the real- world problems that 
make the noncitizenist project so urgent. This also gives rise to the two other 
dimensions of challenge.
 The second dimension to the noncitizen challenge is one of legitimacy. This 
problematises how the liberal State and the liberal State system is justified, 
including how it justifies itself. It includes both the theoretical dimension of the 
challenge mentioned above and the dimension of the challenge posed by the 
activities that must be carried out in order to maintain such a system that does 
not acknowledge the claims of noncitizens. Whereas in the first dimension, the 
question was whether it is theoretically possible to maintain a State defined on 
liberal democratic lines, in this second dimension the question is whether it can, 
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in practical terms, be possible to maintain a State or a State system that is justifi-
able or legitimate according to liberal democratic norms and does not acknow-
ledge noncitizenship. This sits between the first and the third dimensions of the 
noncitizen challenge.
 The third dimension, building upon the previous two, is the existential dimen-
sion to the noncitizen challenge. It has two aspects:
1 On the one hand, based on the second dimension to the challenge, the 
concern is whether any existing system can be understood to be a liberal 
democratic one when it must act in ways that seem counter to liberal demo-
cratic norms. That is, the concern is whether a State thereby undermines its 
own liberal democratic existence (though not its existence per se). This 
builds upon the second challenge, to ask whether a State that must act illi-
berally in order to maintain its non- relationship with noncitizens can still be 
referred to as ‘liberal democratic’.
2 On the other hand is the direct existential threat posed by individuals who 
challenge their noncitizen- vulnerability. This can be seen in real- world 
attacks to liberal State institutions and in the contraventions of those instru-
ments of protectionism that are shown to be unjust or illegitimate (consider 
the flouting of borders, riots at detention centres and rejection of property 
disparities).34 Cecile Fabre has warned that the poor of the world would be 
justified in waging violent war against the rich world that keeps them poor.35 
Related, one might want to ask what actions of these experiencing activated 
noncitizenship might be justifiable.
The work in this book, then, has been to present this three- dimensional nonciti-
zen challenge to the State built upon liberal democratic principles that arises 
from its ignoring of noncitizenship: theoretical normative, legitimacy- based, and 
existential.
 Related to this is the idea of struggle. Judith Butler’s presentation of vulner-
ability as potentially itself part of struggle was introduced above.36 One way 
this could play out is presented by Celestine Nyamu- Musembi. Nyamu- 
Musembi proposes that the rights that are really important are those which 
people identify through their own struggle. She argues that rights are ‘shaped 
through actual struggles informed by people’s own understandings of what 
34 An interesting paper on this is Luis Cabrera (2012) ‘Unauthorised Immigration as Principled 
Resistance’, Keynote Lecture at Displacement, Resistance, Representation: Culture and Power 
in Contexts of Migrancy, Conference at Queen Mary University of London 28–29 June 2012.
35 Cecile Fabre (2012) Cosmopolitan War, Oxford University Press. Can this be related to Martin 
Borstelmann’s notion of ‘the international civil rights movement’?
36 For example, see Judith Butler (2016) ‘Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance’, pp. 12–27 in 
Judith Butler, Zeynep Gambetti, and Leticia Sabsay (eds) (2016) Vulnerability in Resistance, 
Duke University Press.
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they are justly  entitled to’.37 If seen this way, then, in the activities in the 
second part of the third dimension of challenge above, we can identify some 
serious struggles and so some particularly important rights, and consequent 
State obligations. As Jeremy Waldron has declared, arguments for basic rights-
 satisfaction should be put in terms of ‘How dare you’ rather than ‘Please 
may I’.38
 The interest here is not in rights per se, but in the way in which rights and 
obligations arise from a special sort of individual- State relationship – and the 
impact that this relationship has upon individuals’ capabilities. The actor- 
orientated approach of Nyamu- Musembi offers a way in which to incorporate 
the claims of individuals themselves (whether directly or explicitly, or as evid-
enced through their struggles) into the theory. Through the challenge that 
noncitizen- vulnerability poses to a State and the State system, it becomes pos-
sible to start to identify the obligations of liberal justice that States have towards 
such persons in virtue of their noncitizenship.
 The challenge can be understood to develop in one of the first two dimensions 
whether or not people are actually able to struggle. And yet, if we look through a 
noncitizenist lens, we can see political struggles that are obscured by a citizenist 
approach. Chapter 11 shows how struggles, from the explicit organised col-
lective action of domestic workers to seek protection of their rights, to the phys-
ical movement of migrants globally, can be understood as noncitizenist 
challenges – and part of a global politics of noncitizenship in a context in which 
there is often an attempt to stifle noncitizen politics.
 Noncitizenship should not only be associated with vulnerability – and the 
political struggle and challenge of noncitizens should not only be seen as born of 
vulnerability. In fact, persons experiencing an activated noncitizenship may still 
realise their capabilities in ways that they value, and ways that are empowered. 
Through ingenuity and persistence, individuals flourish despite, rather than 
because of the State and the State system. This is illustrated, for example, in 
Khadija Farah’s photographs from Dadaab camp in Kenya. Dadaab is the largest 
refugee camp in the world. Largely outside the jurisdiction of the Kenyan State 
and so also of the State system, its inhabitants are largely kept from engaging 
with the particular State or the system of States.
 Figure 8.1 shows a woman butcher laughing and slicing meat to be sold and 
eaten. Farah describes the image:
Muslimo Hassan Ali is one of the busiest butchers in IFO2. Her speciality is 
camel meat and she is the only one who sells it in the camp. She began as a 
butcher three years ago as a way to provide for her family. Pictured here is 
37 Celestine Nyamu-Musembi (2005) ‘Towards an actor-oriented perspective on human rights’, 
pp. 31–49 in Naila Kabeer (ed.) (2005) Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions, Zed 
Books p. 31.
38 Jeremy Waldron (1993) Liberal Rights; Collected Papers 1981–1991, Cambridge University 
Press p. 21.
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one of her nine children. Because there is no slaughterhouse in IFO2, 
Muslimo travels by motorcycle (her own) at 7 am to pick up the meat from 
IFO camp, roughly 6 km away. “If we had our own slaughterhouse, it would 
make things much easier on me and the other butchers here,” she says. But 
she is proud of her business and the fact that she employs three people. “It 
all started with 3000 shillings and now I have this as well as other small 
stalls around the camp,” she says with a huge smile on her face. Muslimo 
also sees her job as providing a necessary service to the community and 
hopes to continue in this way while supporting her family by expanding the 
business.
Hassan Ali’s relationship with the Kenyan State is one of activated noncitizenship. 
She is noncitizen- vulnerable and this is challenging to the State and to its legiti-
macy. And yet she acts and finds capability- functionings despite this.39 She is for-
bidden from working and has no access to support on account of her status, and yet 
she has developed a thriving business that contributes to her community and 
supports her family. She is vulnerable, but she is far from abject or powerless. 
39 For an analysis of the impact of non-acknowledgement of Somalis in Kenya, see Oscar Gakuo 
Mwangi (2017) ‘Statelessness, Ungoverned Spaces and Security in Kenya’, in Tendayi Bloom, 
Katherine Tonkiss and Phillip Cole (eds) (2017) Understanding Statelessness, Routledge.
Figure 8.1 Butcher in Dadaab Camp (Khadija Farah).
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Her noncitizen- vulnerability is a challenge, but her flourishing is also challeng-
ing in a context in which she is flourishing despite the State. Recognition of her 
noncitizenship and her capabilities, removing barriers to her flourishing, could 
help to reduce her noncitizenship activation, reducing her noncitizen- 
vulnerability and in turn decreasing the challenge it poses to the State and to the 
State system.
 While Heather Johnson’s understanding of noncitizenship differs in some 
core ways from that which is developed here, her work also helps to deepen our 
understanding of how this functions. She also sees ‘the noncitizen as central, a 
transgressive and disruptive figure in world politics who challenges the ways in 
which we understand political subjectivity’.40 I propose that noncitizenship in 
itself is not challenging – indeed, it is a central and normal part of liberal theory 
if it can only be recognised as such. But activated noncitizenship, in a context 
where noncitizenship is denied recognition and noncitizens are thereby rendered 
unacceptably vulnerable, is challenging. It is this which has the potential to chal-
lenge the theory, the legitimacy, and even the existence of the liberal democratic 
State and the system of States.
 Johnson describes how individuals must both identify and hide their identity 
in order to transgress the structures set up to exclude them. Perhaps the most 
shocking instantiation of this is found in a 2015 paper mentioned already in 
Chapter 5. It is entitled ‘These Fine Lines’, referring to the lines of a fingerprint. 
In the paper, she uses the words of a poem which describes the process of effac-
ing a person’s fingerprints in the fire of a kitchen stove.41 A picture of just such a 
kitchen stove sitting in the home of a refused asylum seekers in the UK is found 
in Chapter 5 (see Figure 5.2).
 As can be seen in the different presentations of Waldron, Nyamu- Musembi, 
Butler, Farah, and Johnson, this is not passive or abstract. Individual nonciti-
zens, in claiming rights, or in living ‘as if ’ they had rights (which, in the 
absence of a recognised noncitizenship, is usually taken to mean living ‘as if ’ 
citizens), can seem challenging to the day- to-day reality of States built upon 
liberal democratic principles, but this is only the case insofar as their rights- 
claiming is denied and thereby politicised.42 In the case where a person’s 
rights, political agency, and even being, are denied, even mundane activities 
can be politicised and challenging. I argue that recognising noncitizenship and 
the place noncitizens hold within the liberal democratic theoretical framework, 
40 Heather Johnson (2014) Borders, Asylum and Global Non-Citizenship: The Other Side of the 
Fence, Cambridge University Press. Quoted text appears on p. 1.
41 Heather Johnson (2015) ‘These Fine Lines: Locating Noncitizenship in Political Protest in 
Europe’, pp. 951–965 in Citizenship Studies 19(8).
42 This has been discussed in very different ways. For example, see Engin Isin (2012) Citizen-
ship Without Frontiers, Bloomsbury; Heather Johnson (2014) Borders, Asylum and Global 
Non-Citizenship: The Other Side of the Fence, Cambridge University Press; Yasemin Soysal 
(1994) Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe, University of 
Chicago Press.
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and addressing the inhibition of their capabilities, will be crucial to arresting 
the continued activation of noncitizenship and so the challenge this poses. 
This may well include recognition of formal citizenships that have been 
denied, though this is not the focus here.
 All these dimensions of the noncitizen challenge derive directly from nonciti-
zen vulnerability and its activation. The project of reclaiming liberal democratic 
theory, then, will need to find a means of lessening or mitigating this vulner-
ability and of recognising both noncitizenship and the challenge it poses within a 
reconceptualisation of liberal democratic theory. Central to this is the commit-
ment to an inalienable right to self- preservation, that ‘[f]or all human beings to 
function with a significant degree of rationality and self- awareness, they need a 
certain minimum amount of physical security, health care, and subsistence …’43 
This is the aim of the next chapter.
43 Odera Oruka 1989 ibid. p. 53.
9 Dynamic capabilities
The capabilities approach as it is used here provides a way in which to examine 
how activated noncitizenship interferes with what a person can do and be and 
the obligations to which this gives rise. While the content of the obligations 
arising may differ depending on the context and location of the particular instan-
tiation of the relationship, these obligations are continuous. Far away, a State 
based on liberal democratic principles has a negative obligation not to infringe a 
person’s access to capabilities, and to facilitate an international system that also 
does not inhibit capability- functioning. At a State’s border, and at the various 
locations where the border is experienced, the obligations become more direct. 
Within a State, the obligation is directly to facilitate basic capability- functioning, 
to facilitate dynamic capabilities, and not to inhibit functioning.
Background considerations
This approach includes three core concepts: capability, functioning and agency. 
A person’s capability ‘represents the various combinations of functioning 
(beings and doings) which that person can achieve’.1 There is no need for her/im 
to make use of them. The agency aspect of the capabilities approach means that 
individuals simply need to be put into a position in which they could make use 
of such capabilities to function if they wanted to. This includes dynamic capabil-
ities – the capabilities that an individual has to respond to changing social and 
institutional conditions but also to contribute to changing them.
 This draws heavily on the capabilities approaches of Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum, but the intention of the work here differs. Their approaches 
were primarily directed at providing a tool with which to evaluate how well 
individuals are faring. In particular, they sought to provide a means of com-
parison between people and between States (as in the Human Development 
Index). Ingrid Robeyns identifies three ways in which the capabilities 
approach is used: (1) to evaluate individual advantage and social 
arrangements; (2) to critique other approaches; and (3) as a formula for 
1 Amartya Sen (1995) Inequality Reexamined, Harvard University Press [first published 1992].
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making interpersonal comparisons of well- being. She identifies the capabil-
ities approach as a paradigm.2
 In this chapter, the capabilities approach is used in order to examine what is 
problematic in the activation of noncitizenship – in order to identify that it is 
problematic for a State to restrict noncitizens from doing and being and what 
obligations arise. Here, the intention is not to provide a complete account, but 
instead to set out a mechanism by which such obligations can be identified and 
some of the considerations that will need to be factored into its application. 
Though different, this does not deviate irreconcilably from the capabilities 
approach of Nussbaum and Sen and, most importantly, maintains the spirit of 
their approach.
 The most common way in which to respond to the liberal democratic assump-
tion of the equal moral worth of humans who thereby have equal claim to the 
conditions they need for the freedom to flourish is by listing ‘human rights’. This 
has provided a powerful tool in protecting and promoting the needs of vulner-
able persons, but it is not a useful starting point for theoretical work trying to 
establish why and which States have obligations towards individuals. In reality, 
it is difficult for some people to claim their human rights. First, in complex cases 
it is often difficult to establish the location of the obligation to ensure a human 
right,3 particularly for persons who do not fall neatly into citizen and quasi- 
citizen categories.
 Underlying citizenism is found in literature on rights which uses the words 
‘citizen’ and ‘person’ interchangeably. In addition, the rationale behind obliga-
tions associated with rights are often tied into the construction of the State 
system and what this means for citizens. This risks overlooking special con-
siderations of noncitizenship. Second, the approach of a fixed list of rights, 
while serving an important pragmatic purpose in implementation, can make it 
difficult to respond to the changing and complex nature of human life without 
producing a proliferation of lists to accommodate each nuance that arises. It can 
be difficult to reflect the way in which existing systems of norms themselves 
affect the development of future frameworks. The dynamic capabilities 
approach enables analysis of complex systems and changing social conditions, 
and how they are shaped.
 One group that is often left out from discussions of citizenship, let alone those 
of non- citizenship and noncitizenship, is that composed of children. However, 
the special case of children is discussed with regard to capabilities and consider-
ing capabilities here can help us to explore the particular importance of children 
in discussing noncitizenship. Children are important to consider both because 
they are particularly vulnerable and because it is through children that we can 
2 Ingrid Robeyns (2005) ‘The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey’, pp. 93–117 in Journal 
of Human Development 6(1).
3 As a particularly stark presentation of this, see Onora O’Neill (2005) ‘The Dark Side of Human 
Rights’, pp. 427–439 in International Affairs 81(2).
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most clearly see the temporal and ongoing importance of capabilities and so also 
the capabilities of noncitizens. This is because children’s capabilities today are 
partially for today and partially for the future. We know that educating children 
today will enable them to develop as individuals, as workers and as part of the 
ongoing social and political structures of which they are part, including helping 
to shape them. But children are not the only ones whose capabilities today affect 
their capabilities tomorrow.
 The consideration of children raises an additional question. As mentioned above, 
children are particularly vulnerable to adults and each other. They are also particu-
larly vulnerable to the State. Indeed, most States built on liberal democratic prin-
ciples in fact enforce an additionally restrictive and non- emancipated condition on 
children within society. They are required to receive an education (which usually 
means attending school) for example, but are forbidden from working on an equal 
basis to others in society. There are things that they are not allowed to do and places 
that they are not allowed to go. Children are also prevented from access to some of 
the ways in which citizens are able to participate in deciding how the State’s power 
is allocated. They cannot vote or stand for office, for example.
 Could these additional aspects of a child’s position in society make her/im 
noncitizen- vulnerable? Jacqueline Bhabha, for example, has interrogated this, 
questioning whether children are really able to be citizens in current circum-
stances.4 Children are vulnerable, and they are vulnerable to States. The vulner-
ability of children, when it is activated, is also challenging to the States where 
they live. Indeed, mistreated children are often used as symbolic of errors in 
policy. This has been particularly the case in the discourse around migration.
Why capabilities?
While the capabilities approach is primarily intended to provide a means of com-
parison within and across societies, both Sen and Nussbaum move on from this 
original approach, in different ways and to different extents. For Sen, an under-
standing of capabilities can help to provide a base- standard for measuring human 
development. This is seen for example in the Human Development Index which 
he helped to develop.5 For Nussbaum, capabilities are not only intended to 
measure inequality, but:
4 Jacqueline Bhabha (2003) ‘The Citizenship Deficit: On Being A Citizen Child’, pp. 53–59 in 
Development 46.
5 The Human Development Index is used as a comparative tool to measure the level of development 
between States. In recent years, additional dimensions have been added and indeed distinct new 
indices have been added. To see the most recent iteration of this, see the website of the United Nations 
Development Program: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi (accessed 4 
April 2017). For Sen’s candid statement of his contribution to, and view of, the measure, see Amartya 
Sen (1998) ‘Mahbub ul Haq: The Courage and Creativity of His Ideas’, speech at the memorial 
meeting for Mahbub ul Haq at the Untied Nations, quoted in Selim Jehan (2002) ‘Evolution of the 
Human Development Index’, Handbook of Human Development, Oxford University Press, p. 154.
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… to articulate an account of how capabilities, together with the idea of a 
threshold level of capabilities, can provide a basis for central constitutional 
principles that citizens have the right to demand from their governments.6
Crucially, it also allows the consideration of social interactions. It allows us ‘to 
explore the social institutions that are favourable for human flourishing, as 
against those that impede it’.7 The approach in this chapter is to apply capabil-
ities specifically to the claims of noncitizens.
 This chapter takes the evolution of the approach further, using capabilities to 
frame the analysis of what noncitizens have the right (by justice) to demand from 
States built upon liberal democratic principles and from the State system. Given 
the broad understanding of the activated noncitizen- State relationship, based on 
vulnerability with respect to capabilities and challenge as a result, many of the 
disadvantaged individuals highlighted by Nussbaum and by Sen can in fact be 
seen to be experiencing forms of activated noncitizenship (even in the case of 
persons who are formal citizens). In addition, the practical work to identify 
 capabilities made by both Sen and Nussbaum can provide a useful starting point 
for establishing what is being impeded in the activation of noncitizenship.
 Capabilities are not being used here within a moral theory. Instead, the 
 capabilities approach is used to assess institutional arrangements and considera-
tions of justice. As such, the dynamic noncitizen capabilities approach developed 
here avoids some of the main potential criticisms of other forms of the capability 
approach. In particular, capabilities theorists have been criticised in terms of 
their theories’ ability to motivate the obligations that they identify.8 As it is 
understood here, the obligations arise from the construction of the institutional 
framework itself. The capability approach provides a valuable tool in the context 
of noncitizenship because it can be developed in a non- contractarian way, allow-
ing individual autonomy without the need for consent.9 That is, for example, it 
does not need to rely on some historic or hypothetical contract amongst indi-
viduals or between the individual and the State in order to motivate the obliga-
tions of justice. It is not the only approach that will allow this, but this is an 
important benefit of the capabilities approach.
 It is important because, as argued above, noncitizenship cannot be seen as 
a contractarian or consensual relationship with the relevant State(s) (however 
tacit or abstract). This book does not make any claims about the nature of the 
6 Martha Nussbaum (2000) Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, Cam-
bridge University Press, p. 12.
7 Frances Stewart (2013) ‘Capabilities and Human Development: Beyond the Individual – The Crit-
ical Role of Social Institutions and Social Competencies’, Human Development Report Office 
Occasional Paper 2013/03.
8 For example, see Thomas Pogge (2002) ‘Can the Capability Approach be Justified?’, pp. 167–228 
in Philosophical Topics 30(2); Thomas Pogge (2010) ‘A Critique of the Capability Approach’, 
pp. 17–60 in Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns (eds) (2010) Measuring Justice: Primary 
Goods and Capabilities, Cambridge University Press.
9 For a useful explanation of this, see for example Martha Nussbuam (2006) Frontiers of Justice: 
Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, Harvard University Press, from p. 81.
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 citizen- State relationship and the capability approach developed here is therefore 
narrow. Yet the noncitizen claims put forward here could potentially be incorp-
orated even within a theoretical framework that is otherwise contractarian (i.e. 
one in which the citizen- State relationship is constructed on contractarian lines), 
which arguably will be the family of liberal theory for which incorporation of 
noncitizens will be particularly difficult.
 The flexibility of the capabilities approach also makes it particularly well suited 
to accommodating evolution and change in social contexts, interests and political 
constructions. And it allows individuals to be understood as individual decision- 
makers. More than this, it allows the recognition that policy and institutional struc-
tures feed into the context in which interests and capabilities are defined in the first 
place, contributing to the activation of noncitizenship. It also, then, allows an exam-
ination of how the theory itself can influence the situation at both of these levels and 
can facilitate individuals to contribute positively to that change. Finally, the 
dynamic capabilities approach in the context of noncitizenship also provides an 
institutional explanation as to why States should consider the obligations that the 
approach attributes to them. It is the construction of the State that both motivates 
the content of the theory and generates the obligations.
 The capabilities approach emerged out of two key developments in the second 
half of the twentieth century. First, feminist discourses were being developed 
across politics, economics and society in States built upon liberal democratic 
principles and others.10 They demanded and produced political theorisations that 
could both take account of female agency and address aspects of women’s lives 
that were often omitted from theory, such as traditional caring roles.11
 Second, and related, was the move away from flat economic measures that 
focused on an accumulation of financial wealth, towards a human- centred under-
standing of utility,12 including a more nuanced appreciation of human interest.13 
This was crucial to the creation, in the late 1960s, of the United Nations Devel-
opment Program (UNDP) under the mantra that people are both the means and 
the end of economic development.14 Yet, importantly, the capability approach 
does not, like welfare economics, for example, put emphasis on valuations 
10 Feminist discourses were arising in other States too, though these are not the focus of this book. 
Chapter 11 revisits feminist literature in more detail.
11 For an overview volume that provides a selection of key texts going back quite far in history, but 
is necessarily selective about more recent work, there is Estelle Freedman (2007) Essential Fem-
inist Reader, Random House. Another survey that does not go so far back in time, but provides a 
broader disciplinary study is provided by Alison Jagger (2014) Just Methods: An Interdiscipli-
nary Feminist Reader, Paradigm. For work specifically on care, see for example Carol Gilligan.
12 Consider, for example, Mahbub ul Haq (1976) The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third 
World, Columbia University Press; Amartya Sen (1983) Choice, Welfare, and Measurement, 
Harvard University Press.
13 Amartya Sen (1977) ‘Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic 
Theory’, pp. 317–344 in Philosophy and Public Affairs 6(4).
14 This is put lyrically in the opening to Chapter 3 of Mahbub ul Haq (1995) Reflections on Human 
Development, Oxford University Press. For a critical discussion, see T.N. Srinivasan (1994) 
‘Human Development: A New Paradigm or Reinvention of the Wheel?’, pp. 238–243 in 
American Economic Review 84(2) at p. 239.
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between States of what has been produced or achieved. Instead, it focuses on the 
features of the world and how they put people into a position of capability.15
 Arising within and between these movements, and within the context, for 
example, of the work of John Rawls and Thomas Scanlon, Amartya Sen’s capa-
bility theory calls for multidimensional measures that would be able both to 
speak to women’s experiences of development, and to characterise more accu-
rately the complex nature of how humans want to live out their lives.16 It was felt 
that explicitly and intentionally addressing hidden gender discrimination, for 
example, was needed in order to avoid developing theory that is unthinkingly 
male- oriented.17 As he observes:
… one of the many contributions of feminist economics has been precisely 
to bring out the importance of certain freedoms that were not recognised 
very clearly – or at all – earlier on, for example freedom from the imposi-
tion of fixed and time- honoured family roles, or immunity from implicit 
derogation in social communication …18
We can add to this the many roles that women often play simultaneously (unpaid 
housework and caring, paid labour market work, community organising)19 and 
the effects of their traditional exclusion from consideration (both political and 
economic). Crucially, Sen saw the problems raised by an acknowledgement of 
the needs of women as evidence also of the need for an economic theory that can 
accommodate a changing social structure with consequent changes in how 
people view their own interests. His capability approach was intended to offer a 
nuanced way in which to measure equality or inequality across people within a 
society or societies in terms of their capabilities to function in the ways that are 
important to them.
 Alongside this, and building in important ways upon her work on Ancient 
Greek ethical traditions,20 Martha Nussbaum also developed a capabilities 
15 For a neat presentation of the differences between capabilities and welfarist approaches, see for 
example Robert Sugden (1993) ‘Welfare, Resources, and Capabilities: A Review of Inequality 
Reexamined by Amartya Sen’, pp. 1947–1962 in Journal of Economic Literature XXXI.
16 Amartya Sen (1980) ‘Equality of What?’ in S. McMurrin (ed.) The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values University of Utah Press; Amartya Sen (1992) Inequality Re-examined, Clarendon Press; 
Amartya Sen (1999) Development as Freedom, Knopf Press.
17 For example, set out in Ingrid Robeyns (2008) ‘Sen’s Capability Approach and Feminist Con-
cerns’, pp. 82–104 in Flavio Comim, Mozaffar Qizilbash and Sabina Alkire (eds) (2008) The 
Capability Approach: Concepts, Measures and Applications, Cambridge University Press; Eva 
Feder Kittay (1999) Love’s Labour: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency, Routledge.
18 Amartya Sen (2004) ‘Dialogue: Capabilities, Lists, and Public Reason: Continuing the Conversa-
tion’, pp. 77–80 in Feminist Economics 10(3) (an interview) p. 79.
19 Susan Moller Okin (2003) ‘Poverty, Well-Being, and Gender: What Counts, Who’s Heard?’, 
pp. 280–316 in Philosophy and Public Affairs 31(3), p. 285.
20 To see how Nussbaum herself has presented this, see for example Martha Nussbaum (1992) 
‘Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism’, pp. 202–246 in 
Political Theory 20(2); Martha Nussbaum (1987) Nature, Function and Capability: Aristotle on 
Political Distribution, UNU WIDER Working Paper WP31.
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approach prioritising those things needed for good human life which was able 
to respond to the questions raised by feminism and welfare economics. Her 
approach draws lessons from both Stoic and Aristotelian traditions, character-
ising the Stoic as holding that every human has dignity and is worthy of rever-
ence merely by virtue of being human,21 though adding (with feminist 
ethicists) that humans are also dependent upon each other.22 And she seeks, 
with the stoic, a life with ‘truly human functioning’.23 She also draws upon 
Aristotle’s analysis of the purpose of human dignity and the goods of human 
life and flourishing (eudaimonia). Nussbaum’s capability approach, then, 
incorporates both individual human dignity and extreme dependency.24 It is 
also intended as a comparative measure, in order to assess justice within a 
society and across societies.
 Together, Sen and Nussbaum have developed a normative discourse of 
capabilities. This provides the basis for the efforts in this chapter to under-
stand better the implications of the vulnerability of activated noncitizenship. 
However, while their approaches are intended as mechanisms for assessing 
societies, comparing individuals’ capabilities, the use of capabilities thinking 
in this chapter is different. In line with Sen and Nussbaum, irrespective of 
whether people decide to make use of capabilities, they are valuable. Capabil-
ities are used as a way in which to elaborate the nature of the noncitizen- 
vulnerability – and what is challenging about it. As such, the capabilities 
approach is used here to uncover the obligations of States towards 
noncitizens.
 The conceptualisation of capabilities is useful for this project because it 
provides a way in which to measure the implications of individual- State rela-
tionships in terms of what is good for human life. In this way, using capabil-
ities as a tool does not prejudice the outcome of the project based on what any 
one of us thinks makes life worthwhile. What is important is what each indi-
vidual believes is important. It also allows for a changing social and institu-
tional construction of society. For example, there will be different implications 
for what justice requires from a State in an institutional framework that 
strongly activates noncitizenship than one in which noncitizenship is not 
strongly activated. And indeed, part of the characterisation of justice that is 
developed must also take into account the importance of moving from the 
former to the latter.
21 Martha Nussbaum (2011) Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, Cambridge 
University Press p. 129.
22 In this she draws upon Locke’s comment that the stoic-inspired theorising upon ‘free, equal and 
independent parties’ ignores the fact that humans are dependent on each other. John Locke 
[1690] 2008 s.95–99; quoted in Martha Nussbaum (2003) ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitle-
ments: Sen and Social Justice’, pp. 33–59 in Feminist Economics 9.
23 Nussbaum 2003 ibid. p. 40.
24 Set out particularly in Martha Nussbaum (2003) ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen 
and Social Justice’, pp. 33–59 in Feminist Economics 9 p. 53.
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Introducing noncitizen capabilities
Based upon the analyses in foregoing chapters, there are three main levels of 
capabilities to consider here. To identify them, we need to ask what sort of non-
citizen capabilities must not be impaired at all (Level 1) and which should be 
mitigated (Level 2). Chapter 5 found that another level of capability is being 
infringed in some extreme cases of noncitizenship activation: the capability to 
be, and to be seen to be (Level 0). Table 9.1 gives an example of what the 
content of these levels of capabilities might be. This is a loose list and is inten-
tionally vague. It is certainly not intended to be exhaustive. It builds upon Sen’s 
approach. He intentionally mostly keeps capabilities unspecified. It is also likely 
that there is bleeding between levels in the table, depending upon context, and 
depending upon the individual. This is to be expected. The table also accords 
with other taxonomies. For example, Henry Odera Oruka and Abraham H. 
Maslow, in different contexts, both focus on what a person is able to think about 
or desire. As Odera Oruka puts it, a person who is suffering hunger or thirst will 
be unable to think about other things. And in this way we know that hunger and 
thirst are basic.25 Teodros Kiros takes this further, observing that ‘[t]hose human 
beings who do not have the money with which to buy food are condemned to 
die’. He identifies those things which are more or less necessary for bare life 
first.26 It is problematic to build a hierarchy beyond this extreme.
 The suggestion is that Type One capabilities cannot be acceptably made 
unavailable, while Type Two capabilities could potentially be mitigated. These will 
be discussed in turn, but first let us turn to Type Zero capabilities. Type Zero refers 
to having one’s living existence recognised or recognisable. Chapters 4 and 5
Table 9.1 The three types of noncitizen capabilities
Type Zero Recognition of living 
human existence.
Making life logically possible.
Type One Bare life, including bodily 
and mental integrity.
Healthy: food, water, air, shelter and human-
to-human relationships.
Type Two Day-to-day functioning and 
flourishing.
Creativity, decision-making, thinking and 
rationality, play, relationships with nature, 
aspiration.
25 Henry Odera Oruka (1989) ‘The Philosophy of Foreign Aid: A Question of the Right to a Human 
Minimum’, pp. 465–475 in PRAXIS International 1988(8), p. 53; A.H. Maslow (1989) ‘A Theory 
of Human Motivation’, pp. 20–35 in Harold J. Leavitt, Louis R. Pondy and David M. Bojc 
(1989) Readings in Managerial Psychology 4th Edition, University of Chicago Press [first pub-
lished in 1964]. Personal safety is included in Type One, love and esteem are included in Type 
Two. This also resembles the list given by Martha Nussbaum.
26 Teodros Kiros (1992) Moral Philosophy and Development: The Human Condition in Africa, 
Ohio University Press p. 168.
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presented how some activities of States and State institutional arrangements with 
respect to some noncitizens go further than merely denying bare life or even 
killing. It was found that some institutional arrangements force a person into a situ-
ation of presumed non- existence with respect to that State. I proposed that this 
occurred because of the illogicality in a liberal democratic State construction that 
does not allow for (unhyphenated) noncitizenship. This is troubling for a political 
system built upon liberal democratic thinking, or indeed almost any ideological 
framework. At its most basic, all humans must in fact be recognised to exist as 
humans. We might debate about whether a particular State has obligations towards 
that person, but the fact of a person’s human existence must be recognised for 
liberal thinking even to get off the ground.
 The core premise of the capabilities approach is that how well rights are 
secured cannot be measured only by the specific achievements or functionings 
that people end up with, nor by the tangible resources that they have, though 
these may be important. It is about putting people in a position of capability to 
function in crucial areas, which may be constrained when noncitizenship is acti-
vated. What this means varies from person to person. To take Nussbaum’s 
example (which she takes from Aristotle), Milo the wrestler needs more food 
than other people,27 while a person without the use of her/is legs will need equip-
ment unnecessary for someone else.
 This is precisely not to say that everyone will need the same starting point or 
will arrive at the same end point – indeed, the end points are not what is 
important. The photograph in Figure 9.1 portrays a contemporary Milo of 
Croton. Paralympian Iliesa Delana won high jump gold at the 2012 Paralympic 
Games by clearing 1.74 metres. As this picture shows, he also did this with only 
one leg. The amount of functioning a person can derive from any particular 
resource, then, also differs from person to person. Someone who is unable to 
digest dairy products is unlikely to derive as much benefit from a glass of milk 
as another person. The capabilities approach does not require that this person has 
access to milk, so much as that s/he has access to adequate nutrition, whatever 
that means for her/im. The capability approach as it is understood here also 
requires that people have the means to make use of certain material goods.
 Finally, different people will want to use their capabilities differently. Con-
sider Level 2 capabilities. One person might derive great satisfaction, and even 
aspects of self- identity, from developing a skill like writing poetry. Another 
person might find poetry boring. A third may even want to inhibit her/is indul-
gence in poetry for ideological reasons that are meaningful to her/im and to her/
is self- understanding. This is even the case with capabilities of the first type, 
since a person might choose to go on hunger strike, or to enjoy camping under 
27 This refers to Milo of Croton, an outstanding wrestler of the sixth century who won many awards 
at the Olympic Games. Aristotle makes the reference in the Nicomachean Ethics at 1106b; see 
Roger Crisp (ed.) (2000) Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Cambridge University Press, p. 30. 
Nussbaum also discusses this example, for example, in Martha Nussbaum (1992) Love’s Know-
ledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature, Oxford University Press.
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the stars in freezing temperatures. The key in the context of noncitizenship is 
that it is not the State institutions that write such individuals out of the possib-
ility of enjoying the use of these capabilities. The capabilities approach allows 
for ‘competing conceptions’ of what is important, while still providing an overall 
idea of what these could include.28
 In examining how to use his approach to measure capability, Sen considers 
this comparison:
[a] person’s advantage in terms of opportunities is judged to be lower than 
that of another if she has less capability – less real opportunity – to achieve 
those things that she has reason to value.29
The aim then of the capabilities approach from this perspective is not to create a 
‘canonical list of rights’, but to provide means for comparisons between people 
in terms of their access to rights.30 As one way to think this through, Nussbaum 
28 I take the phrase ‘competing conceptions’ from Rosalind Hursthouse in her defines of virtue 
ethics’ ability to allow for ‘competing conceptions of eudaimonia’, or happiness/flourishing. See 
Rosalind Hursthouse (1991) ‘Virtue Theory and Abortion’, pp. 223–246 in Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 20(3), p. 228 n. 4.
29 Amartya Sen (2009) The Idea of Justice, Allen Lane p. 231.
30 Amartya Sen (2005) ‘Human Rights and Capabilities’ pp. 151–166 in Journal of Human 
Development 6(2) p. 157.
Figure 9.1  Fijian high-jumper Iliesa Delana wins gold in the 2012 Paralympic Games 
(Matt Dunham, Associated Press, 2012).
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lists capabilities that are intended to be both separate and connected.31 To ensure 
that the flexibility allowed by this essentially comparative function of the cap-
abilities is retained in the different application of it here, two elements are 
involved. First, there is the comparative element to a certain, though lesser, 
extent. Second, there is the explicit use (developed in the following section) of 
dynamism.
 Sen also argues against the notion that there may be a fixed hierarchy of 
capabilities. That is, for him, it does not make sense to say that a little more 
food is always more important than a little more shelter, since this would 
assume that the needs of someone who starves in a warm house and those of 
someone who eats well but suffers the elements can be appraised in the same 
way.32 What is key to the approach presented in this chapter is that a collection 
of capabilities are needed, in interconnecting ways, to enable a person to flour-
ish. And where noncitizenship is activated, it is the State and the system of 
States that puts that noncitizen in the relevant situation of vulnerability, and 
this is challenging to a State built on liberal democratic norms.
 In situations of activated noncitizenship, capabilities become inaccessible 
or at risk of being inaccessible. This then challenges the liberalness of the 
State and the justifiability of both the State and the system of States along 
liberal lines. This approach does not require that the capabilities way of under-
standing is ‘universal’ but only that this impediment to capabilities causes 
problems for liberalism broadly understood and can frame what is needed to 
address the challenge. As such, the capabilities approach to noncitizenship 
could easily be incorporated into a wide variety of existing theoretical 
approaches.
 Broadly, when a noncitizen’s ability to develop in one or more of these 
dimensions is being impaired by a State, her/is noncitizenship is activated. 
The most obvious way in which this occurs is when the basic conditions for 
life are made difficult to access and this is clearest again when it takes place 
within a State. In such cases, the obligations are also quite clear: there is an 
obligation to ensure that such basic conditions are not made difficult to access, 
and also that the individual’s capabilities are not impaired by the existence of 
the State and the State system (or the way in which it is operating).
 When we consider the other capabilities, a difficulty emerges, and it is a 
difficulty that is not special to the noncitizen approach. This is the problem of 
how extensive the capability obligations should be and how they should 
operate (including the imperative to avoid infringing on autonomy). In order 
to understand this, it will be necessary to triangulate between the current 
31 Versions of this list are found for example, at Martha Nussbaum (2000) Women and Human 
Development: The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge University Press pp. 78–80; Martha 
Nussbaum (2003) ‘Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice’, pp. 40–42; 
Martha Nussbaum (2011) Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, Harvard 
University Press pp. 33–35.
32 Sen 2004 ibid. p. 78.
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reality of States, the State system, the relationship of citizenship, and the rela-
tionship of noncitizenship, as well as the various sets of interests involved – 
and to do this on a case- by-case basis. This will be no small task.
Introducing dynamism
The capabilities approach was also developed to allow for an evolving understand-
ing of human interests and needs based on public reasoning and discussion. Sen 
writes that he ‘must stand up against a grand mausoleum to one fixed and final list 
of capabilities’.33 And the dynamic capabilities approach presented here also aims 
to avoid this, as well as taking the dynamism a step further. This section presents 
my ‘dynamic capabilities’ approach, showing how it builds upon the presentation 
of capabilities given above, and how it draws upon insights from another body of 
work addressing something known with the same name, found within the Strategic 
Management Studies literature34 – and how it relates both to the dynamism in the 
theory and to the empowerment of both States and noncitizens to affect it.
 The first step of a capabilities approach is the emergency provision of access 
to capability- functioning right now. This is directed at alleviating the immediate 
problems associated with activated noncitizenship, but it will not provide a 
long- term resolution. Into the longer term there is the need for a society in 
which this sort of emergency direct response is not necessary. Part of how to 
understand the State’s obligations towards noncitizens, then, is that it must also 
facilitate a society in which the dignity and individuality of persons in a noncit-
izen relationship with the State are respected, and noncitizenship is not acti-
vated. Or at least, it is not activated in the ways it is activated today. This will 
need to counter the common contemporary approach in States ostensibly built 
upon liberal democratic principles, of developing a society in which noncitizens 
are constructed increasingly as hyphenated non- citizens, as other, as outside the 
sphere of liberal concern.
 As we have seen, justice in the context of capabilities and noncitizenship 
cannot be satisfied by a one- off creation of any set of rules, even assuming their 
perfect enforcement. It is a constantly evolving conception of how society(ies) 
can function, including what capabilities they can realistically provide, with the 
changing notion of noncitizenship as a crucial aspect of this – and it will need to 
include recognising noncitizens as the active agents of societal change that they 
33 Amartya Sen (2004) ‘Dialogue: Capabilities, Lists, and Public Reason: Continuing the Conversa-
tion’, pp. 77–80 in Feminist Economics 10(3) (an interview) p. 80.
34 For example, see David Teece and Gary Pisano (1994) ‘The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms: an 
Introduction’, pp. 537–556 in Industrial and Corporate Change 3(3); Birger Wernerfelt (1984) 
‘A Resource-Based View of the Firm’, pp. 171–180 in Strategic Management Journal 5(2); 
Véronique Ambrosini, Cliff Bowman and Nardine Collier (2009) ‘Dynamic Capabilities: An 
Exploration of How Firms Renew Their Resource Base’, British Journal of Management 20; 
David Teece (2009) Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management: Organizing for Innova-
tion and Growth, Oxford University Press.
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are and could be. Moreover, it involves an ongoing feedback from reality into 
theory. For example, to express this in terms of Judith Lichtenberg’s notion of 
‘situationalism’, people are affected in their actions by small changes in their 
environment.35 Lichtenberg notes that the way people act is affected by how 
other people act, and that the way people feel about what they need for well- 
being is affected by how the others around them are faring.36 For example, the 
conditions that people feel that they need in order to flourish may change, includ-
ing how this does or does not involve others. Part of this will require recognition 
of the relevance of ‘banal’ acts (as presented in Chapter 5) and facilitating a 
responsive social structure.
 This is particularly important if we are to take solidarity seriously. In a frag-
mented society, some individuals may consider their flourishing to be impaired by 
the need to share space or community with members of some group (whether 
defined by gender, sexuality, ethnicity, race, nationality or other characteristic). 
Given the importance that this exclusion may play in the capabilities of those indi-
viduals to flourish, it should not be ignored or simply demonised within liberal 
thinking. However, such a position does cause problems for a liberal society, as it 
will put barriers in the way of ensuring that people are able to flourish simultan-
eously. That is, if my ability to flourish requires that you do not flourish then we are 
stuck with a zero- sum game. We need to acknowledge that I currently feel this way, 
but not that this is the way things have to be. We also need to examine the institu-
tional structures (of internal injustice and banal dehumanisation, for example) that 
can seem to pit some individuals against others – and look for ways to address them.
 This means that the role played by the institutional structure in facilitating the 
construction of a society in which individuals can live together must be recog-
nised, and part of the obligation of the State must be to facilitate solidarity. This 
is because of its importance in making a liberal democratic State society feas-
ible. This is particularly relevant to the situation for those in a noncitizen rela-
tionship with States today, since the constructed dehumanisation of some 
persons as hyphenated non- citizens and their exclusion from societies and from 
justice- thinking can make it difficult to conceive of ways in which to acknow-
ledge the claims of both noncitizens and citizens. Recognising this problem and 
the role of institutions in addressing it is part of the second framing of capabil-
ities justice. While justice- thinking as presented here must start from where we 
find ourselves now, it must be dynamic – recognising the possibility of changing 
the basic conditions, how they are understood, and how they are shaped. This 
35 Judith Lichtenberg (2014) Distant Strangers: Ethics, Psychology, and Global Poverty, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 122. Note also, in a different way, these economists’ study of 
how identity affects how we feel about our interests: George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton 
(2010) Identity Economics: How our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages and Well Being, Prince-
ton University Press.
36 ‘The relativity of well-being’, see Lichtenberg 2014 ibid., p. 124. A different dimension of this is 
discussed, for example, in Kate Pickett and Richard Wilkinson (2010) The Spirit Level: Why 
Equality is Better for Everyone, Penguin Books.
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might involve, for example, promoting internal justice within societies and 
avoiding demonising certain individuals. It will also require acknowledging the 
role of noncitizens in affecting society and institutional structures – and examin-
ing how to facilitate this to happen.
 The extent to which people feel well disposed to helping others, including 
specific others, may well alter over time and according to policy. What people 
consider to be just is also diverse and changes over time; a process which can be 
actively influenced. This potential to influence how society functions must be a 
core part of how we understand State obligations in this area. This is because, 
apart from other things, it is important for enabling noncitizen capabilities to be 
part of the State’s justification for its power. More crucially, it is important for 
enabling a State built upon liberal democratic principles and a system of States 
influenced by those principles, to fulfil currently apparently conflicting obliga-
tions simultaneously. Persons value different modes of (societal and individual) 
functioning at different times. To characterise how individuals understand their 
own capabilities, then, it is necessary to be able to take into account this evolv-
ing nature of human functioning, as well as the complex ways in which people 
view their own interests and affect the perceptions of others. It must also 
acknowledge that institutions can, and do, manipulate these changing prefer-
ences whether they intend to do so or not. Indeed, some decisions must be made 
which will affect how people view their capabilities and those of others.
 There are three ways to see this (and all three can be useful):
1 Dynamism in the capabilities
2 Dynamism in the theory of those capabilities, and
3 Relationship between the two.37
That is, it is necessary to allow, first, for flexibility and change in how individuals 
understand their capabilities and, second, for how this flexibility and change fit 
within a theory of capabilities, including a social understanding of value. There also 
needs to be flexibility in a third dimension: in terms of how the justice of capabil-
ities operates this will be addressed shortly. The Strategic Management Studies 
literature in this area shows particularly well that there is a difference between a 
passively changing system to which a dynamic capabilities approach must respond 
and a theory in which the dynamic capabilities themselves are understood actively 
to alter the environment within which they operate.
 In this chapter, the emphasis is upon a dynamism that is active rather than 
responsive. This acknowledges the crucial role of current actions and characterisa-
tions of capability, as well as enactment of capability, in shaping the reality to 
37 This idea arose from reading the work on dynamic capabilities within strategic management 
studies, in particular that of David Teece and Gary Pisano: David Teece (2009) Dynamic 
Capabilities & Strategic Management: Organizing for Innovation and Growth (2011 edition), 
Oxford University Press, p. 4; David Teece and Gary Pisano (1994) ‘Dynamic Capabilities of 
Firms: an Introduction’, pp. 537–556 in Industrial and Corporate Change 3(3).
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which future instantiations of the theory must respond. This includes both the insti-
tutional shaping of society and a recognition of the claims made by citizens and 
noncitizens alike – and recognition of their own roles in shaping that society. In 
Development as Freedom, Sen argues that ‘[i]ndividual freedom is quintessentially 
a social product’.38 He argues that social arrangements enhance individual freedoms 
and that, in turn, individual freedoms can help improve social conditions.
 In this way, today’s understanding of justice, and of noncitizen capabilities 
within that, will help to create the context within which justice, and noncitizen 
capabilities within that, is understood tomorrow. It also presents as part of the 
dynamic capability framework a requirement to shape the environment within 
which capabilities are experienced, and to which theories must go on to respond, 
and to facilitate others to shape it. This is particularly important when it comes 
to noncitizenship since noncitizens cannot be understood within contractarian or 
consensual interpretations of individual- State relationships, and insofar as they 
are noncitizens, they may be unable to use traditionally understood democratic 
means to affect societal and institutional change.
 Cultural and political norms can be altered – including through policy deci-
sions. Chapter 5’s presentation of banal dehumanisation presented Michael 
Billig’s description of how a State uses its powers to alter action and prefer-
ences, through ‘banal nationalism’. While many in stable societies may seem to 
take their nationality for granted, Billig argues that this only works because of an 
unnoticed constant recreation of the nation. He argues that the nationalism that 
erupts in times of crisis does not come from nowhere, but draws upon something 
that is quietly nurtured daily in a mundane, ‘banal’ way,39 fixing appropriate 
behaviours and social categories. Processes like this are central to this second 
dynamic stage of justice in the context addressed here, and so to the activation – 
or not – of noncitizenship. Crucially, a State shapes how noncitizenship is under-
stood no matter what. Even if this is by totally ignoring noncitizenship, that State 
thereby constructs how it will be understood and experienced. And there is a 
further dimension to this. For liberal theory to work, a noncitizen also needs to 
be empowered with regard to that construction.
 In the construction and reconstruction of State society, some form of norm- 
shaping is inevitable as decisions are taken for how that State society is to be 
governed, for example, and how democracy and redistribution is to be organised. 
So, since these social norm- shaping processes are in fact taking place in some 
form, irrespective of explicit intention, it could be argued that there is an obliga-
tion for a State that wants to identify as liberal democratic to direct them towards 
ensuring informal capability- rights-promotion including for those relating to a 
State as noncitizens. While this may seem like brainwashing, if this construction 
is going to happen one way or another anyway, then for a State to be liberal 
democratic, it needs to make sure that the form in which the society is 
38 Amartya Sen (1999) Development As Freedom, p. 31.
39 Michael Billig (1995) Banal Nationalism, Sage Publications [2002 printing] p. 5.
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 constructed will allow liberal institutions to function. As a result, it becomes 
necessary for a State based upon liberal democratic norms not only to avoid 
banal dehumanisation but also to engage in some sort of banal humanisation 
process to help to address the challenges posed by today’s activation of nonciti-
zenship – and to help to develop a society conducive to capability- functioning 
generally that will allow all participants to be part of shaping it.
 This is important. Several of the reasons given for not securing basic capabil-
ities for various categories of persons experiencing activated noncitizenship both 
within the territory of a State and beyond are sociological. They relate to the 
maintenance of a coherent society or national culture, or to the idea that simil-
arity is needed in order to motivate collective giving and welfare.40 It seems from 
the literature (of which that referred to here is but an extremely small sample) 
that these factors are not fixed, but cultivated, maintained or disassembled by 
policy decisions. The dynamic capabilities approach advocated here, then, is not 
only for the enforcement of human rights (understood through capabilities) as 
such, but for the development of a context in which individuals have assumed 
access to capabilities. This could include one in which the claim to noncitizen 
capability rights does not need to be made because the noncitizenship has not 
been activated. So long as noncitizenship is activated, a State built upon liberal 
democratic principles has a self- constructed obligation to address the vulner-
ability and challenge to which it gives rise through reinstating capabilities to 
function. This is as true for noncitizenship activated far away as it is for 
noncitizen ship activated within a State’s borders, even amongst its formal citizens.
 While much discourse can be directed at urgent rights- enforcement, it is 
worth also exploring how to develop a context in which noncitizenship would 
not be activated in the way it currently is. This would contribute to the develop-
ment of a society (at both State and international levels) with better future con-
ditions for justice in relation to noncitizenship. But it would need the collected 
informal contribution of all those participating in it. It is a mistake, as Waldron 
for example has pointed out, to take ‘the beliefs and preferences of individuals 
as given’, as this risks ‘ignoring the fact that forms of society may determine 
forms of consciousness and the structure and content of preferences’.41 We can 
avoid this by seeing society as fundamentally changing, acknowledging that it is 
possible to affect this positively.
 This means that one’s own perception of what one can do and be can change 
according to time, society and policy, amongst other things, and that one can 
40 Yael Tamir (1995) Liberal Nationalism, Princeton University Press; David Miller (2006) 
‘Nationalism’, pp. 529–545 in John Dryzek and Bonnie Honig (eds) (2006) The Oxford Hand-
book of Political Theory, Oxford University Press; see also education in Kok-Chor Tan (2005) 
Justice Without Borders, Cambridge University Press, at p. 54 and Gillian Brock (2002) ‘Liberal 
Nationalism versus Cosmopolitanism: Locating the Disputes’, pp. 307–327 in Public Affairs 
Quarterly 16(4) at p. 308, for example.
41 Jeremy Waldron (1993) Liberal Rights; Collected Papers 1981–1991, Cambridge University 
Press p. 41.
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even play a part in shaping it. Gillian Brock writes: ‘all nations are “works- in-
progress”, and their characters change.’42 By this, she means that new indi-
viduals, with new ideas and customs do not ‘harm’ or ‘dilute’ culture, but 
participate in its inevitable evolution. This notion of ‘works- in-progress’ can be 
usefully adapted to talk about the fundamental notion of the evolution of social 
rules and norms in terms of rights- satisfaction (qua capabilities).
 A State based upon liberal democratic norms has an obligation, then, and an 
interest, in constructing and reconstructing itself to reduce the noncitizen chal-
lenge through a reduction of noncitizen- vulnerability (and so of the activation of 
noncitizenship). This includes the shaping of norms. Achieving this will require 
not only securing the capabilities of noncitizens, but also the development of a 
State society and an international society in which those capabilities can be 
operationalised (i.e. such that it is recognised not to be a zero- sum game) and 
indeed are operationalised. This book begins from the world as it is today 
because this is where we are now, not because the world today is magically dif-
ferent from at any other time.43 The dynamic capabilities approach to noncitizen-
ism acknowledges the need to generate a more just set of institutions if we start 
from where we are now.
A special relationship
The capabilities of noncitizens as presented here are not only general moral rights. 
They are particular and they are institutional, arising within and because of the 
liberal State system. Moreover, failure to address the capabilities of noncitizens, 
including their dynamic capabilities, risks significant challenges to a liberal State, 
theoretically, practically and existentially. The dynamic capabilities approach also 
allocates correlative duties to States for the rights of specific noncitizens addressing 
the concern of those like Onora O’Neill that, in order for rights to make sense, they 
need duty- holders or, to use her language, that ‘a right that nobody is required to 
respect is simply not a right’.44 The conception of noncitizen rights developed in 
this book is also translatable amongst theoretical and contextual traditions. As such, 
it could be incorporated into a citizenist approach, and one which currently requires 
that people consent to the State and frame State duties around the conditions of that 
consent (whether hypothetical or not). Susan Moller Okin criticises some of the 
work of the theorists discussed in this chapter for not genuinely making space for 
42 Brock 2009 ibid. p. 197.
43 Hillel Steiner introduces the phrase, ‘magic dates’ to denote a phenomenon, for example, in terms 
of property-ownership, and group-membership, where, until some magic date, it was possible to 
join, or take ownership, but after some magic date, the relation is fixed; Steiner 1994 ibid., 
p. 264.
44 This wording comes from Onora O’Neill’s writing in the context of bioethics, though it is a 
theme throughout her work. This particular quotation comes from: Onora O’Neill (2002) Auto-
nomy and Trust in Bioethics, Cambridge University Press, p. 78.
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the ‘silent voices’.45 For Okin, in the cases she is discussing, those silent voices are 
the voices of women in so-called ‘developing’ countries. The dynamic capabilities 
approach addresses this directly, showing why this silencing is problematic and 
suggesting both how to address it and the potential implications of doing so.
 While noncitizens are often silenced, they are also often far from silent. At 
the time of writing, the clearest way in which noncitizenship is becoming diffi-
cult to ignore for liberal States is through migration, making the noncitizen chal-
lenge real for liberal democratic States that have often tried to ignore it.46 This 
has been driving a rethinking of migration governance frameworks.47 It does not 
remove the problem of silence, but it shows that many of those who might seem 
silent are in fact shouting loudly. As will be shown, particularly in Chapter 11, 
the dynamic capability approach provides a way in which to frame this and the 
implications of the associated struggles. It also provides a means by which to 
look for voices that are currently made inaudible, and politicalities that are other-
wise submerged within the liberal democratic State system.
 The current reality of activated, unacknowledged, noncitizenship causes sub-
stantial problems for a State that wants to see itself as justified according to 
liberal democratic principles (broadly defined). This is in terms of the vulner-
ability of individuals to States and the State system and the challenge that this 
poses. If the liberal democratic State model is to be salvageable it needs to find a 
way to address this situation. One way in which to construct a solution is through 
the notion of dynamic capabilities. Sen develops his capabilities approach partly 
out of a need to address problems raised by feminist economics, but acknow-
ledges that this can also pave the way for other changes based on ‘progress of 
social understanding’ and ‘the productive role of public discussion, social agita-
tion, and open debates’.48 A noncitizenist critique of existing systems provides 
just such an opportunity.
45 Susan Moller Okin (2003) ‘Poverty, Well-Being, and Gender: What Counts, Who’s Heard?’, 
pp. 280–316 in Philosophy and Public Affairs 31(2), p. 301.
46 And indeed, the economic and other costs to the States of maintaining this ignorance has been 
considerable.
47 This is developed in Chapter 11.
48 Amartya Sen (2004) ‘Dialogue: Capabilities, Lists, and Public Reason: Continuing the Conversa-
tion’, pp. 77–80 in Feminist Economics 10(3) (an interview), p. 80.
10 Learning from feminism
Feminism refers to a body of approaches that assert that women should be 
valued, and their needs and interests addressed, on an equal basis to men – and 
that this is not yet the case.1 This includes the proposition that a woman can 
hold a political relationship with a State that is not mediated by a man. Some 
feminist approaches focus more directly on social aspects of female experi-
ence, others on person- to-person implications, but the interest here is particu-
larly in the institutional relationships between individuals and States, with a 
focus on what this means in a liberal democratic context. Arising in response 
to sexism in a related way to that in which noncitizenism arises in response to 
citizenism or statusism, feminism is examined in this chapter as a meth-
odological tool from which noncitizenism can learn. That is, this chapter 
analyses feminist critiques of liberalism, and in turn critiques of those 
critiques, in order to develop methodological insights for the development of 
noncitizenism.
 Appropriately, terminology in this area is controversial. This chapter adopts 
the following conventions:2 ‘sex’, ‘physical maleness’ and ‘physical female-
ness’ are used here to refer narrowly to a person’s physical sex, including 
her/his organs and hormonal organisation. It is acknowledged that one person 
can be both physically female and physically male, or can transition between 
them. The words ‘gender’, ‘womanhood’ and ‘femaleness’ are used here to 
refer to much broader social and institutional constructions, including role 
allocation, for example.3
1 Some writers on feminism use the plural, ‘feminisms’. I agree that there is no singular feminist 
position. However, as I have adopted the singular ‘liberalism’ while acknowledging the diversity 
of liberalisms I will also adopt the singular ‘feminism’ to refer to the broad spectrum of positions 
that can be described in some form as feminist.
2 The terminology adopted broadly follows common usage found in contemporary feminist theory. 
It is set out, e.g. in Ann Oakley (2015) Sex, Gender and Society Revised Edition, Ashgate [first 
published 1972], at Chapter 6.
3 For example, Pierre Bourdieu (2001) Masculine Domination, Polity Press. See also Oyeronke 
Oyewami (1997) The Invention of Women: Making An African Sense of Western Gender Dis-
courses, The University of Minnesota Press.
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Why learn from feminism?
It might seem arbitrary to draw upon feminism here rather than on movements 
responding to institutional and legalised racism, for example. There are obvious 
connections between (hyphenated) non- citizenship and racism today and the 
intersections of this with class and other factors. The focus here is on feminism 
because of the necessary structural challenges that it shares with noncitizenism. 
That is, it is theoretically inconsistent for a liberal State to lack a conception of 
noncitizenship. And it is currently physically inconsistent for it to lack a concep-
tion of physical femaleness (the question of whether baby- making machines 
might make recognition of sex unnecessary some time in the future is a topic for 
another book). In both cases, these inconsistencies risk translation into injustices 
when these relations are ignored or denied.
 Race and class are not necessary in this way. It is theoretically and physically 
possible for there to be a just society without notions of race and class.4 In 
 developing a system of justice today it is crucial to acknowledge directly, and to 
address, the many- faceted institutionalised realities of race and class. They are cur-
rently pervasive and ignoring or denying these distinctions within contemporary 
societies risks injustice. Yet this is only contingently the case. For this reason, the 
very real structural implications of aspects like race, class and gender – understood 
beyond physical sex – need to be deconstructed as part of developing a dynamic 
route towards a just State society.5 It is possible to imagine and maybe even work 
towards a context in which these distinctions are not made. Not so for 
noncitizenship.
 There is also an important difference between noncitizenship and all these 
other relations. Absent these efforts at recognition, class, race, gender and other 
arbitrary distinctions will continue to be intersecting routes through which 
 noncitizenship is activated, including amongst those who are formal citizens. It 
is important also to consider age here – both old age and young age – in terms of 
its implications for the activation of noncitizenship. In the history of liberal 
democratic theory, all of these factors have been part of writing people out of 
access to citizenship or consideration within the liberal nexus, and to discrimi-
nating also amongst formal citizens, from the outset.6
 Feminism is examined here, then, because of its similarity in form in some 
ways with noncitizenism and the lessons which it can therefore teach (including 
through its mistakes) to nascent noncitizenism.
4 The unnecessary nature of race is presented, for example, in Kwame Antony Appiah (1992) In My 
Father’s House. Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, Oxford University Press, from p. 28. That 
race is unnecessary, but currently very important to address, see for example Tendayi Marovah 
(2015) ‘Using the Capability Approach to Conceptualise African Identity(ies)’ pp. 42–57 in 
Phronimon 16(2).
5 Consider the institutional measures suggested by: Angela Davis (1998) ‘Prosecution and Race: 
The Power and Privilege of Discretion’, Fordham Law Review 13; other aspects for consideration 
are physical ability, settledness, age, for example.
6 This is presented in Chapters 3 and 9.
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 Some have tried to examine feminism as parallel to other -isms and this has not 
generally been successful. This is not the project here. Catharine MacKinnon for 
example explains how she had hoped to analyse feminism as a parallel to Marxism, 
such that feminism relates to gender as Marxism relates to class.7 She explains that 
she found that this parallel was too simplistic. Geraldine Heng, meanwhile, 
presents how nationalisms that construct women as the perpetuators of a nation 
may not dialogue well with feminist movements that have developed alongside 
them (or even within them) as part of the same anti- colonial struggles.8
 Attempts to model feminism as parallel to struggles against racism may be 
unable to take into account intersectional realities.9 Where feminism is seen as 
parallel to the struggle against racism, the compounded struggle of people 
experiencing exclusion in both dimensions at the same time becomes difficult to 
analyse. A Black woman in the UK may well not only experience discrimination 
on the basis of being a woman and discrimination on the basis of being a Black 
person. She may well also experience additional discrimination on the basis of 
being a Black woman and this is difficult to analyse if feminism and the struggle 
against racism are seen as parallel. This chapter is instead using a study of fem-
inism to inform the development of noncitizenism.10
 The necessity in feminism and in noncitizenism are also of different sorts. 
Noncitizenship as presented here is a foundational relationship of a State built 
upon liberal democratic principles. It is as foundational as citizenship, but also 
meaningless in the absence of those liberal democratic institutions that created 
it. The necessity of physical femaleness is of a different sort. A just State must 
include a recognition of the core physical realities of maleness and femaleness 
including pregnancy and childbirth. This is not to suggest anything necessary 
about gender beyond that. And it is not to assume that maleness and female-
ness are mutually exclusive or all- encompassing or to suppose them 
uncontested.11
 7 Catharine MacKinnon (1989) Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, Harvard University Press.
 8 Her focus is Singapore and Malaysia. Geraldine Heng (1997) ‘ “A Great Way to Fly”: Nation-
alism, the State, and the Varieties of Third-World Feminism’, pp. 30–45 in M. Jacqui Alexander 
and Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1997) Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic 
Futures, Routledge. She also shows how the notion that feminism is ‘Western’ can be used 
against it by anti-colonial nationalist movements at p. 33.
 9 bell hooks (1983) Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism, Pluto Press.
10 This is not novel. Others have used the study of feminism to frame a discussion of other move-
ments. For example, Charles Mills looks at the feminist approach to patriarchal liberalism to 
enrich his study of a racially organised liberal structure. Charles Mills (2015) ‘Race and Global 
Justice’, pp. 181–205 in Barbara Buckinx Jonathan Trejo-Mathys and Timothy Waligore (eds) 
(2015) Dominated Global Political Justice: Conceptual, Historical, and Institutional Perspec-
tives, Routledge.
11 Indeed, in 1949, Simone de Beauvoir famously wrote ‘One is not born, but rather becomes, a 
woman’, in Simone de Beauvoir (1972) The Second Sex, Penguin [translated by H.M. Parshley]. 
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein (1988) Deceptive Distinctions: Sex, Gender and the Social Order, Yale 
University Press, provides a careful analysis of structural and cultural contexts that produce 
differences of gender sometimes thought to be scientifically based.
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 Much feminist work has argued that, while narrowly defined physical sex 
may be pre- institutional, gender roles are created by institutions and by society.12 
The rejection of binarity in this book was inspired by the work carried out in 
gender discourses that reject the traditional binary approach to gender identity 
and to gender roles.13 The argument here is only that, as femaleness is minimally 
physically necessary, so noncitizenship is theoretically necessary in a liberal 
democratic State. Though they are necessary in very different ways and have 
very different implications for liberal State self- understanding, in both cases the 
necessity of two types of relation often leads to an assumption of binarity 
between these two categories of relationship, with one side normative and the 
other side represented as a lack.
 Noncitizenism must navigate a path between a theoretical fact – that there is 
noncitizenship and there is citizenship – and the misappropriation of this as a 
binary in dominant interpretations of liberalism. That is, on the one hand there is 
the failure to recognise obligations that arise in the noncitizen relationship. On 
the other hand, there is the attribution to (unacknowledged) noncitizenship of 
arbitrary dimensions that do not derive from the theoretical necessity. Central to 
this is the non- recognition of (unhyphenated) noncitizenship and the construc-
tion of anything other than citizenship as an absence. This results in the assump-
tion that some people are seen as appropriately citizens or quasi- citizens and that 
others have no political reality at all.14
 Kum- Kum Bhavnani and Margaret Coulson raise a related concern – and 
identify a trap to be avoided. They argue that the broader sociological reality of 
gender, because it appears to be based on the physical reality of sex, can itself seem 
necessary. They argue that ‘[t]he problem with the concept of gender is that it is 
rooted in an apparently simple and “real” material base of biological difference 
between women and men’.15 However, they argue that this misses the complex 
experiences of gender that arise from the realities of social constructions of power. 
This relates closely to the worry presented here in the case of noncitizenship.
 In this chapter, as throughout the book, the emphasis is upon implications for 
liberal democratic thinking. As such, focus is upon the role of feminism within 
liberal democratic thought and other feminist thinking where relevant. The 
increasing inclusion of feminist considerations in liberal political theory and 
wider political and legal discourse has led to enriched theory. This is found 
12 Catherine MacKinnon examines the relationship between the State’s institutional power and the 
social and legal construction of ‘woman’; Catherine MacKinnon (1991) Towards a Feminist 
Theory of the State, Harvard University Press; Suzanne J. Kessler and Wendy McKenna (1978) 
Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach, University of Chicago Press.
13 Judith Butler (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, Routledge; Judith 
Lobber (2007) ‘Beyond the Binaries: Depolarising the Categories of Sex, Sexuality, and Gender’, 
pp. 143–159 in Sociological Inquiry 66(2).
14 This echoes the pre-fathers of modern liberalism, Aristotle and Plato.
15 Kum-Kum Bhavnani and Margaret Coulson (1986) ‘Transforming Socialist-Feminism: The 
Challenge of Racism’, pp. 81–92 in Feminist Review 23, at p. 84.
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amongst those working in feminist thought directly and those who, though influ-
enced by the new ways of thinking that feminist considerations have necessi-
tated, might not see themselves as feminist political theorists.
 As a result of a mainstreaming of feminism, the culture of political theory 
today, and the policy frameworks it proposes and critiques, are truer to the way 
societies function. They are better able to take into account more complex and 
nuanced social considerations (such as the family, childhood, periodic sickness 
and caring roles) that affect everyone in society, not only those identified as 
women. Such considerations were not adequately addressed until feminist 
analyses were applied to States’ institutional structures – and did so, to coin a 
phrase, ‘from the ground up’.16
The household writ large
In the 1980s and 1990s, feminist liberal political theorists identified substantial 
problems with liberal political theory which, without argument, assumed the 
household to be the fundamental unit of human political organisation, thereby 
ignoring relationships within the household. John Rawls himself, in a passage 
published posthumously by Martha Nussbaum, can be observed to have 
remarked on the lack of work in this area:
Except for the great John Stuart Mill,17 one serious fault of writers in the liberal 
line is that until recently none have discussed in any detail the urgent questions 
of the justice of the family, the equal justice of women and how these things 
are to be achieved. Susan Okin’s contentions about this in Justice, Gender and 
the Family cannot be denied.18 Liberal writers who are men should, with what-
ever grace they can muster, plead solo contender to her complaints.19
Some feminist theorists have argued that theories which have assumed the 
household as the core unit of society have been unable to take into account the 
different roles of individuals within a household and in particular the implica-
tions of this for females (with the physical sex and the gender categories con-
flated) more generally.
 Perhaps the most famous part of Rawls’s work is his thought experiment of 
the ‘veil of ignorance’. In A Theory of Justice, published 20 years before he 
wrote the above comments, he asks his reader to imagine that everyone in 
society withdraws behind a veil. In that hypothetical space, they are ignorant of 
16 For example, Mills 2015 ibid. p. 193.
17 For example, see John Stuart Mill (1869) The Subjection of Women, D. Appleton and Company 
(note that the full text of this essay is currently available through Google Books).
18 Susan Moller Okin (1989) Justice, Gender and the Family, Basic Books.
19 Reproduced and discussed in Martha Nussbaum (2003) ‘Rawls and Feminism’, pp. 488–520 in 
Samuel Richard Freeman (ed.) (2003) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, taken from an unpublished manuscript, 1994.
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their positions in society. Behind this so- called ‘veil of ignorance’, Rawls asks 
us to imagine that people must decide upon principles of justice to which they 
could agree no matter their eventual social position. This thought experiment is 
central to Rawls’s work and motivates his conception of justice. However, Susan 
Moller Okin points out that for Rawls it is not all people that withdraw behind 
the veil, but all people, represented by heads of households.20 This means that 
the organisation of society is not to be examined from the perspective of indi-
viduals, but households and, in particular, from the perspective of heads of 
households (however this is to be understood). This is not unique to Rawls.
 In addition, while people are required to ignore arbitrary characteristics, sex 
is not explicitly given as one of the arbitrary attributes that people behind the 
veil are required to ignore. Rawls writes:
Amongst the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his 
place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know 
his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, 
strength and the like. We shall even assume that the parties do not know 
their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities.21
This makes it difficult, using this thought experiment alone, to interrogate the 
household. And it makes it difficult to examine the relevance of physical sex and 
gender to justice in society more generally. Theorist Anne Phillips concludes that, 
‘sex- blindness is compounded when Rawls simply assumes that the family is 
just’.22 If this is so, it is not enough simply to re- include sex as an arbitrary charac-
teristic post hoc or to open out the household in isolation. That said, in A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls does list ‘the monogamous family’ amongst the ‘major social insti-
tutions’ to be considered.23 This suggests that he might have in mind some other 
mechanism for interrogating justice within the family. In any case, it is not clear.24
 Subsequently, Rawls does acknowledge that sex should be one of the contingent 
characteristics in the theory, but he does not explain the implications of this.25 New 
20 Susan Moller Okin argues that this is not unique. Okin observes that ‘while liberal theorists claim 
to be writing about individuals, scratch the surface of any of their theories and you will find out 
that they are almost all actually talking about male heads of households’, Susan Moller Okin 
(2005) ‘ “Forty Acres and a Mule” for Women: Rawls and Feminism’, pp. 233–248 in Politics, 
Philosophy and Economics 4(2), at p. 234.
21 John Rawls (2003) A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press [first published 1971] at p. 11.
22 Anne Phillips (1992) ‘Universal Pretensions in Political Thought’, pp. 10–30 in Michèle Barrett 
and Anne Phillips (1992) Destabilizing Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, at p. 18; Susan Moller Okin (1991) ‘John Rawls: Justice as Fairness – For Whom?’ 
in Mary Lyndon Shanley and Carole Pateman (eds) (1991) Feminist Interpretations and Political 
Theory, Polity Press; Moller Okin 1989 ibid.
23 John Rawls (2003) A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press [first published 1971]. p. 6.
24 See useful discussion in: Véronique Munoz-Dardé (1998) ‘Rawls, Justice in the Family and 
Justice of the Family’, pp. 335–352 in The Philosophy Quarterly 48(192).
25 Sex is mentioned in John Rawls (1975) ‘Fairness to Goodness’ pp. 536–554 in Philosophical 
Review 84(4) at p. 537.
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theoretical approaches arising, such as the ethics of care,26 acknowledge in different 
ways the complex network of roles within societies and challenge the traditional 
view that most human life could be structured around a life plan that merely starts 
and ends with vulnerability.27 Instead, these traditions argue that people are vulner-
able to, and dependent upon, each other in changing ways throughout their lives. 
Henry Odera Oruka goes so far as to suggest that it is in this way that we  experience 
the world.28
 In this way also, the crucial role of solidarity in liberalism can be seen. That 
is, while liberalism is often accused of being individualistic, in fact this is only 
in terms of value. It does not need to deny the deep connectedness between 
people, and the importance of this for their well- being. People experience 
periods of sickness and they rely upon each other for the satisfaction of basic 
needs, and they may well need each other and society in order to flourish. The 
way in which the institutions of society are structured can alter the implications 
of this for specific individuals, identified, for example, by sex.
 This approach to sex shares elements with the citizenist global framing con-
fronted in this book. One writer, Deborah Kearns, has proposed that Rawls might 
not have engaged directly with the justice or injustice of the family because he 
recognised that ‘the family is not necessarily a just institution’. It is for this 
reason, Kearns suggests, that he did not include it within the scope of his interro-
gation of justice.29 The apparently indefensible illiberalism within the family 
structure could be seen as echoed in what philosopher Phillip Cole has presented 
as an intractable illiberalism of migration controls and closed borders, which he 
finds is passed over in liberal theoretical work.30 The potential of Cole’s observa-
tion to unseat the whole liberal architecture can explain a reticence to address it 
directly within some mainstream liberal thinking. Perhaps this is because there 
are problems that have seemed so intractable that, as Kearns suggests in the case 
of the family, they are merely put to one side.31
 When political theory and popular discourse automatically defines women as 
derivative in their political relationships with a State from men, it becomes difficult 
to analyse the household. As a result, violence within the household, and its impli-
cation for systems of justice, can be overlooked. Similarly, the structural and other 
26 For example, see presentation of this in Virginia Held (2006) Ethics of Care: Personal, Political 
and Global, Oxford University Press.
27 Moller Okin 2005 ibid.
28 See Henry Odera Oruka 1989 ibid, and also Robert Sugden.
29 Deborah Kearns (1983) ‘A Theory of Justice – and Love; Rawls on the Family’, pp. 36–42 in 
Politics 18(2).
30 Phillip Cole (2000) Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration, 
Edinburgh University Press.
31 Perhaps there is something more to this. Grada Kilomba refers to the ‘ego defense mechanism’ 
found in the colonialist project which inverts ownership and responsibility in response to anxiety, 
both of the colonised and the coloniser, to create beliefs like ‘I have never experienced racism’ or 
‘we had no colonies’. Grada Kilomba (2010) Plantation Memories: Episodes of Everyday Racism 
2nd Edition, Unrast, at p. 18.
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violence against (hyphenated) non- citizens can be difficult to analyse within a 
liberal democratic theory of States that sees noncitizenship only as hyphenated, and 
only as derivative from citizenship as the lack of a relationship rather than a rela-
tionship in its own right.
 In the political and legal systems of States ostensibly built upon liberal 
democratic principles, it has taken identifying women as political actors in 
their own right, with a recognition of their own relationships with States, in 
combination with an increasing audibility of women’s voices, for the associ-
ated rights claims and duties to be acknowledged and enacted more widely. 
Something similar could be the case for noncitizens. So long as the noncitizen 
relationship is insufficient for rights- claiming on its own, people experiencing 
activated noncitizenship will be assumed, to different extents, rightsless. 
Assuming noncitizens to have only a lack of a relationship with a State until 
proven otherwise allows substantial abuses. Feminism provides a model of 
how this can change – indeed, how it can change dramatically in liberal demo-
cratic thought in only a few decades. Feminism in theory and in practice has 
affected policy- making, popular discourse, and lives in States built upon 
liberal  democratic principles.
 Sociologist Christian Joppke has written much on the exclusions made by 
liberal States in terms of citizenship and at borders. He has observed that:
… the most significant development in the past half century has been the 
liberalization of access to citizenship, removing sexual and racial barriers to 
naturalization and upgrading territory over descent in the birth attribution of 
citizenship.32
I agree with Joppke’s emphasis on a notion of citizenship that moves away from 
prejudice based on gender and race and other accidents of birth – though I would 
add that birth on a territory is itself an accident of birth. But this is not enough. 
As has been argued throughout this book, it is necessary also to recognise non-
citizenship as a relationship in itself. This is in order to show that people have 
claims to rights as noncitizens, to enable individuals to claim rights without 
having to claim citizenships, and to prevent people from being excluded from 
rights arbitrarily on the basis of withheld citizenship, and to remove the coercion 
to seek citizenship even when it is contested.
Rejecting binarity
The rejection of binarity in developing the notion of noncitizenship has its roots in 
discourses rejecting gender binarity. Such discourses spurn the idea that there are 
two mutually exclusive gender categories of ‘man’ and of ‘woman’, so that people 
32 Christian Joppke (2007) ‘Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity’, pp. 37–48 in 
Citizenship Studies 11(1) at p. 38.
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are either constructed as men or not men and if they are not men then they are 
women. This binarity of construction conflates constructed gender roles with the 
narrow physical realities of biological reproduction (which are themselves not 
mutually exclusive). It also conflates the necessity of some aspects of physical sex 
with contingent institutional constructions of sex and gender. The complex inter-
weaving of gender experiences, including so- called ‘queer’ narratives, has shown 
that a binary approach is inadequate for understanding how sex and gender func-
tion.33 While seeking rights of women, then, feminism has helped to uncover the 
importance of avoiding reinforcing those restrictive constructions of womanhood 
that feminism itself challenges. Seeing how this has developed within feminist dis-
course will help in understanding how it could develop within noncitizenism.
 Take the classic work of Germaine Greer who has been regarded to be of 
central importance to the production of contemporary feminist discourse, as well 
as connecting this to the real- world struggle for women’s rights. Her writing has 
been pivotal for the creation of feminist theory and for institutionalising feminist 
thinking in real- world activities, for example at the United Nations.34 And yet 
there is a risk that some core assumptions in her work could impede the capabil-
ities of some of those who bear the most burden from the existing bordering 
between genders.
 Greer’s writings have been directed at identifying aspects of women’s experi-
ences that are traditionally ignored or made taboo, such as unremunerated 
domestic work and female sexuality. However, the female experience that she 
identifies is, for Greer, peculiar to women identified physically at birth and in 
opposition to men. In her work, she identifies various institutionalised ways in 
which women qua non- men are discriminated against.35 Read in this way, Greer 
could be seen as risking essentialising the category of female according to exist-
ing pervasive definitions. The implications of this for individuals for whom this 
essentialising is particularly problematic has played out publicly. For example, 
Greer has opposed acknowledgement of the femaleness of someone who had 
transitioned from male to female and was seeking appointment to the staff of an 
all- female Cambridge college.36 This recalls Manuhuia Barcham’s concern that 
Urban Maoris are forced into categories that do not reflect their complex realities.
33 Butler 1990 ibid.
34 For example, the roles of Margaret Mead and Germaine Greer at the controversial World Popula-
tion Conference in August 1974 is mentioned in Stanley Johnson (1987) World Population and 
the United Nations: Challenge and Response, Cambridge University Press, at p. 117.
35 For example, see Germaine Greer (2007) The Whole Woman, Random House.
36 For example, discussed in Sarah Gamble (2015) ‘Gender and Transgender Criticism’, in Julian 
Wolfreys (ed.) (2015) Introducing Criticism in the 21st Century, Edinburgh University Press. 
Gamble cites a 2009 article in the Guardian, Germaine Greer (2009) ‘Caster Semenya sex row: 
What makes a woman?’, 20 August 2009. Greer restates this position as recently as 2016 in Calla 
Wahlquist (2016) ‘Germaine Greer tells Q&A her trans views were wrong, but then restates 
them’, in The Guardian 11th April 2016. Her position is that someone qua man has enjoyed the 
benefits of being a man in a world built for men irrespective of whether he now wants to relin-
quish some of those privileges.
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 It is then the individuals that most struggle with the existing assumptions and 
constructions of binarity that are made to carry the burden. This seems problem-
atic from a liberal standpoint committed to equality and equal dignity. Perhaps 
there is a particular obligation to those who, in some particular context, are 
struggling less from the current framing, to use their position(s) to do the addi-
tional work of troubling it – to make space for those who are placed outside to 
enter into the discussion. There are lessons here to be learnt for non citizenism – 
and for those who work to promote the rights of noncitizens.
Acknowledging intersections
‘Second Wave’ feminist discourses arising particularly within the anglophone 
literatures of the US, UK and Australia in the 1980s and 1990s have been criti-
cised for their failure to acknowledge the experiences of those whose experience 
of femaleness is compounded by other minority memberships. That is, ‘the viol-
ence that many women experience is often shaped by other dimensions of their 
identities, such as race and class’.37 This can also involve non- recognition within 
struggles for recognition themselves. Consider Gloria Anzaldúa’s reflections on 
being queer, White, Catholic, Mexican and indigenous, living just on the US side 
of the border with Mexico.38 Difficulties associated with unacknowledged inter-
sectionality is illustrated particularly well – and in a different way – by the prot-
agonist, Adah, in Buchi Emecheta’s Second Class Citizen who is shown to be 
seen as second class as a woman, as a poor woman, as a Black woman, and as a 
Black Nigerian woman in London.39 And she is made second class in ways that 
none of the other characters in the book can understand, as none of them share 
all of these characteristics subject to discrimination.
 This speaks to the noncitizenship presented in this book. Individuals sub-
jected to these intersectional spheres of exclusion as ‘second class citizens’ can 
be seen to be experiencing noncitizenship activated in a number of dimensions, 
even in cases in which the individuals in question are formal citizens of the State 
under consideration. In Emecheta’s book, we follow Adah in her movement 
from Nigeria to the UK and the reader sees how the exclusions she experiences 
in Nigeria are continuous with, though different from, the exclusions she experi-
ences in the UK. The language of noncitizenship provides a way in which to 
analyse how these interact and to examine implications for States’ obligations in 
their relationships with the individuals concerned.
 In order to address this, it will be necessary to ensure that the frameworks 
developed take into account the many diverse ways in which individuals may 
interact with them. An important way in which to do this is for the perspectives 
37 Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991) ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Viol-
ence Against Women of Color’, pp. 1241–1299 in Stanford Law Review 43 at p. 1242.
38 Gloria Anzaldúa (1987) Borderlands/La Frontera, Aunt Lute Book Company. See also 
Chapter 8.
39 Buchi Emecheta (1994) Second Class Citizen, Heinemann [first published 1974].
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of those affected by intersecting dimensions of noncitizenship to be part of the 
development of theoretical and institutional frameworks. Feminist theorist Audre 
Lorde argues that non- dominant (and non- dominated) difference is essential for 
the production of knowledge and understanding – and for dynamic capabilities 
to be possible at their fullest.40 She emphasises that recognition of different per-
spectives alone is not enough. All perspectives need to be allowed to be part of 
the discussion neither as norms nor as contra- norms. This is easier said than 
done. For example, Chandra Talpade Mohanty provides an analysis of how fem-
inist scholars themselves ‘codify others’ as being non- Western, non- urban, or in 
other ways ‘other’ with regard to how a particular scholar sees her/imself. She 
observes this in a wide variety of scholars who privilege their own (diverse) per-
spectives as ‘normal’ and identify others as different.41 This provides an example 
of Lorde’s more general concern with regard to domination and barrier- drawing. 
It shows how spaces of domination can also be created within efforts specifically 
to challenge domination. This is also a risk in noncitizenism.
 Feminism challenges systems of oppression and advantage. But, as Paula 
Rothenberg warns, people do not generally see the ways in which they are privi-
leged themselves.42 And by extension, people do not see the ways in which they 
themselves are dominating. Indeed, some have referred to a ‘Race to Innocence’, 
whereby there is almost a struggle to see oneself as the most subordinated.43 This 
risks obscuring otherwise hidden perspectives. And it risks a situation in which 
feminist theorists accidentally develop inadequate and problematic theory which 
takes into account only the concerns of those who are in a privileged position in 
terms of creating the theory.44 Phillip Cole’s ‘Insider Theory’ diagnosis was not 
directed at feminism, but at liberalism more generally and with regard to its 
inherent citizenism. He suggests that theorists tend to theorise the world as they 
know it. As such, Cole suggests that it could be that liberalism might be unable 
to theorise rights beyond the insider constituency that created it. As the discus-
sion above shows, this is a risk even within a body of theory that explicitly tries 
to challenge the exclusions and dominations in existing approaches.
40 Audre Lorde (1983) ‘The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House’, pp. 94–101 
in Cherie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa (eds) (1983) This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by 
Radical Women of Color, Kitchen Table Press.
41 Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003) Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing 
Solidarity, Duke University Press, at Chapter 1.
42 Paula Rothenberg (2000) Invisible Privilege: A Memoir About Race, Class, and Gender, Univer-
sity Press of Kansas.
43 Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack (1998) ‘The Race to Innocence: Confronting Hierachi-
cal Relations among Women’, pp. 335–352 in The Journal of Gender, Race and Justice.
44 For example, Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan have suggested that ignoring race, class, national-
ity, sexuality, means that whiteness, middle-classness, heterosexuality and women wanting to 
have children becomes the norm. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (2004) ‘Feminist Paradigms’, 
pp. 765–769 in Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (eds) (2004) Literary Theory: An Anthology, 2nd 
Edition, Blackwell.
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 Noncitizenism might begin to offer a way in which to address some of these 
difficulties. A particular strength of this approach is its ability to examine the 
interrelationships of apparently distinct forms of discrimination and 
vulnerability- creation. It can enable a joined- up analysis and recognition of how 
exclusions operate in apparently very different individual experiences and how 
they flow into, and relate to, each other.
 The three- fold exclusion of working- class Black women presented by Nira 
Yuval- Davis can, then, be seen as problematising a system which imposes and 
activates noncitizen- vulnerability in three dimensions, rather than only as 
stretching across distinct categories of exclusion.45 The noncitizenist approach 
allows for this – and it allows for the recognition that such structural exclusions 
take place globally and that exclusions far away are continuous with exclusions 
close at hand. Unhyphenated noncitizenship is necessary to liberal democracy. 
Unhyphenated noncitizenship can be activated because of discrimination along 
racial, gendered, class or other grounds, including a mixture of several grounds. 
Failing to recognise unhyphenated noncitizenship and so categorising such 
 individuals as hypenated non-citizens has been a tool of justifying arbitrary 
exclusions from consideration within the liberal nexus.46
 In practice, once someone has been excluded from such consideration, it is 
easy to lose sight of the arbitrariness of that exclusion, especially if it comes to 
seem legalistic. This can sometimes then be used to reinforce and deepen exclu-
sions (‘expulsions’). The non- binary understanding of citizenship and nonciti-
zenship allows an analysis of noncitizen claims alongside a protection of 
citizenship. As such, individuals have rights even when institutional or social 
constructions suggest that they do not. In fact, this construction gives rise to 
special claims against the States in question and recognition of the intersecting 
ways in which individuals become noncitizen- vulnerable.
New ways of understanding rights and justice more broadly
Feminist critiques of liberal political theory have nourished the development of 
work which can more accurately characterise human experience in ways that go 
well beyond physical femaleness. Recognition of the roles of care and depend-
ency often associated with females has enabled a broader analysis of how care 
and dependency function in human life more generally – and a recognition that 
45 For example, see Nira Yuval-Davis (2006) ‘Intersectionality and Feminist Politics’, pp. 193–209 
in European Journal of Women’s Studies 13(3) at p. 195.
46 Bhabha and Shutter’s 1994 book provides a useful analysis of how this has played out in prac-
tice with regard to women’s experience of UK immigration law. Jacqueline Bhabha and Sue 
Shutter (1994) Women’s Movement: Women Under Immigration, Nationality and Refugee Law, 
Trentham Books.
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these dimensions need to be part of a just institutional arrangement.47 Rather 
than ‘looking at men as if they had just emerged from the earth like mushrooms 
and grown up without any obligation to each other’,48 it is then possible to char-
acterise humans as following a life- path that makes them intermittently vulner-
able and dependent upon each other in various ways. This has enabled better 
analyses of sickness, disability and other factors. Recognition of complex social 
and other interests has driven new ways of thinking about human need and 
development. Attempts to understand structural discrimination against women 
and other minority groups have helped to uncover deeper inadequacies in exist-
ing political structures. Work on noncitizenship can be part of this process, con-
tributing to the development of a more accurate and just theoretical institutional 
framework more generally.
 Feminist theorists argue that traditional theories of rights and of justice are 
fundamentally flawed when they assume their jurisdiction principally to be that 
of those constructed as men (which may also exclude consideration of the 
caring roles of males, and their dependencies, as being non- male – consider for 
example the stigma still sometimes associated with paternity leave).49 Restart-
ing the analysis, taking into account aspects of the lives of females, and of 
those constructed as women, that cannot be characterised by these traditional 
accounts, generates theories acknowledging justice in family structures, the 
role of care, and the relevance of vulnerability and need at different life stages, 
for example. This has led such theorists to develop different, and more 
complex, notions of capability and need, and more complex ways of examin-
ing whether they are being met. In turn, this has made way for more nuanced 
theorisations more generally and has been part of what has cleared the way for 
the noncitizenism developed here.
 Feminist thinking in political theory and beyond has enabled a deeper and more 
just understanding of human society more broadly, including a re- examination of 
the meaning of gender. In turn, this has enabled a critical approach to masculinity 
and the politics of maleness – and the ways in which femaleness and maleness 
overlap and interact – including how this plays out with regard to the State and its 
47 For example, Eva Feder Kittay (1998) Love’s Labour: Essays on Women, Equality, and Depend-
ency, Routledge;see also essays in Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers and Susan Dodds (eds) 
(2014) Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, Oxford University Press.
48 This passage comes from Thomas Hobbes (2003) On The Citizen, Cambridge University Press 
[first published 1651], at p. 102. He offers it as a thought experiment in the establishment of just 
dominion, but does so by effectively defining family relations out of consideration. The phrase is 
discussed by Seyla Benhabib: Seyla Benhabib (1985) ‘The Generalized and the Concrete Other: 
The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory’, pp. 38–60 in Praxis International (4).
49 See Heening Thomsen and Helene Urth (2010) ‘Fully Paid Paternity Leave of 2 Weeks: Impact 
Assessment’, pp. 91–124 in European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies (2010) 
Cost and Benefits of Maternity and Paternity Leave, particularly at pp. 97–101; Samsik Lee and 
Hyojin Choi (2015) ‘Lowest-Low Fertility and Policy Responses in South Korea’, pp. 107–123 
in Ronald Rindfuss and Minja Kim Choe (eds) (2015) Low and Lower Fertility: Variations 
Across Developed Countries, Springer.
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institutions. As such, feminism is not a movement only for the rights of women, 
but rather a movement for a better understanding of humanity that facilitates a 
more just construction of social institutions for everyone involved. Noncitizenism 
has the potential to do something similar.
 This book on noncitizenism is then not only about those experiencing acti-
vated noncitizenship and it is not only interested in implications for the rights of 
noncitizens. Developing a better understanding of noncitizenship and of nonciti-
zen claims (including those based on capability and on dynamic capability in 
particular), makes it possible to capture the fact that there is necessarily an 
element of non- consent in liberal democracy, and that this is not anomalous and 
can be analysed. This means that the position of such individuals can be con-
sidered, including the implications that their positionings have for the justifiab-
ility of the liberal democratic system and for citizenship. Liberal theory requires 
all humans to be understood as equal in dignity. But if citizenship is required for 
basic recognition, then it becomes necessary for everyone to be understood as a 
formal citizen somewhere somehow. This undermines citizenship as well as the 
rights of those who are thereby either excluded or stifled. If citizen- membership 
is separated from access to basic rights or recognition of personhood then it 
becomes possible also to examine citizenship more clearly. Noncitizenism, then, 
can learn from feminism in many dimensions.
11 Global challenges to citizenism
Some political movements today seem to challenge the hegemony of citizenship. 
Examining them under the lens of noncitizenism can help to interrogate this 
further. Doing this can also help to develop the way in which both non citizenship 
and citizenship are understood. Several such movements have been introduced 
in this book, and have been important in building its notion of noncitizenship. 
Some of them will now be explored in additional detail. This includes both 
informal and formal processes. It includes high- level international processes, 
like that which led to the development of the Domestic Workers Convention 
2011, for example. It also includes the mundane everyday realities of migration 
itself as a noncitizenist political movement. The language of noncitizenship can 
help to identify how these and other movements can simultaneously be seen as 
part of a larger noncitizenism and maintain their distinctive claims. Importantly, 
each of these movements has also emphasised the continuity between the dif-
ferent locations of noncitizenship activation.
 Crucially, this analysis also contributes to a more detailed examination of 
State- individual obligations associated with activated noncitizenship, includ-
ing the continuity between contexts and sites of activation. Throughout, it is 
important to emphasise that noncitizenism does not contradict movements to 
expand access to citizenship or to citizen rights. Noncitizenism, as has been 
presented throughout this book, calls for more rights, not less. While acknow-
ledging the importance of liberal democratic citizenship, it also emphasises the 
reality of (unhyphenated) liberal noncitizenship as another foundational ana-
lytical category – and another way in which an individual relates to a State. 
While it does not contest that the citizen- State relationship carries special 
claims, this book has argued that the noncitizen- State relationship also carries 
special claims. Now let us turn to some global movements and explore how 
they challenge citizenism as well as ways in which they risk reinforcing the 
citizenist paradigm.
The domestic workers movement and the Convention
I felt such pride, sitting there, waiting to go up to the podium, with all the flags 
of the world around me. Afterwards I sent the pictures home to our members, 
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and I heard that one broke down in tears. A domestic worker speaking at the 
UN – it doesn’t happen! We were just so happy to be recognized.
(Shirley Pryce of the Jamaican Household Workers Association1)
In 2011 in the chamber of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 
Geneva, an overwhelming majority of delegates from States, employers’ organi-
sations and unions voted in favour of the Domestic Workers Convention.2 This 
Convention, and the process that led to it, are particularly relevant to the politics 
of noncitizenship and the challenges it poses to assumed citizenism. This is seen 
in the words of Shirley Pryce, quoted above. She presents herself as being 
recognised within a world that does not usually recognise her, or others like her. 
She presents herself as being given a voice within a world of States from which 
she is usually excluded, and within which, irrespective of her formal citizenship, she 
experiences, for the most part, activated noncitizenship as a result of her profes-
sional situation (and perhaps also intersections of gender, class, status and race).
 Pryce’s description is of being surrounded by the flags of recognised States, 
to speak before the representatives of the countries of the world. She does not 
argue against the world of States, but demands recognition within it.
 Pryce acknowledges States and citizenships. And in doing this she demon-
strates something important about the noncitizenism presented here. The nonciti-
zenism she exhibits is a real and political relationship within that world of States, 
additional to, not in opposition to, citizenship. Noncitizenism is challenging to 
the current status quo, but it need not be problematic per se. Pryce’s words are 
challenging because of the activated noncitizenship they represent. But her situ-
ation need not be challenging, if she and her strong political relationship with 
States are recognised and acknowledged.
 The labour rights of those employed in various forms of domestic service, 
whether caring or cleaning, have long been difficult to enforce. In 2010, an ILO law 
and practice report on domestic work found that many States partly or entirely 
exclude domestic workers from their labour legislation,3 with only an estimated 10 
per cent of the world’s domestic workers working in States which included them on 
a par with other workers, 29.9 per cent working in States which completely 
excluded them from labour law (this figure is skewed by the 99 per cent of domestic 
workers in the Middle East region excluded in this way).4 Not least, persons 
1 This quotation comes from Celia Mather (2013) ‘ “Yes, We Did It!”: How the World’s Domestic 
Workers Won their International Rights and Recognition’, Women in Informal Employment: Glo-
balising and Organising (WIEGO) Report at p. 57.
2 Discussion of this is developed further in Tendayi Bloom (2015) ‘Is the Domestic Workers Con-
vention a Triumph for Female Migrant Agency?’, UNU-GCM Policy Report 03/02.
3 International Labour Organization (2013) Domestic Workers Across the World: Global and 
Regional Statistics and the Extent of Legal Protection, ILO at p. 46, using data from ILO (2010) 
‘Decent Work for Domestic Workers’, Report IV(1) 4th agenda item, International Labour Con-
ference, 99th Session, Geneva, 2010.
4 ILO 2013 ibid. at pp. 50, 51.
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employed to perform tasks traditionally carried out for free by female family 
members have struggled for the recognition of their work as work.5 This is related 
to the difficulty that women have experienced in achieving recognition for their 
individual- State relationships more generally (this was presented in Chapter 11).
 Globally, changes in work patterns and gender roles, alongside the second- 
generation impacts of decreased birth rates in ‘post- dividend’ developed States 
(those which have enjoyed a period of relatively large working- age population in 
comparison to dependents and now face the period in which those younger 
dependants are adults and the larger former working population is in need of 
care, creating a larger ‘old- age dependency ratio’), make the global domestic 
workforce increasingly migrant- based and increasingly important. An increasing 
global dependence upon households headed by two wage earners has several 
implications. First, the care of children, the sick and the elderly can no longer, 
from a practical point of view, be assumed to be the sole activity of female 
family members of working age (irrespective of other considerations).6 Second, 
women in some countries who are unable to find other forms of work increas-
ingly find employment in domestic settings, often overseas.
 In many cases, the employers of domestic workers may themselves be vulner-
able members of societies, including those who themselves need care not avail-
able from family or State, and this may be their first experience of being 
employers.7 In addition, their need for care, or help with caring responsibilities, 
may not be recognised within existing frameworks. Members of this vast and 
international domestic workforce may be exposed to extreme noncitizen- 
vulnerability, constructed by their unrecognised relationships with States.
 This involves various intersecting dimensions of vulnerability. The con-
structed vulnerability of women in some States, especially to intimate violence, 
is compounded by assumptions relating to race and class, for example, and their 
implications for constructions of femaleness and maleness. This interplays with 
legal vulnerability to employers (who are often private families) for immigration 
rights, there is a risk that the vulnerability may become acute.8 Like other groups 
introduced in this book, the population of domestic workers is also difficult to 
count, with additional implications for recognition and constructions of 
5 For example, Peggie R. Smith (2012) ‘Work Like Any Other, Work Like No Other: Establishing 
Decent Work for Domestic Workers’, Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 12-05-30; Kea Tijdens and Maarten van Klaveren (2011) ‘Domestic 
Workers: Their Wages and Work in 12 Countries’, Wage Indicator Data Report, Wage Indicator 
Foundation, Amsterdam, October 2011, p. 19. See also ILO 2013 ibid.
6 For example, see Einat Albin and Virginia Mantouvalou (2011) ‘The ILO Convention on 
Domestic Workers: From the Shadows to the Light’, UCL Labour Rights Institute On-Line 
Working Paper, www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/lri/papers/EinatAlbin-VirginiaMantouvalou.pdf (accessed 13 
April 2015) (also published in the Industrial Law Journal, March 2012); Joaquin Nieto, speaking 
in Barcelona, quoted in Bloom 2015 ibid.
7 Bloom 2015 ibid.
8 Shu-Ju Ada Cheng (2003) ‘Rethinking the Globalization of Domestic Service’, 166–186 in 
Gender and Society 17/2 at p. 168.
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 vulnerability.9 A global estimate from 2010 suggests that there are at least 52.6 
million domestic workers in the world, leading to the parallel observation that 
‘[i]f all domestic workers worked in one country, this country would be the tenth 
largest employer worldwide’.10 They reportedly represent 3.6 per cent of paid 
employees and 7.5 per cent of female wage earners globally.11
 Spread throughout the world, largely living within the homes of their employ-
ers, often in foreign countries, the vulnerability of this international workforce is 
exacerbated by complex and restrictive immigration systems and citizen protec-
tionism. Migrant domestic workers often routinely work extremely long hours,12 
struggle to claim holidays, rest time or maternity leave,13 experience low and 
even withheld wages,14 with per- hour pay further diluted by the long hours 
worked.15 In addition, living within the homes of their employers makes 
domestic workers vulnerable to further forms of abuse and ill- treatment. This is 
commonly made worse by a lack of local language proficiency, confiscation of 
travel documents and multidimensional discrimination.16
 In 1936, an ILO committee first recommended that labour conditions for 
domestic workers should be on the agenda.17 While ILO resolutions drafted 
with the intention of protecting domestic workers date back to 1948, the 
reality is that domestic workers have mostly remained outside usual labour 
protection frameworks.18 Often excluded from labour unions, members of this 
group have traditionally struggled to organise in usual ways because of the 
 9 ILO 2013 ibid., for example, at p. 13. This also recalls other vulnerable populations addressed in 
this book who have been uncounted and uncountable. See Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 in particular.
10 ILO 2013 ibid. at p. 19.
11 ILO 2013 ibid. at p. 20; HRW, ITUC and IDWN (2013) Claiming Rights: Domestic Workers’ 
Movements and Global Advances for Labor Reform, at p. 10. And this cannot take account of the 
full number of people doing this job irregularly.
12 Studies suggest women regularly work 15-hour days or 78–100-hour weeks: ILO 2013 ibid. pp. 57, 
58 (NB it shows that in developed States the hours can actually be excessively short, where the pref-
erence is for part-time domestic workers, and this brings with it additional problems); HRW (2014) 
‘ “I Already Bought You”: Abuse and Exploitation of Female Migrant Domestic Workers in the 
United Arab Emirates’, Human Rights Watch Report, 2014, p. 15; HRW (2011) ‘The Domestic 
Workers Convention: Turning New Global Labor Standards into Change on the Ground’, Human 
Rights Watch Report, p. 13; Tijdens and van Klaveren 2011 ibid. p. 29.
13 For example, see HRW 2011 ibid.; ILO 2013 ibid. – according to ILO data, in 2012, about 45 per 
cent of the world’s domestic workers were not entitled to a single day off per week.
14 Workers often earn less than half of the average wages in the country where they work. In some 
cases they earn less than 20 per cent of average local wages – see HRW 2011 ibid., p. 13 and one 
report found that, in 2011, only 25 countries included foreign domestic workers in the national 
minimum wage – UNWomen (2013) Contributions of Migrant Domestic Workers to Sustainable 
Development, UNWomen, Bangkok, p. 18.
15 Tijdens and van Klaveren 2011 ibid., p. 19.
16 Ada Cheng 2003 ibid.
17 In 1936, the question of the working conditions of domestic workers became prominent through 
the debate over the 1936 Holidays with Pay Convention which controversially explicitly 
excluded domestic workers. ILO 2013 ibid., at p. 1.
18 Smith 2012 ibid., p. 165; Mather 2013 ibid., p. 22.
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peculiarities of their working arrangements (one union leader in Spain 
observed in 2015 that ‘domestic workers do not exist as a collective’ because 
they work within separate households).19
 Migrant domestic workers can seem to exemplify noncitizen- vulnerability in 
these dimensions that have been discussed. And the recognition, including the 
forced recognition, of the vulnerability is also challenging to the liberal democratic 
principles of the States where they live and from which they have travelled (where 
those States are built upon liberal democratic principles). It troubles the relationship 
between immigration controls and human equality, liberty and individuality. And 
yet these noncitizens are not merely vulnerable. They participate in and make 
claims against States. And they have couched these claims within what appears to 
be an explicitly noncitizen- like challenge. Overwhelmingly, the call they make is 
for rights as workers and as humans, broadly challenging international and domestic 
citizenist systems. The leaders of the domestic workers movements directly criticise 
systems that construct them as vulnerable and that restrict the scope of those who 
are able to make use of global systems of movement and exchange. The challenge 
made by (mostly female, mostly migrant) domestic workers, then, provides a useful 
introduction to what real- world noncitizenist activism might look like.
 Such individuals are not inherently vulnerable. Their vulnerability is a noncit-
izen one, constructed by the non- recognition of their relationships with States. 
These are predominantly working- aged people who have demonstrated their 
resilience through their movement and through their engagement in physically 
hard and psychologically demanding work. Yet, they have been made vulnerable 
through the systems they must navigate. Their decisions have been restricted ini-
tially by their territorially distant noncitizen- vulnerability. Their employment 
options are prescribed and their capabilities in situ are diminished by their terri-
torially present noncitizen- vulnerability. That is, otherwise resilient individuals 
are made vulnerable by a structure that cannot adequately acknowledge their 
ways of relating to the States involved and so also to other individuals.
 Migrant domestic workers are vulnerable to the State in which they work, and 
in this way they are made more vulnerable to other individuals such as employ-
ers and recruiters. Their legal right to be in the State and to have a recognised 
relationship with it may be based upon their work contracts. Their access to 
labour and other protections are based upon their ability to prove their right to be 
there. In turn, this can make such individuals very dependent upon individual 
employers, even in order to claim protection against those same employers. This 
all makes the political movement of global domestic workers especially important 
to understanding contemporary noncitizenism. This includes their engagement 
with an international engine which, though part of the State- based system, is not 
built primarily of Member States: the International Labour Organization (ILO).20
19 Raquel Gil, quoted in Bloom 2015 ibid. at p. 15.
20 See, for example, ILO (2013) ‘The collective organization of domestic workers: Decent work in 
action’, pp. 77–86 in ILO 2013 ibid.
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 Industrial action of washerwomen and other household workers is recorded in 
various countries since the nineteenth century.21 In the 1980s and 1990s there 
was a sudden global increase in employment of migrant women as domestic 
workers.22 Through the 1990s, organisations of domestic workers were develop-
ing across global regions. In 1995, at the UN 4th World Conference on Women 
in China, ‘domestic workers’ organizations from Latin America, South Africa, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and the Philippines, along with campaigners for women’s 
rights and “wages for housework” ’, met.23
 While it has been suggested that there was initial resistance to getting 
involved in the campaigns of the domestic workers amongst some unions, in 
2006 the first ever global conference of domestic workers’ organisations took 
place, reportedly driven by domestic workers’ organisations and well attended 
by national and global union representatives, as well as labour support networks, 
ILO staff and academics.24 In 2008, an ILO working group reportedly began 
researching the legal situation for domestic workers globally.
 The ILO Domestic Workers Convention was put to a vote in June 2011 and 
was adopted with 396 votes in favour, 16 against and 63 abstentions. Figures 
11.1 and 11.2 show the banner lowered by domestic workers’ organisations at 
the back of the Assembly Hall (11.1), and then the same banner laid out in the 
entrance to the building, with some of those domestic workers who had cam-
paigned for the Convention lined up behind it (11.2). The reactions of delegates 
within the hall, and the fact that, according to first- person accounts, they were 
unexpectedly invited to lay out their banner in the entrance, show the level of 
support there was for the Convention and for the movement of domestic workers 
that was behind it.
 Initial ratifications came quickly and in only two years and three months after 
adoption, the Convention came into legal force. Irrespective of concerns relating 
to the efficacy of the final revision of the Convention, the support mobilised for 
it is interesting to observe, as is the way in which this support was mobilised. 
Commentators on the process remark on the achievements that were made by a 
movement largely driven by workers traditionally seen to lack collective agency, 
as ‘unorganizable’,25 and subject to some of the most regressive unfreedoms. 
They clearly acted politically and exhibited some sort of relationship with States 
21 Eileen Boris and Premilla Nadasen (2008) ‘Domestic Workers Organize!’, pp. 413–437 in The 
Journal of Labor and Society 11(4).
22 Stuart Rosewarne (2013) ‘The ILO’s Domestic Worker Convention (C189): Challenging the 
Gendered Disadvantage of Asia’s Foreign Domestic Workers?’, Global Labour Journal 4(1) at 
pp. 3–4.
23 Mather 2013 ibid., p. 3.
24 Adelle Blackett (2012) ‘The Decent Work for Domestic Workers Convention and Recommenda-
tion, 2011’ pp. 778–794 in The American Journal of International Law 106/4, p. 786, drawing 
upon phrasing in Catherine Dauvergne (2008) Making People Illegal: What Globalization means 
for Migration and Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. See also Mather 2013 ibid., 
p. 12.
25 Boris and Nadasen 2008 ibid.
Figure 11.1  Domestic workers lower banner in 2011 (International Labour Organiza-
tion, 2011).
Figure 11.2  Domestic workers celebrate in 2011 (International Labour Organization, 
2011).
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and with the State system, but their activity is not adequately captured through 
the lens only of traditional liberal democratic citizenship. To understand the 
domestic workers movement within a liberal democratic framework, it is helpful 
to adopt the terminology of noncitizenship.
 By setting out in plain language the rights and protections to which domestic 
workers are entitled, the Convention highlights the many ways in which this 
group has, till now, been rightsless.26 For example, Article 5 requires that a 
domestic worker be protected from ‘all forms of abuse, harrassment and 
 violence’. The fact that it was felt necessary to put this in a Convention in 2011 
is extraordinary. And it makes clear the levels of rightslessness of domestic 
workers. Cooking, cleaning and caring are vital to the healthy continuation of 
society and the claims made by domestic workers also form part of a wider 
struggle for recognition of these vital jobs, which have traditionally been seen as 
women’s work in the States under consideration here. In this way, as well as 
through the wider discourse of care, the Domestic Workers Convention also 
helps to show potential interactions between noncitizenism and feminism.
 There is, though, a danger in applying the noncitizenist lens in this way. 
Members of the domestic workers movements discussed here have largely pre-
sented their struggle primarily as one of labour.27 What they have sought is rights 
as workers – for domestic work to be recognised as work and for migrant 
domestic workers to be recognised as workers within existing frameworks. This 
is seen, for example, in the slogan ‘Work like any other, work like no other’,28 
and in Figure 11.3 of a domestic worker protester in India. The statement on the 
placard in the image is clear. Members of this movement explicitly seek solid-
arity amongst workers irrespective of considerations of citizenship and nonciti-
zenship. As such, the presentation in this chapter could be accused of 
misrepresenting what the individuals themselves have been doing. This is not 
what this chapter is trying to do. The noncitizenist lens provides another way in 
which to see the struggle without denying the form in which it has proceeded.
 This is for three reasons. First, these workers, who need not be especially vul-
nerable for any particular reason in themselves, are rendered particularly vulner-
able by existing structures. This vulnerability arises in no small part because of 
the unacknowledged noncitizen relationship which they experience with the 
States involved. Their ability to engage qua workers is impaired because the 
State does not recognise its relationship to them insofar as they are noncitizens. 
It is this which makes them vulnerable – both to States and to individuals.
 Second, the domestic workers movement is not based around citizenship or 
quasi- citizenship. While it includes calls for regularisation of status and access 
26 Blackett 2012 ibid., p. 786, drawing upon phrasing in Dauvergne 2008 ibid.
27 For example, WIEGO (n.d.) ‘Informal Workers in Focus: Domestic Workers’.
28 Peggie R Smith (2011) ‘Work Like Any Other, Work Like No Other: Establishing Decent Work 
for Domestic Workers’, Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal 51(157).
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to citizenship, this is not fundamental, but instead presented as a means of secur-
ing rights and addressing vulnerability. The central concern is that individuals 
are rendered vulnerable with regard to their basic capabilities and their less basic 
ones, including dynamic capabilities to affect the system.
 Finally, the conditions and claims of this group, however they are framed, 
challenge States’ self- definition as liberal democratic and challenge a system of 
States that entrenches their vulnerability rather than enabling them. The main 
thrust of the campaign has focused on unapologetically claiming rights irrespec-
tive of an individual’s officially recognised relationship with a particular State. 
This case provides an important example of empowered noncitizenism.
Figure 11.3  Domestic worker protester in India (International Labour Organization, 2011).
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Global movements of migrants and migrant movements
I am honored to stand before you today on behalf of the 244 million 
migrants all over the world. After years of being voiceless and invisible, we 
– the migrants – are finally welcomed here to speak for ourselves […]. 
I speak before you today with a clear message. Do not talk about us without 
us. We have answers and have been voicing them. Listen and talk with us 
about migration, development and human rights. International conventions 
designed to protect us have been ratified, but they remain in a paper and not 
in action […]. Let’s work for a world without vulnerability, insecurity or 
invisibility. As people, as workers, as women, as migrants – we are ready to 
make this happen. Work with us.
(Eni Lestari Andayani Adi, Chairperson, International Migrant’s 
Alliance (IMA) speaking at the Opening Session of the UN 
Summit on Large Movement of Refugees and Migrants 
19 September 2016, New York City29)
Unable to realise capability- functioning, made noncitizen- vulnerable to the 
global State system, those experiencing a strongly activated noncitizenship may 
cross borders, forcing themselves – and their vulnerability – to be seen in those 
States with which they have a relationship. Migration itself can be interpreted, 
then, as a form of noncitizenism. Whether this recognition is the intention, or 
whether individuals are simply trying to access capability- functioning, including 
dynamic capabilities to affect the system, in any way they can, their capability- 
seeking is politicised and challenges the citizenist status quo.
 This can be seen particularly in the events that led up to the High- level 
Summit on Large Movements of Migrants and Refugees in September 2016. 
Global migrant activism, through the movement of people, through the claiming 
of rights, and through engagement in local and international political processes, 
has been growing in importance, particularly since 2006.30 Those bearing the 
burdens of a citizenist status quo, as Eni Lestari Andayani Adi observes in the 
statement above, are challenging their vulnerability and their invisibility within 
the existing international framework.31 This is another important example of 
noncitizenism.
 There have long been large- scale movements of people in different regions 
across the world.32 However, from around 2011, this movement began to impact 
29 Available here: http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/7660310/ima.pdf
30 Tendayi Bloom (2017) ‘The Critical Role of Civil Society in the Development of Global Migra-
tion Governance Frameworks’, UNU-GCM Commissioned Policy Report; Tendayi Bloom 
(2014) ‘Global Migration Governance: A Decade of Change?’, UNU-GCM Policy Report 02/07.
31 Eni Lestari Andayani Adi was herself an Indonesian domestic worker. See for example The 
Jakarta Post (2016) ‘UN speaker Eni learns migrant workers’ rights the hard way’, Sunday 28 
August 2016.
32 Indeed, there has always been movement: Patrick Manning (2005) Migration in World History, 
Routledge.
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more strongly upon those States built upon liberal democratic principles with 
particular power within the international system of States. It has become increas-
ingly difficult for those States to ignore the movements of people and their 
causes and implications. States are confronted with all of the aspects of 
noncitizen- vulnerability that were presented in Chapter 8, and the three forms of 
noncitizen challenge.
 Movement from States in poverty increased, and from those where wars were 
waging. This movement put pressure on liberal democratic States’ systems of 
migration control and internal control measures. The liberalness of States built 
upon liberal democratic norms came increasingly into question, while fear in 
some States developed at the impact of immigration on ‘liberal values’. This has 
come in two forms. One is the concern that new arrivals dilute or even subvert 
majority values. The other is that the behaviour of States with regard to migrants, 
especially in the context of fear, has subverted majority values.
 Figures 11.4–11.7 were taken by a Syrian emigrant, Zakaria, somewhere 
between Turkey and Chios in 2015/2016. He had received a disposable camera 
from Kevin McElvaney on 8 December in Izmir in Turkey, and cannot share his 
surname or home town for reasons of personal security. He left a wife and two 
young children behind in Syria, but kept in touch with them as he travelled. He 
was hoping to bring his family to Germany or else to return to Syria. He took 
Figure 11.4  Exhausted woman, child and others on the dinghy (Zakaria, #RefugeeCameras, 
Kevin McElvaney, 2015/2016).
Figure 11.5  A Greek fisherman escorts and guides the boat to a safe harbour (Zakaria, 
#RefugeeCameras, Kevin McElvaney, 2015/2016).
Figure 11.6  Overcrowded dinghy: the view looking forwards (Zakaria, #RefugeeCameras, 
Kevin McElvaney, 2015/2016).
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photographs of the dinghy ride from Turkey to Chios and then mailed them to 
Kevin McElvaney to develop. He wanted to let people know what it was like. He 
now lives in Berlin in Germany.
 In the photographs, we can see the utter vulnerability of individuals migrating 
in these circumstances. Through Zakaria’s lens we can see the power of the sea 
and the powerlessness of the people trying to cross it. While the sea is powerful 
irrespective of States, those who are safe within the structures of liberal citizen-
ships in well- to-do States are mostly protected from this. They submit to the 
States that protect them, apart from other things, from the elements. The people 
pictured, and the man taking their picture, have been forced to make themselves 
vulnerable to the sea because of their vulnerability to States. They were unable 
to board planes or charter ships in the normal way because of their status. It is 
likely that they paid sums much larger than it would have cost to travel by 
‘regular’ and less dangerous means.33
33 For example, see first-hand description in Iddrisu Wari (2016) ‘You Make a Decision and You 
Start Your Journey: Reflections of a Ghanaian Economic Migrant and Founder of the NGO, 
CEHDA’, pp. 194–217 in Belachew Gebrewold and Tendayi Bloom (eds) (2016) Understanding 
Migrant Decisions: From sub-Saharan Africa to the Mediterranean Region, Routledge.
Figure 11.7  Looking backwards at the motor (Zakaria, #RefugeeCameras, Kevin 
McElvaney, 2015/2016).
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 These pictures also echo Gohar Dashti’s staged image in Figure 3.1 and her 
description of it. While the couple in Dashti’s photograph sought the shelter of 
the desert in the absence of the shelter of a State, the people in Zakaria’s photo-
graphs seek the shelter of the waves when States are anything but protective. 
They are trying to function despite, rather than because of, States and the system 
of States. Through these images, Zakaria challenges States built upon liberal 
democratic norms that have constrained the liberties of such individuals by 
assumption, effectively forcing them, unnecessarily, to choose between unac-
ceptable risks (either to stay somewhere racked by violence and poverty or to 
take to the sea in unseaworthy vessels). This is deeply challenging for States 
built upon liberal democratic norms.
 In the 2010s, movement continued from the increasing number of countries 
where poverty and violence were making life untenable, and where popular pro-
tests expressed dissatisfaction with governments unable to protect their popula-
tions from economic shocks.34 These have been described primarily as citizen 
movements, but we could also see them as movements of formal citizens protest-
ing their activated noncitizenship. While most people moving in these contexts 
were going to neighbouring countries and others moved south, some moved 
northwards and westwards. They were making decisions for as many reasons as 
there were migrants. Some may have been driven solely by the need to arrive 
somewhere safe. For others, the movement was also in order to earn money to 
support family members or to pursue an ambition that could not be attained 
without movement. Movement may have been in order to better situate oneself 
within the global system.
 Agreements brokered by the European Union and various European States 
with North African and Eastern Mediterranean States have included provisions 
intended to stop migrants from moving onwards to the countries of Europe, par-
ticularly to those of Northern and Western Europe, activating individuals’ non-
citizenship with more States in more dimensions.
 With the increasing instability, both in some sub- Saharan countries and in 
some of those surrounding the Mediterranean, this became increasingly prob-
lematic. Reports emerged of people stranded in desert encampments and 
falling victim to dangerous gangs, for example.35 Using the terminology 
developed in this book, these individuals were already in some form of an 
activated noncitizen relationship with those States trying to stop their move-
ment. With the unrest in Libya, for example, this movement became particu-
larly urgent as persons identified as being of sub- Saharan origin were targeted 
34 Of course there were many and complex reasons why people protested across many sites. The 
economic situation represents one aspect of this. Marina Ottawa and Amr Hamzawy (2011) 
‘Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab World’, Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace Policy Outlook, 28 January 2011.
35 Davide Gnes (2013) Maghnia: Crossing the Uncrossable Border, Mission Report on the 
Vulnerability of sub-Saharan Migrants and Refugees at the Algerian–Moroccan Border, Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Copenhagen.
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by violent groups who blamed them for unrest in the country.36 People became 
stranded in Libyan prisons and in scattered camps. This was not unique to 
Libya. And yet movement continued.
 It was during this period that the situation in Syria was becoming increasingly 
violent and Syrians joined the Iraqis, Afghans and others east of the Mediterra-
nean fleeing from their homes into neighbouring States, with some also travel-
ling further westwards. These movements can be understood in terms of 
desperation, but they can also be seen as empowered. Individuals who could be 
perceived as having no options were finding a way to survive by moving, despite 
the barriers that were being put in their way. They were seizing capabilities that 
were otherwise being denied them. Their activated noncitizenship in relation to 
their country of formal citizenship was challenging to that State and to the inter-
national community. But the noncitizenship that was being activated with States 
far away was also challenging. Sitting in the centre of this particular movement 
dynamic was the Mediterranean Sea. Despite much NATO, FRONTEX, and 
other surveillance, in 2014, the Mediterranean region saw 75 per cent of all 
 globally recorded migrant fatalities that year,37 while more people were also 
taking land routes around the Mediterranean to try to reach the peaceful and 
prosperous liberal democracies of Western and Northern Europe.38
 By 2015, the scenes in European border- zones were becoming increasingly 
troubling and the implications of activated noncitizenship at the borders were 
being pushed to the extreme. Images flashed around news networks and social 
media of police using tear gas, of people being thrown bread as you might feed 
ducks on a pond, of unaccompanied children being turned away from the richest 
countries of Europe.39 There were reports of people living in Budapest station 
blocked from travel without access to proper sanitation, of people having to give 
36 Ali Bilgic (2013) Rethinking Security in the Age of Migration: Trust and Emancipations in 
Europe, Routledge, Chapter 6; Frank Senauth (2013) The Making And the Revolution of Libya, 
Xlibris, pp. 91–92.
37 Tara Brian and Frank Laczko (2014) ‘Counting Migrant Deaths: An International Overview’, 
pp. 15–44 in Tara Brian and Frank Laczko (eds) (2014) Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost 
During Migration, IOM, p. 20.
38 The project, ‘Mapping and Documenting Migratory Journey and Experiences’, led by Vickie 
Squire, tracks these movements. See also Vickie Squire, Maria Pisani, Angeliki Dimitriadi, Dallal 
Stevens, Nick Vaughan-Williams, Nina Perkowski (2017) Crossing the Mediterranean Sea by Boat: 
Mapping and Documenting Migratory Journeys and Experiences, Warwick University.
39 The tear gas incident was reported as occuring along the Greece-Macedonia border. See, for 
example, Costas Kantouris (2016) ‘Migrants clash again with Macedonian police on Greek 
border’, Associated Press 13 April 2016. The bread incident was reported to have occurred in 
Röszke 1 camp on the Serbia-Hungary border in September 2015. For example, see Jessica 
Staufenberg (2015) ‘ “Inhumane” police throw food at crowds of desperate refugees in Hungary’ 
in the Independent 11 September 2015. The UK, for example, promised to resettle unac-
companied child migrants from the dismantled Calais camp but then introduced restrictions that 
excluded many. Those who managed to travel to the UK were met with additional abuse; for 
example, see Ashley Cowburn (2016) ‘Government efforts to resettle unaccompanied child 
migrants from Calais branded a “disgrace” ’, Independent 16 November 2016.
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up valuables, like wedding rings, to Danish officials, and lines of people trudg-
ing across highly developed liberal democratic States.40
 Individuals made vulnerable by their activated noncitizenship with their coun-
tries of formal citizenship, then made vulnerable by activated noncitizenship 
from afar, were now made even more vulnerable at the border. And their vulner-
ability and the efforts they made to function and even flourish despite this were 
challenging. It challenged States built upon liberal democratic norms at all the 
levels of the noncitizen challenge.
 Then came the death of a Kurdish infant, Alan Kurdi, who was washed up 
onto a Turkish beach.41 For many, this was the rubicon. The recognition 
that something needed to change is seen in the decision that there needed to 
be a UN- level Summit to discuss the situation. And in 2016 the Summit 
was held.
 The direct encounter of these movements helped to disrupt the belief that a 
State built upon liberal democratic principles could rely upon a compartmental-
ised global system, that its liberal credentials could be satisfied by internal 
systems of justice. ‘European values’ were increasingly being applied as meas-
ures for judging European activities overseas as well as activities within Europe. 
And this challenge to the comfortable status quo also came alongside decreasing 
support amongst those primarily identifying as citizens for the protection of 
those noncitizens who were arriving and hoping to arrive into the territories of 
their States, leading to increasing levels of xenophobia. The liberal democratic 
State was under threat by its own failure to recognise the reality of noncitizen-
ship, to humanise noncitizens, and to give weight to their capabilities to func-
tion, including their dynamic capabilities to contribute to this framing. The 
people let down by the international system and now moving to find a better 
position within it were important actors (even if involuntarily) in challenging 
this failure.
 Individuals who were being ignored while they were struggling and dying at 
home, and while they were struggling and dying in transit, were forcing them-
selves to be seen. The leaderships of those States built on liberal democratic 
principles that had been resisting acknowledging what was happening were 
forced to recognise that there was something wrong with the existing status quo. 
The disruption was mostly created by people seeking to satisfy their capabilities 
to function within a system that was constructing them out of doing so.
 Migration itself, then, can be seen as a form of political noncitizenism. While 
the catalyst for the 2016 Summit was particularly the apparent inability of Euro-
pean countries to offer a coherent response to the migration, and the substantial 
40 The Economist (2015) ‘Migrants are thronging Budapest’s train station. Germany beckons, but in 
Hungary the turnstiles have been shut’, 2 September 2015. Lizzie Dearden (2016) ‘Denmark 
approves controversial refugee bill allowing police to seize asylum seekers’ cash and valuables’, 
Independent Tuesday 26 January 2016.
41 Helena Smith (2015) ‘Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees’, 
Guardian Wednesday 2 September 2015.
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pressure upon some Mediterranean countries in particular, its remit went well 
beyond the regional challenge. It sought to take a global approach. In the lead- up 
to the Summit and evidenced in the outcome document, the New York Declara-
tion, there was an apparent commitment made to rethinking global governance 
in the areas of refugee reception and of migration management.42 At the time of 
writing, it is yet to be determined whether this will continue to pursue the nonci-
tizen challenge.
Maintaining noncitizenist focus? Human capital and 
human capability
This institutional process did not come out of nowhere. There has been an 
increasing recognition of the relevance of migration to the global community, 
both through official and State- led processes and through popular migrant rights 
movements. Particularly symbolically, this can be seen in the two High- level 
Dialogues on Migration and Development in 2006 and 2013 and the increasing 
involvement of migrants and migrant civil society in global discussions of 
migration more generally.43 This civil society movement has largely challenged 
the implicit citizenism that has dominated these discussions.
 It has challenged, for example, the renaming of the discussion from one of 
‘migration’ alone to one of ‘migration and development’, with a focus on poten-
tial material contributions of migrants to State development through remittances. 
Indeed, the international policy- making framework may have been made pos-
sible by the ‘discovery’ of remittances and the recognition that there might be a 
way to tap migrant contributions to State development more effectively. This 
was famously referred to by economist Devesh Kapur as ‘the new development 
mantra’.44 It can be characterised as an emphasis on human capital and its rela-
tion to the State rather than upon human capabilities and their relation to the 
individual- State relationship.45
 In this debate, we can see one way in which citizenism and noncitizenism can 
play against each other in the consideration of a major international policy area like 
that of migration. We can see the key salient difference between the notion of 
‘human capital’, and that of ‘human capability’ through a consideration of means 
and ends. Human capital is only ever a means and a by- product in liberal 
42 UN (2015) New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, Seventy-first session, United 
Nations General Assembly A/71/L.1, see particularly Annex I: Comprehensive refugee response 
framework (pp. 17–22), and Annex II: Towards a global compact for safe, orderly and regular 
migration (pp. 22–25).
43 For example, Bloom 2014 ibid.; Bloom 2017 ibid.
44 Devesh Kapur (2005) ‘Remittances: The New Development Mantra?’, pp. 331–360 in Samuel 
Munzete Maimbo and Dilip Ratha (eds) (2005) Remittances: Development Impact and Future 
Prospects, World Bank.
45 For a critical view, see for example Hein de Haas (2005) ‘International Migration, Remittances 
and Development: Myths and Facts’, pp. 1269–1284 in Third World Quarterly 26(8).
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democratic thinking that puts the individual at its centre. From a liberal perspective, 
then, human capital should be pursued insofar as it can achieve some other end; 
and it is valued insofar as it enables the achievement of some other end.46 Human 
capability, and capability- functioning, as presented in Chapter 9, is good because it 
is good for people – and good for the people whose capability is being considered. 
In this way, while capital might be a good indicator of capabilities in some 
instances, and may also contribute to capabilities, it is not valuable in and of itself.
 Examining the goods giving value to the human capital in the case of migra-
tion and development, it is possible to keep watch for methodological citizenism. 
This does not mean citizens should never be prioritised, but that this prioritisa-
tion, where appropriate, must be derivative from the theoretical structural 
implications of that citizen relationship. And that it sits alongside special claims 
also deriving from the theoretical structural implications of the noncitizen rela-
tionship. In the case of migration, it means that the claims of migrants should not 
only be considered in terms of the pay- offs of their human capital for others, for 
example.
 Human capability and human capital are not irreconcilably separate. In fact, 
they may well intersect and mutually reinforce.47 However they represent dif-
ferent fundamental understandings of the importance of the individual humans at 
their core. As such, they may give rise to very different policy frameworks and 
institutional structures. This can be summarised by considering three key ele-
ments in the role of capability:48
1 Direct relevance to well- being and freedom of people
2 Indirect role through influencing social change, and
3 Indirect role through influencing economic production (human capability as 
human capital).
The notion of ‘human capital’ ties easily into the idea of capability, as develop-
ing human capability enables and is enabled by developing human capital. But it 
remains different from, and derivative in importance from, human capability.
46 Sen refers to the distinction between means and ends for example in Amartya Sen (1997) ‘Edit-
orial: Human Capital and Human Capability’, pp. 1959–1961 in World Development 25(12).
47 Katerina Tomasevski (2003) Education Denied: Costs and Remedies, Zed Books p. 33; discussed 
also in Phillipe Legrain (2007) Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them, Little Brown. See also 
Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti and Anna Sabadash (2014) ‘Integrating Human Capital and Human 
Capabilities in Understanding the Value of Education’, pp. 306–230 in Solava Ibrahim and 
Meera Tiwan (eds) (2014) The Capability Approach: From Theory to Practice, Palgrave Mac-
millan. This need not be individualistic, consider for example Severine Deneulin and Allister 
McGregor’s 2010 notion of ‘living well together’. The role of human capital (and the investment 
in human capital) in economic growth is set out in simple terms in Theodore Schultz’s 1961 
paper, where he also sets out the problems of discrimination in hindering human capital (p. 14): 
Theodore W. Schultz (1961) ‘Investment in Human Capital’, pp. 1–17 in the American Economic 
Review 51(1).
48 Derived from Sen’s discussion in Sen 1999 ibid. p. 296.
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 The concern that has been raised with this discourse, then, is twofold. On the 
one hand, it risks impeding developments regarding the rights of migrants. On 
the other hand, it objectifies noncitizens, so that they are not seen as important in 
themselves, but only insofar as they contribute to the human development of 
others. The focus upon migration and development, then, risked focusing not on 
human capabilities and their importance for individual development, but on 
human capital and its importance for State development, which in turn may 
enhance access to capabilities for some. It has been argued that the introduction 
of discussion on ‘migration and development’ rather than on ‘migration’ alone is 
what paved the way for a global discussion to be possible. And yet it is important 
to be aware of the risks. The migration and development discourse risks falling 
short of noncitizenism. In this way, what could appear to be a noncitizenist 
movement could in fact be something quite different.
 In the 2006 UN High- level Dialogue on International Migration and Develop-
ment, while migrants were ostensibly the topic for discussion, migrants them-
selves were not officially facilitated to contribute in person to debate. This 
changed, symbolically at least, at the 2013 High- level Dialogue, which explicitly 
included representatives from migrant rights movements. Despite accusations of 
tokenism, this reflects a recognition of the need to enable noncitizens to parti-
cipate in decision- making about their lives. This also played out in the 2016 
Summit, at which members of the global migrant and refugee community spoke 
before the General Assembly, setting out what they saw as the priorities for 
action. And rather than being heard only as autobiographising victims, their 
presentations, like that of Andayani Adi quoted above, were expert and policy- 
focused. Yet it remains the case that such processes are driven primarily by those 
tasked with representing people insofar as they are formal citizens.
 The recognition of the rights of migrants and the need to include migrant 
voices in international debate – especially when that debate is about migration 
governance – was then driven by a noncitizenist challenge. On the one hand, it 
was the challenge posed by people moving to claim capabilities that they were 
being written out of. On the other hand, it was the way in which this was picked 
up by ‘insiders’. However, there is a risk – as is seen in the conflation of human 
capital and human capability – that this discourse can slip away from noncitizen-
ism, and instead try to preserve the status quo with quick fixes once immediate 
emergencies of the noncitizen challenge seem less pressing. Maintaining the 
noncitizenist lens offers one way in which to guard against this.
A potential noncitizenship
Perhaps the heading for this final section is strange, since this book has argued 
that noncitizenship already exists: theoretically, experientially, and also as a 
movement. And yet there does not exist a theorised understanding of what 
 noncitizenship, broadly understood, would look like. This book has tried to give 
an indication of how such an understanding could develop. Noncitizenship is an 
individual- State relationship, and should be recognised as such. In this way, it is 
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also a political reality, on the basis of which dynamic capability claims are gen-
erated. Failing to take this into account risks both reinforcing the vulnerabilities 
of already vulnerable people and constructing otherwise resilient individuals 
artificially into situations of vulnerability.
 People relate to States as noncitizens for a variety of reasons. They may be 
far away, at States’ borders, or within their territories. They may be stateless 
persons, migrants, formal citizens. They share a special sort of noncitizen- 
vulnerability to States built upon liberal democratic principles and to the State 
system. They also share the challenge that this represents for those States’ con-
sistency, legitimacy, and existence. Noncitizens are not anomalous or trouble-
some. In fact, they are fundamental to the reality of a State built upon liberal 
democratic principles. Such States and systems of States have been constructed 
by and for citizens. Liberal democratic analyses have focused on the justifiability 
of those systems to citizens. Noncitizens qua noncitizens have not had a look- in. 
Those approaches which define the boundaries of citizenship more widely or 
more deeply do important work, but they still do not answer the question of what 
is the nature of the noncitizen relationship and the nature of the obligations that 
arise as a result.
 The core argument in this book is a noncitizenist one. It calls for a move away 
from the assumption that citizenship, or some quasi- citizenship, is the only way 
for an individual to have a recognised relationship with a State or with the 
system of States. In the hyphenated non- citizenship tradition, non- citizenship is 
seen as nothing more than citizenship’s negation, and is completely understood 
as such. If it is presupposed that there is no way other than citizenship or quasi 
citizenship of having a political relationship with a State then it allows that some 
individuals in fact have no recognisable political relationships with any States or 
with the system of States, even in cases where they are clearly engaging 
politically.
 Defined out of any relationship, some individuals become vulnerable to a 
system of law and politics that is not created for them, and within which they do 
not have recourse, or to which they have recourse only at the beneficence of the 
States in question. Noncitizenship provides a means by which to examine how 
these relationships interact, including how citizenships and noncitizenships inter-
twine through an individual, sometimes in her/is citizen and noncitizen relation-
ships with one State, sometimes in her/is citizen and noncitizen relationships 
with more than one State. Indeed, it also helps us to look at how the relationships 
between States can play out in individual- State relationships, particularly when 
there are tensions between States, and sometimes even when an individual is a 
formal citizen of either or both of the States involved. This book has presented 
noncitizenship as a thick foundational individual- State relationship which gener-
ates dynamic capability obligations which are neither humanitarian nor 
derivative from some quasi- citizen status, but derive from the nature of the 
noncitizen–State relationship itself.
 What would a noncitizenist movement look like in practice? We are already 
seeing it and the ways in which it intertwines with citizenship in many forms. It 
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is in the people travelling across borders, despite the barriers, and in the efforts 
of those who try to help them. It is in the struggle of domestic workers and 
migrant workers more generally, and in those who support them. It is in the 
rights- claiming of people in liberal democratic States around the world who, 
though formal citizens, suffer noncitizen- vulnerability and the rights- claims of 
those with no formal citizenship at all. These movements and the many others 
presented throughout this book often seem separate and perhaps even mutually 
conflicting. Examining the continuities between instantiations of noncitizenship 
could help liberal democratic thinking to address them. And it could contribute 
towards the urgent and long- term project of recognising the capabilities of 
 noncitizens in a world of citizens.
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